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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I consider whether it would be per-
missible to· kill someone to remove him from someone else's body
when his presence there provides him with life support. I focus
on cases where the supporter began to provide support voluntarily
but is unwilling to continue and the threat to him in supporting
is less than death. My aim in doing this is to (a) provide a first
step for a discussion of abortion and creation of people, and (b)
throw light on the distinction between killing and letting die.
I first describe cases and layout basic assumptions.
In the course of doing this I consider the view of rights as side
constraints. I argue that it may diverge from a goal maximizing
view which has been suggested as extensionally equivalent to it
and that a goal maximizing view with an emphasis on the self may
more accurately predict some of our moral judgments.
After considering some objections to killing in the life
support cases, I consider an argument of J.J. Thomson's for the
permissibility of killing in such cases. I elaborate on a criticism
of her argument, consider different views of when unwilling use of
a person is morally objectionable, and classify the sorts of justi-
fications which could be offered for using someone. I then present
four objections to the criticism of Thomson's argument, one of which
examines in some detail what happens when stronger reasons justify
doing what weaker reasons do not justify. I conclude that the ob-
jection to Thomson's argument for the permissibility of killing holds
up but that it itself does~t show that killing is impermissible.
I next consider Thomson's discussion of cases where it is
agreed someone may be killed, because I discern in them an attempted
defense of her original argument. I examine these other cases in
v
detail and discuss the significance of our having a prior claim to a
body/property that someone who threatens us is using. I conclude that
thes~ other cases do not provide a defense of her argument for the
permissib'ility of killing. Finally, I present another criticism
of her argument which shows that it (a) predicts that we may kill
when we may not, and (b) assimilates the justification of killing
in cases which should be kept separate.
I consider one more attempt to defend Thomson's argument,
based on the view that killing and letting die are morally equiva-
lent, per see I consider in detail how to construct comparable
kill and let die cases and isolate two competing principles for
generating such cases. I apply four tests to kill and let die
cases constructed according to one of the principles and conclude
that each test shows that a killing is not morally equivalent
to a letting die in these cases. I also conclude that neither of
the two principles generates kill and let die cases which are useful
in showing that Thomson's argument for the permissibility of killing
is correct.
I then present an argument (the Justice Argument) to show
that in cases where the person supported would have died if he hadn't
been supported killing to detach him from an unwilling supporter is
never unjust, even if it is not always permissible. I discuss factors
which might make killing impermissible, even if not unjust. I
argue that a right can be overridden even by the pursuit of an im-
permissible goal, and that sometimes it is permissible to defend
ourself against someone we are responsible for having made a threat
to ourself. I conclude by considering two major implications of·
the Justice Argument: (1) It is sometimes not unjust to kill inno-
cent people who are not even innocent threats. (2) The Justice
Argument provides evidence that in virtue of properties it necessarily
has, letting die is not morally equivalent to killing, per see
It also suggests a new method of showing this. In an Appendix I
outline an argument based on these findings to show that killing
is not morally equivalent to letting die, per see This argument
provides some justification for deriving the right not to be killed
from a more basic right and shows us which one of the two competing
principles for generating comparable cases is correct.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Barbara Herman
Title: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
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1INTRODUCTION
A certain sort of justification of abortionl starts by
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fetus is a person, and
takes note of the fact that the woman wh.o carries tl1e fetus in her
body is providing life-sustaining support for the fetus, in virtue
of this residence in her body. This justification of abortion con-
siders these facts and suggests that we might be able to decide if
abortion is permissible, even assuming that the fetus is a person,
if we consider what we may do in other situations where people are
receiving life-sustaining support from other people. The most ob-
vious of these other cases are ones where someone, who was about to
die, is rescued by being attached to another person whose body then
provides him with what he needs for life and could not provide for
himself. These are life-saving situations, of a certain sort.
Since one question in the abortion discussion is whether we may kill
the fetus to remove it from the woman's body, one question we would
want to ask about these life-saving cases would be whether we may
kill the person who is attached to his supporter, in order to remove
lpresented by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her article, "A
Defense of Abortion," Philosophy of Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1
(Fall 1971), pp. 47-66; reprinted in Coben, M., et al. (eds.),
The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 3-22. All references are to the
latter volume.
21him from this other person's body.
Making use of these life-saving cases as analogies to the
abortion situation implies that we either ignore, deny, or defer
consideration of, the differences between the abortion case and the
life-saving cases. Among these differences are the fact that the
person we would kill in an abortion did not exist prior to being in-
side the woman, his residence is continuous with his creation, and,
of course, he was not saved from a prior threat to his existence by
being attached to the woman. Indeed he never faced the threat of
death prior to being in the woman. But even if we think, as I do,
that we must consider the significance of these differences and make
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our arguments take these differences into account, it would be help-
ful in deciding whether we can kill in abortion to see if we can kill
in the life-saving cases.
In addition, consideration of the life-saving cases will
bear on questions raised in recent bio-medical ethics literature as
to whether we may detach people from life-support systems, of a
mechanical, not human, sort. Again, differences between cases where
life-support systems are mechanical and where they are not, will be
important. Nevertheless, the discussion of mechanical life support
systems will be helped by a decision about those cases where life-
lConsideration of such life-saving cases is the procedure
Thomson follows.
21 have discussed these issues (in a way I can not still com-
pletely agree with) in "Abortion: A Philosophical Analysis," Feminist
Studies, (1 (1972) 49-63.
3support syst~ms are human, as in the life-saving cases described
above.
This dissertat.ion is an attempt to analyze life-saving
cases as described above and see if killing to detach the person
from someone else's body is permissible. In order to answer the
question I first~et out in more detail the cases I shall be con-
cerned with and consider some arguments against the permissibility of
killing. I do this in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 I consider arguments
in favor of killing. Among them is an argument presented by Judith
Jarvis Thomson to which I devote particular attention. I present her
argument and a criticism that has been made of it. I conclude that
her argument does not show that we may kill to stop life saving sup-
port. But I also conclude that the criticism does not show that we
may not kill. In Chapter 3, I consider three other arguments for the
permissibility of killing in life-saving cases suggested in Thomson's
1papers. In the course of doing this I present a new criticism of her
first argument (i.e., the argument discussed in Chapter 2). In
Chapter 4, I focus on the third of the three additional arguments
and examine its connections with the question of whether it is mor-
ally worse to kill than to let die. I discuss one common suggestion
lIbido and "Rights & Deaths," Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs 2, No.2 (Winter 1973), reprinted in Cohen, M. et a1. (eds.),
The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 114-127. All references are to the
latter volume.
4as to how we could determine if killing is morally worse than letting
die, and how this bears on knowing if killing is permissible in our
life-saving cases. On the basis of this discussion I conclude that
Thomson's additional argument for the permissibility of killing in a
life-saving ca.se is inadequate. In Chapter 5 I offer an argument for
the claim that killing to terminate life support is not unjust,
though it may sometimes be impermissible.
5CHAPTER I
In this chapter I will describe in greater detail the
life-saving cases of interest to us and set forth certain claims
and points of view that I will assume to be correct without further
argument. Then I will present, and argue against, three reasons
offered for why killing is impermissible in the cases of interest
to us. Finally, I will present a fourth objection to the permissi-
bility of killing in the life-saving cases.
A. Throughout the following discussion I will, primarily, be con-
cerned with wheth~r it is permissible to kill in the following case,
Case A. Case A involves three adults, X, Y, and Z. Y has done
nothing to harm Z and made no agreement to help -him. Z is uncon-
scious and on the point of dying due to some natural cause. He is
in this state through no fault of his own or anyone else. Z does
not desire to die nor is it in his interest to die. As Y observes
Z in his predicament X observes them both. X and Y know the follow-
ing before they act in any way toward Z:
(1) Z is both a good deal younger than Y and has led a
far less rich life up to this point than Y has.
(2) The only way Z's life can be saved is by Y placing Z
inside his body. In saving Z's life, Y can be conceived to be help-
ing Z retain something that is his own that he was about to lose,
namely, his life.
6(3) After a nine month period inside Y, Z can be safely
removed by a procedure, referred to henceforth as Procedure 1, hav-
ing survived the innocuous, unconscious months of residence in Y
well.
(4) Once Z is inside Y there is only one way to remove him
before a nine month period. This way is to kill him, painlessly and
without his knowledge. We may imagine that his death is achieved by
direct assault on his body and even that it is an essential part of
the means of removing him, i.e., if he does not die he cannot be re-
moved. That is, we can imagine that neither assault nor death is
avoidable, if he is to be removed, and they are not merely necessary
concomitants of procedures which are the means of removing him. I
shall refer to this way of removing Z as Procedure 2.
(5) The killing of Z would have to be accomplished by the
third party, X, if Procedure 2 is to be safe for Y.
(6) There is no reason to think that if Z is saved and re-
moved via Procedure 1, he will not go on to lead a long and normal
life, nor that Y, if Z is removed via Procedure 2, will not go on to
live as long and normal a life.
(7) As I imagine the case, certain things will certainly
happen if Z is placed inside Y and he is not removed via Procedure
2. These are: (a) Z being present in Y's body for 9 months and re-
moved via Procedure 1, and (b) the use of the output of Y's bodily
organs by Z's body for life support and life saving purposes. I
7take life saving to be a subcategory of life support. That is, life
support may be present even when the person in residence does not
need to remain in residence except possibly because the means of re-
moval are not safe for him. It is possible, in such a case, that if
he is in residence the person requires that the organs of the person
in whom he resides provide him with life-sustaining material, but
once safely outside he has other means of survival, and he could be
removed at any time if not that the means of removal were unsafe.
In contrast, a life-saving~ of organs is going on in cases where
residence would still be required because of the life-support it pro-
vides, even if removal procedures were safe. In this case, the per-
son would die if not for residence. Case (A) is imagined to be such
a case. (Cases may exist where the use of organs starts off as life-
saving and turns into non-life-saving life support.)
(a) and (b) represent what will certainly happen in Case
(A). As I imagine Case (A) there are also some things which, it is
left open, may happen. These are: (c) discomfort and additional
tasks for Y due to the presence and/or removal of Z via Procedure 1;
(d) ill health for Y as a result of Z's presence and/or removal via
Procedure 1; (e) y's death as a result of Z's presence and/or removal
via Procedure 1.
If y's foresight, or responsibility for foresight, prior
to attaching Z, to these things happening, or the possibility of their
happening, is of any significance in discussing Case (A), it would be
8necessary to describe exactly what Y does foresee. For the sake of
flexibility, I shall assume that before deciding to put Z in him, Y
foresees whatever, in fact, turns out to be the case. So, for ex-
ample, if Z's presence causes great pain, Y will have foreseen this.
This completes the description of what both X and Y know
about the situation. Knowing all these things, Y places Z in her
body in order to save his life. Before the 9 month period is over,
Y decides that he no longer wants to face any or all of (a)-(e), so
he wants Z removed. (Henceforward, I will refer to this reason for
wanting Z removed, as Reason X.) In Reason X, the complaint may fo-
cus simply on not wanting to share one's body, or it may be concerned
with the strenuousness of losses and effort involved in sharing one's
body.
The question is, is it morally permissible for Y to have X
kill Z to remove him? I am not asking whether killing Z is the best
thing that can be done, only whether it is permissible.
B. I have described the case I shall be most concerned with and the
question I shall try to answer. Now I will set out some assumptions
for the forthcoming discussion.
Assumption (1). Persons have a prima facie right not to
be unjustly unfavorably disturbed and this includes the right not to
be unjustly killed. (A non-precise explication of "unfavorably dis-
turbed" would be "worsen the legitimate prospects of, relative to
what they would have been, by certain types of interventions."
9This is intended to exclude situations where the person is made worse
off by the relevant type of intervention but the odds were that the
intervention would improve their position, not worsen it.)
Assumption (2). The types of things enumerated in (a)-(e)
are not the sort that a person has an obligation to endure (or that
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another person has a right to (try to) make them endure) as a means
of helping someone else, when the only reason offered for enduring
them is that the person suffering the losses will be better off, even
having suffered them, than the person whom they benefit would have
been had the losses not been suffered. For example, if A will lose
his life if B does not give up his leg, B does not therefore have to
give up his leg. (Many factors may be involved in calculating who
would be better off than whom, including how people's pasts compare.
We might include people's pasts because we would want to decide who
will be worse off on the basis of the "look" of an entire life. The
lThe distinction is drawn here between what someone has
an obligation to suffer and what another person may permissibly make
him suffer or try to make him suffer. For example, you may have a
right to run across a field to escape a threat to yourself, even
though this means crushing a person underfoot as a concomitant. But
this does not mean that the person underfoot has an obligation to
let you crush him; they may try to stop you. This shows that some-
times we have a right to make someone endure something, even though
they have no obligation to endure this as a sacrifice for us.
Assumption (2) claims that, unlike the Running-Across-the-Field case,
in Case (a) it is true, both that we have no obligation to endure any
or all of (a)-(e) just to save a life, and that no one has a right
to impose the burden .on us.
For purposes of this discussion, I shall not distinguish
carefully between making efforts (involving acting) and enduring
hardship or suffering losses (where this does not involve acting).
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calculation, if it includes the "look" of an entire life, and if it
could be carried out precisely, would, no doubt, be very complex.)
Another way of putting this is that the objective comparative value
of the losses of the two people, regardless of how it is calculated,
is not what determines what rights the people involved have. Pre-
venting the worst from happening (where the determination of what is
worst may include calculations of how many violations of rights will
occur)l is not what determines what rights the people have. As sump-
tion (2) is in keeping with the theory that the rights of people are
constraints on our acting, even to help keep other people's rights
from being violated. This sort of constraint theory is presented in
the work of Robert Nozick. What is supposed to underly this view
(as expressed by Nozick) is the fact that people are separate from
each other, and cannot be used merely for each other's benefits. It
yields the implication that, "the last person on line" is always pro-
tected from being used for other people's sakes.
In presenting Assumption (2) I spoke of someone not having
a right to use another person (and now I have associated it with the
view that the latter person has a right not to be so used.) A usual
implication of the view that we have no right to do something is
that it would be wrong to do it, and the view that others rights
ISee Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York:
Basic Books, 1974), pp. 28-29.
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should be constraints on our acting, implies that it would be wrong
for us to act in violation of these rights.
But there may be cases where it would not be wrong for
someone to violate someone's rights. And I do not mean this merely
in the sense that his right is overridden, so that he-has no right
to complain even if he ought to be compensated. I mean ,that the
violator can be punished for his actions, and yet it is what he ought
to have done. These cases could involve using the person to help
others. We might create such a case if we imagine that the people
who want to put a dying person into someone else's body in order to
save the first person's life are the very same people who are respon-
s~ble for having ~ade the first person deathly ill. It might be argued
that in this case the people violate the supporter's rights and yet
they do the right thing in using one person to help their original
victim.
Or consider Case (X): Suppose I have set a bomb going, in
order to kill five people, when I had no right to do this. Before
the bomb is about to go off I have a change of heart and want to
stop the bomb from going off. The only way to do this is to kill a
sixth person, i.e., his death is a means to stopping the bomb from
killing the other five. This sixth person wouldn't have died other-
wise. Whether I kill the sixth or not I will be a killer, either of
five people or of one. May I kill the sixth?
12
If the case were the same in all respects except that I
am not the person who set the bomb --call this Case (Y)--may I kill
the sixth person to save the five?
Suppose that I may, and even should, kill in Case (X),
but not kill in Case (Y). Then Case (X) will be a case where I still
have no right to kill the sixth person, I may be 'punished for it,
but it is right that I kill him nevertheless.
What are the implications of these decisions in Case
(X) and (Y)? I will now discuss 4 of them.
(1) Constraint theory says that because people are separate their
rights are constraints on our actions. In Case (X) the sixth person
is just as separate from the five as in Case (Y), he still has all
his rights not to be used, as he does in Case (Y). So,constraint
theory of rights should predict that we can't kill the sixth person
to save the five in either Case (X) or (Y). Yet, if we can kill in
Case (X) this means that the person's rights are not constraints on
our action.
(2) Nozick suggests a possible translation of a side-constraint view
into a goal- without side constraint view: "One might think, for
example, that each person could distinguish in his goal between his
violating rights and someone else's doing it. Give the former in-
finite (negative) weight in his goal, and no amount of stopping
others from violating rights can outweight his violating someone's
rights."l Nozick only says "one might" think that such a view was
lIbid., p. 29.
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possible, he doesn't actually support it, but he only rejects it
because it is- "gimmicky," contains indexicals and gives a goal in-
finite weight. He doesn't say that the translation doesn't capture
the intent of the rights-as~constraintsview.
This translation involves a person giving infinite negative
weight in his goal to his violating rights. If this means that on
each occasion when he is faced with violating rights he gives infin-
ite negative weight to doing it, then this translation of the con-
straint theory will, like the constraint theory itself, imply that we
cannot kill in Case (X). But if giving infinite negative weight to
his violating rights implies that he must minimize the number and
significance of rights he violates, then the translation would imply
that I can kill in Case (X). So the prediction of the translation
wouldn't coincide with the prediction of the constraint theory. If
Nozick would accept that one can kill in Case (X), and the latter
interpretation of the translation accurately transmits the intent of
Nozick's view, then his morality would not so much be a rights-as-
constraints morality as a morality which calls for each person to
make himself as non-guilty of as many rights violations as possible,
even if the means to this involves violating some other rights.
At the least, two interpretations of the role of the self
in this morality are possible. One comes closest to what Parfit has
called the agent-relative morality, i.e., in virtue of what I have
done (set the bomb) I have certain responsibilities toward the five
14
people that someone else doesn't have. Therefore I may have a reason
for doing something that ;it would be wrong for someone without the
reason to do. Someone else has an obligation not to kill and they
do not have, without the source. 'of obligation s·temming from wrong-
doing (setting the bomb), a countervailing duty to point to as a
reason for not· performing their duty to refrain from killing. (Al-
though this reasoning seems to make sense, it also seems odd that
someone who is not guilty of setting the bomb cannot simply chose to
help the five people, in the same way I, who have set the bomb, can.)
Another interpretation of the role of the self in the moral-
ity suggested by the second interpretation of the translation of constraint
theory, is what might be ¢alle~ agent-centered,. as opposed to agent-relative
morality. It says that my focus is on my own moral record, my goal
should be to have as little blood on my hands as possible, and there-
fore I must reduce the number of people whose rights I violate.
(3) The conclusion that I may kill in Case (X) opens up possibilities
for what certain people can do in a wide-range of situations.. For
example, suppose Hitler has sent 200 people to go to the gas cham-
bers. Before they are in, he has a change of heart, but the only way
he can save them is by sending 100 other people in another part of
the country to a gas chamber. Had Hitler read a book on a constraint
theory of rights, he might conclude that he couldn't use the 100 to
save the 200. But, perhaps he can.
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If he can, then, in general, people who do something wrong
can do things to undo or forestall the consequences of the wrong,
that other people cannot do. This is true e',en though they will still
be violating some rights, and even if third parties and rights en-
forcers may have to come to the aid of those whose rights he wants to
violate in order to stop his violation of other people's rights.
Likewise, a company that has violated some people's rights by dis-
criminating against them, may be able, on this view, to violate the
rights of other people, in order to compensate the original victims.
The fact that they can do this, does not mean they aren't still vio-
lating rights, it doesn't mean they shouldn't be punished for what
they do, or that a government can condone such violations of some
people's rights in order to help the original victims.
(4) The problem raised here is essentially that someone's (M's)
rights seem to fade out of the picture once the person who is going
to violate his rights has already or will have violated more people's
rights than would be 'violated if M's are. The seeds of this problem
lie hidden in another.
1Foot holds that the duty not to kill is stronger than the
duty to save life. When someone has a choice between killing and
lphilippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect," Oxford Review, No.5 (1967); reprinted in Rachels,
J. (ed.), Moral Problems (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 29-41.
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letting die he should let die. l But when we have a choice between
killing and killing we may kill the lesser number. Foot does not
see any problem with or feel the need to explain why we, who have
set upon the way of violating a negative duty to some'people are
thereby allowed to violate our negative duty to others. She does
not mention either (a) responsibility for those we will have killed,
or (b) minimizing the blood on our hands. Just, so long as we are
going to have to do something wrong, do the least possible wrong.
The cases Foot uses to show that we should kill the lesser
number include the Trolley case. Thomson reanalyzes the Trolley
2
case to show that someone who would only be letting die, if he did
nothing, e.g., an innocent passenger on thetrolle~m~ystill swerve
the trolley so that it kills fewer people. So it is not a question
lInterestingly, although she thinks conflict situations
show which duty is stronger, she thinks that refusing minimal aid in
order to have someone die is just as morally objectionable as killing
in order to have someone die. She makes this point in "Euthanasia,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, no. 2 (Winter 1977), pp. 85-112.
This implies that the act and omission can be equally objectionable,
and yet the duty to avoid one stronger than the other. (Note: if
we would kill rather than let die, our motive in killing would be to
avoid letting die, just as our motive in letting die would be to avoid
killing. If we kill the person will die because we use him as a
means to avoiding letting die. But if we let die rather than kill, even
if the cause of the death of the person who is left to die is that
someone is using him as a means, the ultimate reason why he dies will
be that we could not kill someone else, not that we use him in order
to avoid killing. So, if we let die rather than kill the ultimate
reason for the death of no~ will be that we use them as a means.)
2Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die and the
Trolley Problem," The Monist, 59, no. 2 (April 1976), pp. 204-17.
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of choosing between killing and killing for this person, and yet he
may kill. But, she claims, the innocent passenger may not kill just
anyone in any way in order to save those on the track. For example,
he may not shoot an innocent bystander. In essence, she claims, the
person who swerves the train may kill because this killing does not
involve violation of anyone's rights. This is because we do not
have the right not to have the same threat as would attack others de-
flected to us. We do have a right not to have other things done to
us which will cause someone else to be saved. Her analysis implies
(a) both the person who would be the killer (the Trolley man), and
the person who would only let die, may kill, because the killing vio-
lates no right in.this case, and perhaps (b) both the killer and the
one who would let die if he did nothing, cannot kill anyone in just
any way, i.e., they cannot shoot a bystander to stop the trolley.
This would mean that once we were about to do something wrong, vio-
late someone's rights,we could not do just anything that would mini-
mize the amount of wrong done. (Foot's conclusion that we can do
what we must to minimize the amount of wrong done would be wrong, as
well as her emphasis on the difference that letting die vs. "killing,
and killing vs. killing makes.)
On Thomson's "analysis of the Trolley case, someone who
would kill need not be able to violate rights other people cannot
violate. So the problem of killers being able to do more than others
to correct the wrong would not arise. But if we may kill in Case (X),
18
and not in Case (Y), then, while an innocent passenger on the trolley
may not be able to shoot the bystander to stop the train, the trolley
man could. So he may be able to violate rights that someone else
can't. This case -would not involve merely redistributing a threat to
the sixth person that would have gone to the other five. 1 This means
that Thomson's analysis of the reason why we may swerve the trolley,
while it would show that swerving the trolley is not an instance of
violating some people's rights to help others, would not show that
there weren't indeed cases where we could choose to violate the lesser
number of rights.
For purposes of the following discussion I shall assume
that it is wrong, as well as a violation of his rights, to require the
person in our case to aid someone with the use of his body. I shall
therefore ignore the question of why it can be right for the original
culprit to violate a person's rights to prevent the violation of
someone~ else's rights.
1Note that the fact that the passenger who would only let
die may not shoot the bystander but the person who would kill with the
trolley may shoot the bystander, does not indicate a difference be-
tween killing and letting die. It is only if someone failed to do
what would save five people from death and then could not kill to
make up for doing this, that we could say that killing differs from
letting die. That is, it is only if, e.g., someone who -deliberately
failed to stop the bomb, which they hadn't set (call this Case (2»,
could not kill the sixth person to save the fifth about to be killed
by the bomb, but we could kill in Case (X), that a difference between
kill and letting die would show up.
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Assumption (3). Y does not have an obligation to attach
Z to himself, nor would he be obliged to begin to suffer any or all
of the other losses represented by (a)-(e) (including the losses in-
volved in removal of Z) just for the sake of saving Z's life.
It is possible that Assumptions (2) and (3) are not true.
I am assuming that they are true, because my primary aim in discuss-
ing Case (A) is to see whether one may kill to avoid making the ef-
forts that it is agreed one needn't make just in order to save some-
one's life, regardless of what these efforts are. My primary aim in
discussing Case (A) is to see what relationship holds between whatever
it is that one needn't start to do for the sake of saving someone's
life and what one may kill to stop doing. All that is important for
my discussion of Case (A) is that we not be able to argue that killing
is impermissible. because we would be obliged (to begin) to give the
support in question just in order to save someone's life. The ques-
tion in Case (A) then becomes, whether Y, who has already attached Z
to himself, can have him killed in order to avoid going through with
any or all of (a)-(e), on the assumption that he didn't have to start
any or all of (a)-ee) just to save Z's life.
In addition to these assumptions I shall adopt the follow-
ing points of view: (a) that a person's body can usefully be analo-
gized to a piece of property that they own; so that if you stand on
top of somebody they can tell you to get off their property, no
trespassing, etc. I do not think it is appropriate to say that
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someone owns their body (or their life, or their children). I think
it is appropriate to say someone's body is their own and they have
rights with respect to it because it is their own that are at least
as strong as the rights they have with respect to the things they own. l
Since it is the rights they have with respect to their body that are
of real concern, I shall not pay much attention to the distinction
between someone owning their body and its being their own and their
having rights with respect to it.
I recognize that this point of view has its oddities and
is not acceptable to many people. Nevertheless I do not think adopt-
ing another point of view would alter the conclusions of this dis-
. 2
CUSS10n.
lTheir children are their own and they have rights with
respect to them because they are their own, but they do not own them
and do not have all the rights they have with respect to their property.
2Lila O'nriscoll in "Abortion, Property Rights, and the
Right to Life," The Personalist, (April 1977), pp. 99-114 has
argued that we can be called on to sacrifice a great deal of non-
bodily property to save someone else's life (or at least that they
can take this property) but that no such demands can be made on our
bodily property, because of the particular role that the body plays in
the formation of personal identity and self-respect. Although I dis-
agree with the reasons O'Driscoll presents for thinking our bodies
cannot be shared with others against our will (e.g., even if the body,
unshared, plays a large role in forming a sense of personal identity
this does not mean that·~ formed, the sense of identity would be
lost if the body is shared, even involuntarily, nor that self-respect
is lost if sharing is justified, albeit involun~ary), I am not op-
posed to separating off use of the body from other types of sacri-
fices in such a way that arguments for the permissibility of requiring
taxation in order to aid others, for example, need not imply the
falsity of Assumption (3).
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The second point of view I shall adopt is that of treating
someone's life, or the rest of his life, as if it were something he
owns, something that can be possessed by him, something that belongs
to him. The fact that the rest of their life is not in existence yet
does not mean that we cannot conceive of it belonging to him, in the
way potential products can belong to people. I shall also treat the
person'himse1f as something that can be owned by himself, or belong
to himself. So when a person is killed we can see this as comparable
to the loss and/or destruction of something that is the person's own
thing--the loss of future life, the destruction of himself. The dis-
tinction between destroying the possessor and the thing possessed
will become blurred.
C. I have now set out Case (A) and some Assumptions and points of
view I shall adopt in the discussion. I will now begin to consider
the question of the permissibility of killing Z. First, I will elim-
inate certain possible arguments for the impermissibility of killing
Z. I will argue that the mere fact that aid is begun voluntarily
with foresight to what must be suffered, does not give a commitment
to continue to aid. The fact that we foresaw that someone would be
better off if aid continued, also does not give a commitment to con-
tinue. Nor does the fact that we voluntarily introduced- someone into
our bodies and they would be the one to be moved if they didn't con-
tinue in residence. I will claim that any argument for the imper-
missibility of killing which also implies that it is impermissible
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to refuse to go on making additional donations of aid, will fail, be--
cause we would not have to make additional donations of aid in Case
(A). I conclude that only an argument which objects to killing because
it involves something other than the failure to continue support, has
a chance of being correct.
(1) The first suggestion for the impermissibility of kill-
ing Z is that because Y began, under no coercion, intentionally, to
give aid for a certain purpose and all of the losses to him he now
wants to avoid were foreseen by him as necessary, either as means or
concomitants to accomplishing his purpose, therefore he is under an
obligation to continue to give aid that he didn't have to begin giv-
ing. If he must give aid, then he certainly can't kill to stop giv-
ing it.
Note that this is an argument for the impermissibility of
killing which would also apply to the impermissibility of stopping
aid, even if it didn't involve killing, i.e., this argument would
also not allow us to refuse to give further donations of aid. That
is, if the continuation of aid weren't a question of not stopping the
support, support which will continue if we don't stop it, but, in-
stead, were a question of performing separate acts to keep the aid
going, this argument would also require us to do the acts to keep the
aid going.
But this argument is inadequate. The fact that someone
intentionally began to suffer losses for the purpose of reaching
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a goal, with the sort of foresight noted, does not" by itself, give
a commitment to continue. (It certainly is not the same as promis-
ing to continue to suffer losses.) For example, someone may start
to donate money to a worthy cause recognizing that it will mean a
deep financial burden for him to continue. The person who is helped
had no other offers of help, still has none and would not have had
any. The helper decides after a while that he can't bear the burdens
he thought he could. If help stops, the person helped would be no
worse off than he would have been if the help had never started.
Furthermore, the person helped never had any expectations the help
would continue. In this case the helper may stop making payments.
The fac~or of intentionally beginning, with foresight to
consequ·ences to oneself, may bear on whether one is bound to continue,
but other factors besides it alone will have to be present to yield
the conclusion that one is bound to continue. People may (and often
do) try to help others but find the experience too much for them and
then stop. Of course, people may make all sorts of arrangements:
they may make promises; they may make contracts to continue and they
may agree to the option to not continue. One might even construct a
utilitarian argument for people being allowed the option to stop aid-
ing on a project once they start; i.e., they are more likely to at
least try, and perhaps go through with it, if they know for sure
that they can change their minds. But there are no agreements to
continue in Case (A) and the option not to continue needn't rest on
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utilitarian considerations. Of course, in cases where there is
never any intent to go through to the end of a helping project, not
even an intent to try to, where one only plans to offer a little bit
of one's services for what good they do regardless of whether some-
thing greater is achieved or not, one's voluntarily starting also
need not give rise to an obligation to continue. Sometimes it is
possible to just offer so much and no more. And it is the claim
here that the same holds true where there is an initial intention to
complete a project: the initial intention, the voluntary starting,
and the foresight to losses to be suffered, do not, by themselves,
involve a commitment to continue or bind us to continue. l (Whether
we can or cannot stop aid will depend to a great extent on whether
the person we started to aid will be worse off if we stop than he
would have been if we hadn't begun. I shall discuss this factor in
greater detail below.)
The second suggestion is that an obligation to continue
to aid, and hence an obligation not to kill, arises simply--without
consideration of other factors--because one voluntarily started sup-
port with foresight to the fact that the person would be better off
lNote that it is possible for someone to have as his aim
or purpose in acting the rescue· of another person without at the same
time having ever intended to complete the rescue: the aider might
not have decided whether he will put up with all he foresees will
happen to him if he goes through with the project, but have begun
the saving anyway, leaving it to his later mood to decide whether
to continue.
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if one continued support than if one stopped, or that they will be
worse off if one stops than they were when one was supporting them.
But this argument is inadequate too. If Assumption (3)
is correct one doesn't have to provide someone with something just
because they will be better off with it. Nor, when one's services
provide someone with something, is one therefor~ obligated to also
provide for their continued possession of that thing if they can't
retain it by their own efforts. So if the situation Y faced were
one of giving Z support in installments Y needn't start the next
installment just because Z would be better off with it or because they
have already received aid to retain that for which they need further
support.
The third suggestion is that we can account for the imper-
missibility of killing by noting that Y voluntarily introduced Z in-
to his own property and it is Z who will be disturbed in being re-
moved. But this will also not do. Bringing someone into one's resi-
dence for a purpose does not mean that one can't have the person
moved in order to get them to leave before the purpose is achieved.
We don't have to move our house from under someone we have invited in,
we can get them to leave our private property, though of course not
necessarily always or by any means. For example, someone does not
have a right to stay on our property forever, just because we brought
them in willingly, for an end still unaccomplished, even though it
would be beneficial for them to stay, and even though we have to
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move them to get them out. If we can remove them safely and they are
no worse off for the experience than they would have been if we hadn't
brought them in, we may remove them.
As noted above, the first two suggestions for the imper-
missibility of killing would also be arguments for the impermissibil-
ity of refusing to give further donations of aid. Some services and
objects can be divided into small quantities before being given, so
that providing continued service or use requires separate acts of do-
nation. In these cases, to stop aiding one simply does not perform
the next act donating services. But another way to stop benefits is
by interfering with a continuing flow. Any argument against killing,
like the first two suggested above, which also implies that we must
make additional donations of aid, is wrong because we don't have to
make additional donations. In the light of this, an argument for the
impermissibility of killing may try to distinguish between cases where
we have to stop a flow of benefits and ones where we refuse further do-
nations, consider only the former to be killing, and argue only against
it.
D. The fourth suggestion for the impermissibility of killing makes use
of this distinction between stopping a flow and making separate addi-
tional donations. It is as follows: Because some act must be per-
formed to interfere with a flow of benefits and the consequence of this
is death, we have an obligation not to interfere with the flow of bene-
fits, even if this means requiring continued residence in someone's body.
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This description of an interference is milder than
what takes place in Case (A), since in the latter case death is
not merely the unintended consequence of stopping support, it is
the means of stopping it and comes as a result of an assault on Z.
So, those who make the above claim would find it impermissible to
detach Z, even if his death were not a means to detachment, or did
not result from a direct assault on him. Since some may be willing
to argue against even this sort of interference it will be useful
to describe cases other than Case (A) that the fourth objection
applies to.
First, there are cases like Case (B), which I shall
imagine to be just like Case (A), except that removal of Z prior to
a 9-month period inside requires that X pullout a plug leading
from y's body to Z's, with the consequence that Z dies. In Case
(B) not only is Z's death not intended, but it is the consequence
of direct manipulation of something that belongs to Y, not of an
attack on what belongs to/is Z (his person), as in Case (A).
Death can occur as a consequence of "pulling a plug" in
Case (B) either because (1) remaining in y's body is causally in-
volved in providing something which Y needs to stay alive, and so
detachment from the body leaves the field open for the cause of
death to move in, or because (2) the procedure of cutting the link
itself has a fatal effect on Z, e.g., there is trauma of detachment.
In the case of category (1) there are further sub-alternatives:
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(a) what is being provided by continued residence protects Z from
that which originally threatened him before he became attached,
e.g., if he had a kidney disease which would take over again if he
were unplugged from Y, or (b) what is being provided by continued
residence protects Z from some new threat that has replaced the
one he had before he was brought in, e.g., if there is a disease
in the environment ready to attack Y if he leaves Z, or if resi-
dence in Z, while making him immune to the threat he originally
faced, has created some new dependence on something in y's blood-
stream. In these latter cases Z would die of a cause quite differ-
ent from the original threat, since the original threat is imagined
to have been eliminated by attachment.
All these cases are imagined to be ones involving life-
saving use of the organs of Y, as opposed to non-life saving life-
support use of the organs. (See p. 6 for the distinction between
life-saving and non-life saving life support.) Pulling the plug
results in. death in cases in Category (1) because there is, what I
call, Actual Life Saving Need (ALSN) at the time of detachment.
The ALSN cases could include ones in which someone will die if
they are detached, because they need residence, even though they
had no original need to be attached to save their life. That is,
by being attached they were made dependent on attachment for their
life. Cases in which the person who is attached needs the resources
provided for his life by residence, while he is in residence, but
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could live outside the body at any time if a safe removal procedure
were available (so-called viability situations) are not ALSN cases.
Here there is a life-support need, but not a life-saving need.
Both ALSN and viability cases are sub-categories of Actual Life Need
cases (ALN). Cases in which there is no ALSN will have death as a
consequence of pulling the plug only if the procedure of removal
itself has death as a consequence, e.g., trauma of pulling the plug.
Excluded from ALN cases are ones where residence provides nothing ex-
cept a way to avoid the removal procedures, which themselves cause
death. Cases in which there is no ALN may however be ones which-we
can describe as Historical Life Need cases (HLN). These will be cas-
es in which someone was in need of the original attachment to save
their life, but they no longer need the residence. ALN cases may
also be HLN cases. It is also possible to imagine cases in which
there is ALSN, but the only way to detach someone involves a pro-
cedure which will itself cause their death, quite independent of
the effects of not being attached and getting support, e.g., if
death comes as a result of trauma of pulling the plug, though it
would have come anyway as a result of not getting the support.
Pulling the plug cases as usually discussed involve an
ALSN at the time of detachment, with death resulting from failure to
receive support, not because of some trauma of the removal procedure
itself. Furthermore, in these cases as ususally discussed, the need
which residence satisfies is caused by the same original threat which
caused the need for the original attachment. This is how I shall
1imagine Case (B).
Pulling the plug cases can be distinguished from cases
where we simply remove something of one's own that provides pro-
tection against a fatal threat for someone else. In the former
case we interfere with some life-sustaining process -- a process
which, while it may be the product of what is our own, is not ac-
tually what is our own -- in, or as a means to, taking away what
is our own, or geJ:~ing control over what is oU'r own. In the latter
case we directly remove our own thing, without interfering with
some life-sustaining process. The effect of this, however, is that
a fatal threat, which would not otherwise have appeared at this
time, confronts the person from whom we take what is our own. It
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is possible that those who object to killing in Cases (A) and (B)
will also object to removing what is our own thing in this sort of
case.
Finally, while "pulling the plug" cases could conceiv-
ably cause death by way of trauma due to the procedure of removal,
to remain a "pulling the plug" case this trauma would have to be
conceived as not involving a direct attack on the body of the per-
son being detached. For example, there may be cases in which we
have to use an acid to cut the connection between the supporter and
lRecall that as described, Case (A) is also an ALSN,
and hence an ALN, case.
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the person supported, and the acid, unavoidably, is poured over the
body of the person who is to be detached, causing his death. These
are not "pulling the plug" cases, as I imagine the latter. Those
who object to pulling the plug, for the reason offered by the fourth
suggestion above, will find this other type of case objectionable
too. To represent this type of case, I shall use Case (C), which is
like Case (A) in all respects except that the death of Z results from
the procedure of removal because of an attack on his body, e.g., a
solution is injected which will trigger his removal, but causes his
death by directly interfering with his respiration. In this case,
unlike Case (A), death is not a means to removal, only a foreseen
and unintended consequence of the means to removal.
As noted, the fourth objection to killing in Case (A)
seems also to be grounds for objecting to what we do in Cases (B)
and (C). But it isn't clear that what we do in these other cases is
killing. For example, disputes have arisen over whether interference
with the flow of benefits as described in Case (B) is even a killing,
let alone if it is a permissible killing. Those who have argued that
it isn't a killing have also argued that it is permissible, even if
what goes on in Cases (A) and (C) isn't permissible. J.J. Thomson
and B. Brody agree that it is a killing, but disagree about whether it
differs morally from not saving a life. Philippa Foot suggestsl that
I Foot , "Euthanasia," p. 101.
when death is a consequence of the termination of life-saving sup-
port, we may call it a killing, but it won't have any more moral
significance than leaving someone to die, when it is done by those
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who gave the aid to begin with. She doesn't explain why
this is so. 1James Otten provides criteria for killing and letting
die which denies the title "killings" to cases where we pull the
plug on a person who will then die of the reappearance of a threat
from which attachment rescued him temporarily.
I shall assume that "pulling the plug" is a killing,
omitting detailed arguments for this conclusion at this time. 2 I
shall merely note the following: (1) If someone is plugged into a
life-saving support system and someone, who had nothing to do with
attaching him to the system and has no rights in the matter at all,
deliberately unplugs him, this will count as an impermissible kil-
ling~ though the victim dies of the same (pre-existing) cause
that originally threatened him. We can hold that the fact that
Ijames Otten, "Even If One Were Letting Another Innocent
Person Die,'"Southern Journal of Philosophy, 14 (1976), 313-22.
21 have discussed the problems with Otten's analysis
in particular elsewhere.
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someone would die~if we unplugged him does not necessarily give
him a right to stay plugged in, without also holding that people
do lose the right to remain plugged in just because they would die
(of reappearance of previous threats) if they were unplugged.
(2) The person whose support system helps someone else
can cliim rights over his system that the 'unplugger' in (1) can-
not. This may have something to do with making his unplugging be-
ing a permissible killing, but it isn't clear that this makes his
unplugging not be a killing at all. (3) I wish to assume that
pulling the plug is a killing because, while even with this assump-
tion it may turn out that Cases (A), (B), and (e) should be treated
differently, I do not wish to draw a sharp line between them to be-
gin with. I do not want to try to find a solution ~o one case that
would not apply to the others. (4) I do not even wish to deny that
simply removing something of one's own that is protecting someone
can be a killing. Suppose a third party, without permission and no
rights to a coat, deliberately took the coat away from someone, be-
cause he knows this will certainly leave the person open to a fatal
germ in the air. I don't think it is unreasonable to call this a
killing. It may be permissible for the owner of the coat to remove
it, but this may only mean it is permissible for the owner to kill,
not that he isn't killing at all. What seems to be important in
deciding whether a killing is taking place, in both the unplugging
case and the coat removal case, is that something which would not
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have presented a threat to someone's life at time t, does ~present a threat
at. .' ~time t, because of some act that was done. The fact that the
threat is the reappearance of a previously existing one need not
mean that a killing is not going on, and, as is shown by (1) above,
it does not mean that the killing is morally insignificant.
(5) So, I shall assume that those who object to killing
in Case (A) a'lso object to what is done in Cases (B) and (C), that
all these cases involve killings, and the the objection to killing
raised in the fourth Case (A), applies to Cases (B) and (C) too.
However, since the killing, in Case (A) may seem to be the most ob-
jectionable, I shall assume that we have shown the permissibility of
killing in Cases (B) and (C) if we can show it is permissible in
Case (A), but I will not assume that we have shown the permissibil-
ity of killing in Case (A) just because we have shown it to be per-
missible in Cases (C) and (B).
I have presented the fourth objection to killing in Case
(A) and considered what sorts of cases it applies to besides Case (A).
I have also noted that it does not apply to cases where we must de-
cide if it is permissible to refuse to make another donation of aid.
The fourth objection to killing, in effect, focuses on the fact that
it is necessary to kill in order to stop aiding. Objections (1),
(2), and (3) objected to killing, but not because we had to kill, per
see They objected to killing because it would have interfered with
an obligation to have residence and support continue for other reasons.
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It is the concern over the fact that we must kill, expressed in the
fourth objection, that I take to be the crucial o~jection to ter-
minating support in Case (A). It is the attempt to justify this
killing that I will deal with in the next Chapters.
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CHAPTER II
In this chapter I will present arguments for the permis-
sibility of killing in Cases (A), (B), and (C). I argue that rather
than justify killing in these cases on the grounds of simple self-
defense, we should consider what difference it makes to our right
to kill that someone who threatens the supporter is using what
belongs to the supporter, while they are a threat to him. I con-
sider Thomson's views on this question by considering cases she
deals with and indicating what she takes them to show. I pay
particular attention to her major argument, i.e. that we may kill
to prevent someone from using our body, because he has no right to
use it, even to save his life. I then present a criticism of this
argument mady by Brody. The c·riticism is that the fact that some-
one has no right to use our body, even to save his life, does not
mean that he has no right to use it rather than be killed. Before
considering the merits of this criticism, I argue that Thomson and
Brody, despite their differences could share the view that use of some-
one's body needs to be justified, and if it isn't justified some-
thing wrong/unrightful is going on. I analyze this view, contrast
it with another view, and argue that voluntarily introducing some-
one into one's body does not justify his continuing in residence.
I argue that because this is true, Thomson's argument.
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for the permissibility killing applies to cases we are interested
in, where there is no injustice in the initial cause of residence,
as well as to cases where injustice is the initial cause of resi-
dence. I note that Brody and Thomson differ as to whether avoiding
killing justifies residence, but I argue that it is reasonable to
think they agree that we must consider the nature of the means of
removal before deciding whether residence should or should not
continue. In order to see if Thomson's argument withstands Brody's
criticism, I then see if Brody's own argument can be shown to be
incorrect. I consider four criticisms of his argument, and argue
that they do not succeed. I conclude, however, that his criticism
does not show that we may not kill, only that Thomson's argument
does not show that we may kill.
A. The first proposal for the permissibility of killing in Cases
(A), (B), and (C) is that we can defend our own property when it is
threatened by someone, even if this person is an innocent, passive
threat, at least when only the person who threatens us suffers as
the result of our defense. l Z is a threat to Y, albeit an innocent,
passive one; the threat he presents is, at the very least, continued
residence in Y, and possibly other losses, if he remains or is
removed by Procedure 1.
lA clearly less defensible view would be that we can
protect our own territory even if this means we harm an innocent
bystander (i.e. a non-threatening person).
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If we used this argument and defend the killing of Z
simply on grounds of the permissibility of self-defense against
passive innocent threats, we would have to deal with all the prob-
lems raised by self-defense arguments. Among them are: (1) what
sorts of action are permitted in response to a threat of a certain
size, i.e., how large need the threat be in order to merit killing
in self-defense, and when must one undergo a loss rather than
defend oneself, because the only defense available against the
threat is too strong; (2) are we allowed to intend someone's death
in order to defend ourself? (3) what can a person do for himself
and what can someone else (the community's rights enforced or his
agent) do for him? (4) what do the innocent threat and his agent
have a right to do in return? (5) what acts make a person respon-
sible for the threat to himself and does this responsibility always
limit his right to self-defense?
B. Rather than carryon with the approach suggested in A, I shall
see if Cases (A), (B), and (C) have special characteristics which
make them different from ordinary situations in which self-defense
questions come up.
Cases (A), (B), and (C) differ from standard innocent
threat casesat least in the respects that (a) the person who
presents the threat does so while on the property of the person to
whom he presents the threat, and (b) the threat that the person in
residence presents itself involves the use of the other person,
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i.e., being in his property, being in his body is a threat which
the resident presents. So we should see if the fact that there is
use of what belongs to someone makes a difference as to what can be
done to the innocent threat.
The fact that someone who threatens us is using what
belongs to us is a factor emphasized by Thomson. She discusses a
case in which a baby is expanding at a rapid rate while he is on
the property belonging to the person whose life is threatened by
h · 1t e expans10n.
Thomson claims: (1) if the person were threatened on
property which belongs to neither him nor the baby, the person
could, simply on grounds of ordinary self-defense (as in A above)
attack the baby, thereby killing it. But, she claims, it is not
clear that a community rights enforcer would also have the right,
let along the obligation to attack the baby, rather than let the
person threatened die. The justification she gives for this view
is that neither the baby nor the threatened person is at fault.
(The implied justification, in the light of her later discussion,
is that neither the baby nor the person threatened has more of a
right to be where they are than the other.) (2) Thomson claims
that when the baby is expanding on the property of the person whose
life is threatened by the expansion, a rights enforcer may, and
should, attack the baby. In justification for this conclusion all
Thomson says immediately is that it makes a difference that the
1Reference to cases used below are to "A Defense of Abortion."
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baby is in the house belonging to the person who is threatened.
To clarify and expand on the issues raised by the Baby
Case Thomson presents another case in which someone has innocently
found a coat and put it on because he needs it to survive. It is
then discovered that the coat is mine. l·f we take it away from the
other person he will die because he is again exposed to the threat
against which the coat protected him. If we don't take the coat
away I will die. The question is, maya rights enforcer take the
coat away to return it to me. Thomson says yes. The justification
she gives is that we have a prior claim to the use of what belongs
to us.
Thomson presents a 3rd case to emphasize the role of the
use of what belongs to someone. It involves the use of someone's
body: someone is kidnapped for the purpose of plugging a violinist
into him in order to save the violinist's life. The violinist is
saved because he gets to use the other person's kidneys when his
own have failed. The first question raised is whether the violinist
can be unplugged by the person supporting him, even when he will
die if he is unplugged, though the person supporting him will not
die if the violinist remains attached. She thinks the violinist
can be unplugged,l even though the person giving support will suffer
lThroughout her discussion of these issues, in "A Defense
of Abortion" and in "Rights and Deaths," Thomson deemphasizes (and
in the latter paper explicitly argues against) a moral distinction
between unplugging and other forms of killing, such as, for example,
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losses far less than death if support were to continue. She argues
for this conclusion on the grounds that we needn't let our body be
used, and we needn't suffer other losses even far less than death,
in order to save someone's life. It is not only that we needn't
sacrifice our lives for other people's sake.
She claims that no one has the right to use our body in
the way the violinist uses the other person's body, even if he needs
it for life itself. The only way for him to get a right to it is
for us to give it to him and we needn't do this. The right to life,
whatever it is, does not give ~he right to use of whatever it is
b 1 1 d - d 1- 1you a so ute y nee 1n or er to stay a 1ve. So it would be wrong,
she claims, to let the violinist stay against the wishes of the
person supporting him, because the violinist would then be where he
direct killing (which she describes as involving a direct assault
on the person with the intention that they die). While she says in
her second paper, that the violinist may be directly killed, she
speaks only of unplugging in her first paper.
lThe claim that no one gets a right to use our body when
the only reason they have for using it is that they need it to save
their life is involved in Assumption (2). There is some difference
between "only reason" and "even if," which I shall return to. (p. 4).
While Thomson uses a claim like Assumption (2) to argue for the
permissibility of detaching the violinist, she seems to believe that
it would sometimes be indecent not to save a life, even with the use
of one's body and that we oughtn't to fall below the level of
decency in our behavior. Not falling below the level of decency is,
however, distinguished by Thomson, from having an obligation which
gives the violinist a right to our services. Thomson does not claim
that we have no obligation to do anything, however minor, to save
someone's life; but she also doesn't claim that we do have such an
obligation.
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has no right to be even in order to save his life. The body (like
the house in the Baby Case and the coat in the Coat Case) belongs
to someone and they have a prior claim to it, even if its being
used by someone else, who needs it for life itself, will not result
in the death, or even grave injury, of the owner.
Thomson notes that there may be agreement that your right
to life does not include the right to use someone else's body" in
order to save your life, yet some may still argue that the right to
life does include the right not to be killed and detaching the
violinist, or directly attacking him, is killing him. To this she
responds that the violinist can be killed by the person supporting
him because: (~)" if he is not killed he will be left to use the
other person's body and we agreed that he has no right to use the
other person's body even if he needs it for life itself; he will
wind up getting what he has no right to even if he needs it for life
itself. To put the matter the other way around," the person suppor-
ting the violinist will wind up in a position he had no obligation
to be in even if it saves the violinist's life, i.e., the position
supporting the violinist in his body.
(~) if we do kill the violinist to prevent his using what he has no
right to use even if he needs it for life itself we do not deprive
him of anything to which he has a right, since he has no right to
the use of the other person's body, even if he needs it for life
itsel~ and this is what we deprive him of. The killing is ~ot unj~st and is
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permissible because we do not deprive him of anything to which he
has a right when we kill him. Therefore, his right to life is not
violated, since the only reasonable way to construe this right is
that it prohibits unjust killings. l
We can summarize the argument (call it Argument I) in the
violinist case in3 steps: (1) Greater need alone does not give a
right to the use of another person's body even if the need is for
life itself. (2) But allowing the violinist to remain using the
body (by not killing him to remove him) is to let him use what we
agreed in (1) that he does not have a right to use even if it would
save his life. (3) The supporter may kill the violinist because he
thereby prevents the violinist being where he has no right to be
even if it saves his life and so he does not deprive him of some-
thing to which he has a right, i.e., he does not violate his rights.
Thomson claims separately that a third party rights en-
forcer has a right to kill the violinist when the person supporting
the violinist cannot do the killing himself.
lIt is not immediately clear in Thomson's discussion that
she thinks, as I have here represented her as thinking, that the
right, which she thinks someone has, not to be unjustly killed is
not violated simply because the violinist has no right to the use of
the body 'to have his life saved. She first merely says (p. 13) (a)
he has no right to the body so if we deprive him of this we do not
violate his rights and (b) if he is killed he is not killed unj.ustly
so his right not to be killed unjustly is not violated. That is,
it is not at first clear whether (b) follows from (a). But she then
(p. 13) to buttress (b) asks--"is abortion unjust killing;' and the
answer deals with whether the fetus has a right to the use of the
woman's body. This makes clear that she thinks (b) follows from (a).
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Argument I, if it succeeds, assimilates the permissibility
of not beginning to give life support aid with terminating it by
killing. I
In summary, I suggested that since the person who presents
a threat toY and who Y wants to have killed in Cases (A), (B), and
(C) is in residence in Y, we should see what difference this makes
to the permissibility of killing, over what y's rights are vis a
vis an ordinary threat who does not reside in him. I presented the
views of Thomson on this question. These are: (1) when the threat
to my existence is in me or what belongs to me, as opposed to just
coming at me, a third party can help defend me by killing the threat.
(If the threat weren't coming from my property, the third party's
lIn "Rights and Deaths," Thomson returns to the violinist
case and presents what can be construed as an addendum to her first
argument but is really another argument in itself (call it Argument
II). It seeks to emphasize the assimilation of not saving life with
terminating life support by killing--either pulling the plug or
direct attack--more directly. The second argument may be summarized
as follows: (1) If I begin to let someone use my body to save their
life, lam doing something that I needn't do, and that they have no
right that I should do. (2) If I allow someone to remain in my body
in order to save their life I am doing the same thing as is referred
to in (1). (3) If I fail to begin to save someone's life I do not
aid and hence I let him die. (4) If I fail to continue to save
someone's life by terminating support I kill him--either because
pulling the plug is killing or because I must attack him directly
in order to, or in the process of, terminating aid. (5) The fact
that I kill the person is not a barrier to my discontinuing support,
if leaving him to die is permissible, because there is no signifi-
cant moral difference between killing and letting die and it is the
same position that I avoid being in by both killing and letting
die. I discuss this second argument later.
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rights might differ, though I could defend myself against the threat
to my life.) (2) when I need what is my own to save my life and
someone else also needs it to save his life, I have preference to
its use. I or a third party can take what belongs to me away from
the other person even if this results in his death. (Presumably,
if it weren't my own thing, we couldn't do this.) (3) I have pre-
ference to the use of what is mine 'even if my need for it is much
smaller than someone else's. For example, someone does not have a
right to use my body even when they need it to save their life and
all I need it for is in order to have my body to myself. (Pre-
sumably, if it weren't my body, and both I and someone else needed
to use it, the one with the strongest need would have the prefer-
ence.) So, because it is my body and I needn't give someone who
needs it for life permission to use it, the fact that the person
threatening me has a need to use my body will not give him a right
to stay. And this fact, that he has no right to use my body even
to save his life is supposed to be the reason why we (I and a third
party) can kill him to stop his using my body.
These points can be whittled down to two major points:
(1) Thomson argues that what third parties may do to help me might
depend on whether or not someone's harming me involves use of what's
mine. Once there is some use of what's mine--or, perhaps, only a
threatened use of what's mine--third parties can do for first
parties what first parties can do for themselves for defense
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purposes; (2) the reason both first and third parties can kill when
my body is being used, even when the person using it needs it for
life, is that the person who would be killed has no right to the
use of my body even if it saves his life. (This is the conclusion
of Argument I.)
C (1) I will refrain, at present~ from looking more closely at
Thomson's cases and what they show about the role played by someone
using something of mine. (I examine the cases more closely in
Chapter 3.) Rather, I will focus on Argument I directly, since it
seems possible that we can apply Argument I to the cases of interest
to us. I will first set out Thomson's claims and argument more
schematically. I will then consider an objection to the argument.
Thomson says: (1) I have no obligation to give the use
of my body even if it saves a life.
(2) The violinist has no right to its use, even if this saves his
life.
(3) No one has a right to require me to let him use my body, even if
this saves his life.
(4) It would be wrong for someone to require me to let him use my
body, even if this saves his life. l
II have discussed the distinction between (3) and (4) in
Chapter 1. In keeping with what I said there, it is possible that,
at the least,it would not be wrong for those very people who caused
the violinist's kidneys to fail to attach him to me. I shall how-
ever assume (4) is correct in this case.
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(5) I have a just prior claim to my body, even if someone else
needs it for life. (I shall interpret this in a limited fashion,
so that it doesn't mean that I can kill someone to stop their using
my body, but only that if they aren't using it yet, they can't start
to use it. This makes it possible for it to be a reason for why we
can kill, instead of involving the assumption that we can kill.)
(6) The right to life doesn't imply a right to have whatever one
needs for life.
(7) The right to life doesn't imply the right not to be killed, it
only implies a right not to be killed unjustly. (Problems arise
with this claim. It is unjust to violate someone's right. If the
person's right is not "the right not to be killed," but "the right
not to be killed unjustly" then we must claim "It is unjust to
violate the right not to be killed unjustly" and this is redundant.
This means (1) that, contrary to what Thomson says, rights should
be expressed without "unjust" in them, and (2) it would be better
to say that a right not to be killed can be overridden, so that it
would not be unjust to kill, rather than that there is no right to
life in the sense of no right not to be killed. For the time being,
however, in examining Thomson's Argument I I will continue to use
her claim [7].)
(8) It won't be unjust to kill because (a) injustice comes when we
deprive someone of what he has a right to (violate his right to it),
(b) if we kill we won't be depriving him of what he has a right to
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(violating his right to it), (c) since (1) we agreed he has no right
to use of my body, even if it saves his life. So, if we deprive
the violinist of this we are not depriving him of what he has a
right to, and (2) killing does not violate his right not to be
killed, since he has no such right (7) above). He only has a right
not to be killed unjustly and we do not violate this ~ight because
we kill not unjustly if we don't deprive him of use of a body he has
a right to.
There are two ways of viewing this argument: one says
that if we do kill we don't deprive someone of what he has a right
to. The other way says, that if we don't kill he gets what he has
no right to (my body).
Brody ,makes the following sort of criticism of Thomson's
1first argument. (He just seems to ignore the second argument,
though it is in the second argument that the emphasis he places on
the distinction between killing and not saving a life is dealt with
directly by Thomson.) He says, we can agree that someone does not
1Baruch Brody, Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1975). What I shall present is a
criticism suggested by Brody's criticism. It 'is more limited than
Brody's entire criticism, in that it doesn't aim to show that
killing is impermissible, but only that Thomson's argument doesn't
show that killing is permissible. I shall ignore the part of Brody's
criticism which aims to show that killing is impermissible because I
do not think it is correct. Having made this clear, I shall continue
to refer to the c+iticism as Brody's criticism, argument, etc.
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have the right to continued use of someone else's body merely
because this is necessary to save the first party's life. But
this does l1:0t mean that someone cannot have a right to continued
use of someone else's body for some other reason. One such reason
might be that neither the supporter nor anyone else has the right
to kill the resident to remove him. So, he has a right to stay,
because no one has a right to kill to remove him.
To expand on Brody's point: Thomson says "we needn't
support someone even if they need it for life itself."
Brody's point is tha"t we must agree to this only if it
means that the fact that someone's life will be saved is not a
sufficient reason.for our having to support him, i.e., we needn't
support someone merely in order to save their life. This can be
interpreted to imply that we needn't support someone merely in
order to save their life or for obviously equal or less weighty
reasons.
In agreeing to "we needn't support someone even if they
need it for life itself" we do not agree that we needn't support
someone if their life is being saved, in the sense that we can kill
when support has the effect of saving their life. We needn't
support them merely in order to save their life, but that it saves
their life doesn't necessarily mean we can kill to stop doing it,
since we may have to support them as the alternative to killing them. l
lIn fact, we may think the person has to be supported
because support saves his life, in the sense that his ALN need
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Furthermore, agreeing to "we needn't support someone
merely in order to save their life" is not the same as agreeing "r
needn't do something even in order to save someone's life" if the
use of "even" involves our agreeing that saving the life would be
the weightiest possible reason for supporting someone. This would
commit us to agreeing that "someone has no right to the use of the
body, all things said and done" and that, therefore, he has no right
to be there even rather than be killed. But avoiding killing may be
an ever weightier reason than saving life, so the phrasing of our
agreement that we don't think he has a right to be there merely in
order to save his life, shouldn't be such as to commit us to the
view that he has no right to be there for any other reason.
As noted, on one interpretation, the phrase "r needn't
support someone in my body, even to save his life," is taken to:
(1) point out an effect of staying in my body, imply that it is the
strongest possible reason that could be offered for requiring me
to support someone in my body, and note that it is not a sufficient
reason, and therefore (2) indicate that it is decided that there is
makes detaching a case of killing, necessarily. This still doesn't
mean that he is supported merely in order to save his life. To say
that we may have to support him in order to avoid killing him
(rather than saying we may have to support him rather than kill him)
is misleading if the image conjured up is like that when we swerve
a car in order to avoid crashing into someone. ~Here we were on our
way to killing someone and we must do something which interferes
with this. Or: I must sit on my hands in order to avoid strangling
someone. Here, sitting on my hands interferes with my doing some-
thing else.
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~ reason why I need to support someone in my body, i.e., I simply
need not support someone in my body.
On this interpretation, agreeing that "I needn't support
someone in my body, even to save his life," conunits one to agreeing
that there is no other reason which could justify support. Brody.
obviously does not agree with this interpretation. If this is the
only interpretation, then he may legitimately argue that it is not
immediately clear why we must agree to it if we agree that we need
not support someone merely in order to save his life.
It seems to me that there is another interpretation of
"I needn't support someone in my body, even to save a life,"
according to which it: (a) indicates one particular reason for the
sake of which I needn't support someone in my body, and (b) empha-
sizes (by the use of "even") the great significance (but not neces-
sarily the ultimate significance) of the reason which is insufficient
to justify support.
This interpretation makes "r needn't support someone in
my body, even to save a life," equivalent to saying: "I needn't
support someone merely in order to save a life, even though this is
a very strong reason." This interpretation is consistent with our
saying: "I needn't support someone, even in order to save their
life, but I may have to support them rather than kill them. But
because this latter interpretation may not be the natural one, I
will try to speak of someone not having to support someone merely
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in order to save their life, where this implies he needn't do it
for equal or lesser reasons.
The following are implications of Brody's point: (1) The
supporter may have an obligation not only not to kill, but also to
go on supporting. That is, he may have to support rather than kill;
(2) It is agreed to be impermissible for outside parties, the law,
etc. to decide to allow residence in one person's body to continue
merely to save another person's life. But it may be permissible to
allow residence to continue because it is decided that it is
impermissible for anyone to kill to remove the resident. Outside
parties would not be doing what it was agreed it is impermissible
for them to do, if they decide that someone has a right to stay in
someone's body because we may not kill him to remove him. l
Deciding that he has to stay because we can't kill is to offer a
reason for staying quite different from saving his life. So, if
the person remains in the other's body because we may not kill him,
he will, in fact, not acquire a right to the use of the person
merely to save his life. If we agree that acquiring a right to stay
merely to save his life is wrong, this does not mean it is wrong
that he acquires a right to stay when our aim is to avoid killing.
II use "we may not kill" to mean "no one may kill, not the
supporter himself, or anyone else." I do not mean merely that we
decide that third parties cannot kill, but the supporter himself may
kill. I shall continue to use this expression in this way.
All this will be true even if he receives life-saving
support as a consequence of his staying attached, since it is not
for the sake of receiving this support that he is being allowed to
stay.
53
54
we won't necessarily be doing what we needn't be doing, if Reason 2
is adequate justification. So, the fact that if we can't kill, the
supporter will do what we agreed he needn't do for one reason, does
nothing to show that.he oughtn't to do it for another reason. It
is possible that the reason (e.g., no killing permitted) which
justifies continuing residence would justify it only because con-
tinuing residence saves a life. That is, it is possible that if the
person were going to die soon anyway, despite residence, it would
make no difference if we killed him or not. Even if this were true,
we still could not know that we were doing what we agreed we needn't
be doing. For continuing the residence, because of the life-saving
effect, is different from continuing it for the sake of the life-
saving effect.
We can summarize Brody's criticism of Thomson's first
argument as follows: Argument I says that we can kill in order to
remove someone from another person's body, because we do not have to
"
let someone use our body even if it saves his life. But Argument I
is wrong, because while we can agree that we need not let someone
use our body merely to save his life, this does not mean that we may
not have to let him use our body rather than kill him. We may have
to do something rather than kill someone, something that we wouldn't
have to do rather than not save someone.
Having presented and elaborated on Brody's basic point I
will now see how it fits into a more systematic attack on Thomson's
argument.
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Thomson's argument says that we may kill because it was
agreed that the resident has no right to use of my body, even if
it saves his life, so if we kill him we are not violating his
rights, not depriving him of what he has a right to. The attack
begins: we didn't agree the person has no right to use your body,
only that he has no right to use it merely in order to save his
life. Therefore he may have a right to use the body rather than be
killed. There might be an attempt to continue the attack as follows:
So, if we kill we may be taking away what he has a right to (use of
the body), therefore killing may be unjust.
This continuation, however, would be circular, since,
presumably, the r~ason why the person would get the right to use of
the body is that killing to remove him would be unjust. That is,
knowledge that the killing is unjust would have to precede the con-
clusion that he had a right to use of the body, and not follow from
it.
So, if we want to make use of the possibility that some-
one has a right to the body rather than be killed, we must be
prepared to first say why killing would be unjust.
We might say (1) He would lose his life which he has a
right not to be deprived of, and therefore killing would be unjust.
The implication of this would also be that he gets a right to the
use of the body, because we can't kill him.
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Thomson's counter to this might be: (2) But it was agreed
that he has no right to the use of the body, therefore, he can't
have a right not to have his life taken away, therefore we can kill
without injustice. (That is, it can't be unjust to kill because
the supposition that it is unjust implies what we know to be false,
i.e., that he has a right to use of the body.)
The response to (2) would be (as above) (3): we didn't
agree that he had no right to use the body, only that he had no
right merely in order to save his life. He may have a right to stay
for other reasons, and one of these may be rather than be killed,
i.e., rather than violate a right not to be killed. So this
supposition that it is unjust to kill does not conflict with what
we agree is true.
Thomson's alternative response to (2) might be: (4) (a)
he has no right not to be killed (Claim 7) only a right not to be
killed unjustly, and (b) we know the killing wouldn't be unjust,
so we wouldn't be violating his right.
Continuing to accept Clai~ 7, the question then is, how
do we know the killing wouldn't be unjust. That is, even if there
is no right not to be killed, only a right not to be killed
unjustly, not all killings are not unjust. We would violate some-
one's right not to be killed unjustly if we did kill unjustly. So
we must show that killing would not violate the supposed right not
to be killed unjustly.
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As noted, Thomson's grounds for the killing not being
unjust were that it wouldn't deprive the resident of the use of the
body to which he had a right, since he had no right to its use.
Given the possibility--if we can show that killing is unjust and
this is not out of the question so far--that the resident has a
right to it.s use rather than be killed, Thomson's argument for kill-
ing not being unjust could be only that he has no right to the use
of the body merely in order to save his life.
In response to this we should focu~ on how misleading it is
to simply say that killing would not be unjust so long as we deprived
someone of what he had no right to independent of any possible right
he got because we could not kill. Suppose I have no right to an
apple in my possession. We cannot show that killing me to get the
apple back is not unjust by arguing that I have no right to the
apple. Because the apple is such a small gain at the price of
killing, killing would be unjust and I, acquire a right to keep the
apple if the only way to take it away from me is to kill me.
Likewise, it is not clear from what Thomson says that we wouldn't
be violating someone's right not to be killed unjustly just because
we kill him in order to stop him using what he has no right to use
merely in order to have his life saved. And if it is unjust, then
he would get a right to use of the body rather than be killed.
If we drop Thomson's view that someone does not have a
right not to be deprived of life (only a right not to be deprived of
it unjustly), it is also not clear why we can say that someone may
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be killed without injustice simply because he will lose use of the
body to which he has no right merely in order to save his life.
Someone's right not to be killed may be overridden (and so we would
not kill him unjustly) but we do not show it is overridden by either
assuming it is or by arguing as though the right did not exist.
We can distinguish between two types of arguments via analogies:
Suppose someone has no right to the apple he holds and no right to
the banana he holds. In order to take away the apple we must also
take away the banana. In this case we may truly argue that we can
take away the apple because in doing so we do not deprive him of any-
thing to which he has a right. But suppose someone has no right to
the apple he holds but he does have a right to the banana he holds.
In order to take the apple away I must also take the banana away.
In this case we cannot give as an argument for taking the apple away
that doing so does not involve taking away anything he has a right
to. It is possible that we may take the apple and banana away, i.e.,
his right to the banana may be overridden by the goal of taking the
apple away, so when we take away the banana we can say we do not
violate his right to it. But we cannot give as a reason for the
right being overridden (a) that it is overridden or (b) that it
doesn't exist, so that there is nothing to stand in the way of taking
the apple. Likewise, we can't say that he can be killed simply because
he has no right to the apple in order to save his life, since this
doesn't show, on the face of it, that his right not to be killed is
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overridden by the need to get the apple, rather than that the person
acquires a right to hold onto the apple so long as the alternative is
killing him to take it away.
D. I have tried to present Brody's point in as strong a light as
possible by fitting it into a systematic argument against Thomson.
I will put off dealing with the merits of Brody's criticism. In-
stead, in this section I will first try to make clear why Thomson's
Argument I, which is developed in response to a case where someone
is kidnapped in order to help someone else, is applicable to the
cases we are concerned with, where someone voluntarily began to aid
someone. The reason for not doing this before presenting Brody's
criticism was that, in the course of showing how Thomson's argument
applies to our cases, I also show the extent to which a certain
type of perspective could be behind positions as diverse as Brody's
and Thomson's. This perspective is that the use of someone's body
requires justification and something wrong is going on if there is
residence without justification. I argue that this perspective is
correct. (The attempt to show that it is correct is, in part,
justified by the role it plays in a later discussion of Brody's
criticism. In that discussion I argue that when certain types of
justifications for residence are given, it is important not to lose
sight of the fact that something wrong is still going on.)
I will suggest that one might take the position that
Argument I does not apply to the cases we are interested in because:
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(a) there is no injustice involved in putting Z into Y, and (b)
there is some other source for Z's right to stay besides his having
a need to have his life saved. I argue that the absence of an in-
justice in the origins of residence does not mean that continued
residence against the will of the supporter is not wrong/unrightful,
and of legitimate concern to both the unwilling supporter and a rights
enforcer. This is because continued residence in another person's
body requires justification if it is not to be wrong/unrightful,
and mere absence of injustice in the origin of residence is not
justification. I argue that the fact that the supporter voluntarily
introduced the person, or that he was introduced accidentally, is
also not by itself justification for continuing residence. If
justification for continuing residence is needed and there is no
justification for continuing residence peculiar to cases where
residence is voluntarily begun, we may apply Argument I to the cases
of interest to us. I argue that residence in someone's body
requires justification both because a person has rights to his body
and because people should not be where they have no right to be. I
claim that the view that residence which does not result from in-
justice may be of concern to a right's enforcer need not conflict
with the view that correction of events which result from injustices
should be of even greater concern.
(a) Ordinarily, much is made of the distinction between
using a person and not using them. The distinction revolves around
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whether someone intentionally causes something to happen to someone
else for some end. But, as a matter of terminology, it seems ap-
propriate to employ the word "use" when someone merely resides in
someone's body. That is, it is appropriate to say that someone is
using someone else's body when he resides in it, even if no end is
served by his residence and no one placed him there. For example,
someone who was blown into someone else's body by a gust of wind,
and who, while they remain, receives no benefit from residence at all,
can still be said to be using the other person's body. This means
that someone (the person occupied) can be said to be used even if
no one intends that he be used and only simple residence (not
benefit from it) is involved.
However, this point could be taken to be merely a matter
of terminology. That is, the fact that we could call all these
cases "using people," would not necessarily affect the moral dis-
tinction that is usually made between cases in which bad things
happen to people because other people did something with the inten-
tion that these bad things happen to them, and cases in which bad
things happen to people, e.g., by accident. We might employ use-S
(use-strict) for the former cases and use-L (use-loose) for the
latter, as a matter of terminology. And someone might argue that
only use-S's are morally significant wrongs.
The moral (as opposed to terminological point) that I \
wish to make about the need for justifying presence of one person
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in another's body (or property) is that there can be something
morally wrong with a use-L (i.e., there can be something wrong with
residence when there is no injustice in its cause and hence no
use-S.)
An alternative point of view can be made clear if we con-
trast a case like the kidnapped violinist with a case where the wind
blows someone into residence into another person's body. The case
of the violinist might be taken to imply merely that it is wrong
for someone to require one person to carry another person just for
the sake of helping the latter. If we take "use" to apply to simple
residence, with or without benefit to the resident, regardless of
how or why he came to be in residence, then this narrow interpre-
tation does not condemn uses-L of a person's body. Furthermore,
this narrow interpretation of the violinist case does not merely
mean to make Brody's point again. It does not say that allowing
residence rather than kill makes residence alright. This would be
a case, if not being able to kill were adequate justification for
residence, where residence is not wrong because a justif~cation has
been given for requiring it. The narrow interpretation of the
violinist case says that if the residence is not the result of
forced human intervention we cannot conclude that there is something
wrong with the residence, in a sense which would make us have to
look for a justification for it at all. The presence may be un-
desirable to the person who is intruded into; it may even call for
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attention by a rights enforcer, if a rights enforcer is obliged to
rescue anyone in distress regardless of cause. But to the extent
that a right's enforcer's primary function is to enforce rights, it
does not present him with the same sort of primary concern that un-
just acts do. So, it is consistent with one reading of the violin-
ist case that continuation of a residence which was begun by a gust
of wind involves nothing prima facie wrong, so long as it is not
continued for any illegitimate reason, such as using someone to get
benefits for the person in residence.
Such a narrow interpretation would be supported by the
fact that while it can be claimed that people have a right not to
be used merely as means, e.g., injured by other people as a means to
the latter's end, it cannot be claimed that people have a right sim-
ply not to be in an injured state (e.g., as the result of an act of
nature). It can be claimed that people have a right that someone
else not put them into a certain bad state, or interfere with a good
state, but not that, people have a right not to be in that bad state,
or to remain in that good state. So, if the wind harms you, your
rights have not been violated. This same critique could be made of
the view that people have a right to have their property occupied as
they see fit; it is not true, at least in the sense that one has no
right that the wind not blow a rock onto one's property when one
doesn't want it there. Thomas Nagel seems to make a point like
this. 1For example, he criticizes an inclination he sees in Nozick
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to base a strong right by people to non-interference from other peo-
pIe, on the value of being able to direct one's own life. Nagel
notes that we have no right that bad things not happen to us. We
also do not necessarily have a right that others help us to prevent
people's interference with us. Yet claims for rights such as these,
as much as the right that people not interfere with us, would seem
to follow from a concern, such as Nozick argues from, for keeping
control over one's own life. It is only the right that others not
interfere with us that we can claim to any great degree according
2 3to Nagel. Additionally, Harman remarks on a comment of Nagel's to
the effect that if a natural calamity occurs we do not think that
anything morally wrong has happened.
lIn his review of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia,
"Libertarianism Without Foundations," Yale Law Journal, 85, No.1
(Nov. 1975), pp. 136-149.
2Nagel leaves open the possibility that we do have a
strong right to some kinds of aid. He does not say in the article,
whether we have a stronger claim to aid when it is used to stop un-
just interference by another person than we have when it is used to
stop harm from natural forces.
3In "Moral Relativism Defended," Philosophical Review,
84 (1975), pp. 3-22.
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This view, that people have no right to be in a certain
state, and only certain causes of harm make harm morally wrong,
suggests the narrow interpretation of the violinist case described
above: There is something wrong if someone is forced by another
person to share his body against his wishes. This does not mean
there is something wrong, in the same sense, if someone's resourc-
es are not being disposed of as he would wish, or if his territory
is not being occupied as he would wish, when no impermissible human
intervention has caused this, and the reason for allowing continu-
ation of the presence does not involve using-S the person. Someone
being occupied unwillingly is a wrong of concern 'to a rights enforc-
er when there was a violation of rights in introducing the resident
or, perhaps, if there is interference with the exercise of a right
the supporter is agreed to have to try to remove someone (e.g., when
the removal would be harmless for all concerned). But if, for ex-
ample, a gust of wind brought someone in, no one interferes with
the exercise of the agreed right of removal, and it is only that the
owner of the property is physically unable to make use of the means
'of removing the party, there is nothing wrong of concern to a rights
f · h f h h d···d 1en orcer ~n t e act t at t e unwante person remaJ.ns ~n res~ ence.
1Proponents of such a narrow interpretation may hold that
the owner of private property can remove the other person if he can
do this safely. (One could not remove someone just for being on
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In summary:
I have said that despite the fact that we can call all
residences in people uses of them, some may hold that only uses
involving injustice involve 'somethingmorally wrong of concern to
a rights enforcer. The grounds for this 'is that 'peoplehave a
right not to be interfered with byothers,'but not a right that
accidents not befall them or that their property be disposed of as
they prefer.
This view says that since we do not have a right to have
our property be in the condition we desire it to be in, only a
right not to have someone require the entrance or interfere with
agreed means of removal or require continued residence for improper
motives, there is no' right not to have a person in one's body. If
the person is there when the rights-violating factors aren't present,
there is no problem of primary significance to a rights enforcer in
the continued residence. I have allowed that such a view may be
public property). This means that even on the narrow view, the fact
that there is nothing wrong with the person remaining against the will
of the owner, doesn't mean that they have a right to stay. Proponents
of the narrow interpretation may even say that the other person may
not resist safe removal. But if the owner and his allies cannot re-
move the party, there is no inappropriate residence of concern to a
rights enforcer in things staying as they are. If there is no injus-
tice in their staying there (because no one forces the owner to keep
him for some improper motive), and there is no right simply not to
have him there (since we do not have a right to have our property be in
the condition we desire that it be in, but we only have rights against
acts of other people making it as we don't desire), then what could be
morally wrong in his remaining without further justification?
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consistent with the right of the owner to remove someone who is in
residence, even if the latter wants to stay, if the procedure is
harmless. But still this would not mean that anything wrong of con-
cern to a rights enforcer is going on.
If I wake up in the morning with someone inside me, and
I know the wind blew them in, and no one else knows about my situa-
tion, and I can't manage the safe removal procedures, there is noth-
ing wrong of concern to a rights enforcer in the situation. It may
be distressing as a situation for me, but not anything morally wrong
or inappropriate. It is as if a tree had fallen on me: this is dis-
tressing, but not inappropriate or wrong.
A proponent of the narrow interpretation may argue further
as follows: Thomson says we may kill to remove the violinist from
the supporter's body because he has no right to be there even to save
his life. But perhaps we can kill someone who has no right to be
there even to save his life only because (a) another person acted to
save his life by attaching him to the supporter, and (b) this was un-
just, since saving his life is no justification for doing this. If
someone were introduced into another person's body by a gust of wind
there would be no injustice and nothing wrong going on. So maybe (1)
the supporter could not kill, even if the need to have Qne's life
saved is no justification for residence, and (2) a rights enforcer
need have no interest in killing. It may be true that the person who
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is in residence as a result of the gust of wind has no grounds for
being there, i.e., his need for life-saving support doesn't justify
his residence and being plummeted in by accident doesn't justify his
residence. But this is not grounds for killing because his residence
doesn't need to be justified in order for there to be nothing morally
wrong with it; it is not a violation of someone's rights that acci-
dents befall them or that their property isn't disposed of as they
would like.
In summary, on the narrow view it is only the actions or
omissions of people whose acts and ommissions decide if residence
starts or stops that require justification, not residence itself,
in order for something wrong/unrightful not to occur.
(b) Both Thomson' and Brody find it necessary to look
for reasons which will justify residence. They might do this only
because they are concerned with whether someone who either forces
residence to begin with or requires that it continue has adequate
reason for doing this. But concern for finding justification for
residence may also indicate another view, a view which implies that
there is something prima facie in need of justification when a person
is present on someone else's property, if at any point in time he is
there against the wili of the owner. It implies that use-L can be
morally wrong. It implies that if someone doesn't enter by an act
of injustice, but, e.g., by an accident, we do not say nothing is
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wrong in his being there. (Note that even if there were nothing
wrong with his being there, this would not mean that there was a
right on his part to stay; there may be nothing wrong with his
being there because the owner is simply refraining from exercis-
ing his right to remove the resident.) The presence can be ille-
gitimate and inappropriate and the proper concern of a rights en-
forcer, even if the entrance is accidental. The fact that the
situation can be of concern to a rights enforcer need not mean
that he can do something about it a separate argument is re-
quired to show that something can be done about it. A situation
can be wrong, inappropriate and yet there be a justification for
not ending it. But if a justification can be found for not ending
it, this will mean that a wrong unrightful situation cannot be cor-
rected.
The view that a rights enforcer should be concerned when
two people's boundaries overlap against the wishes of one of them,
even if injustice is not involved in the cause but only accident,
need not mean that the rights enforcer can always act on the side of
the person imposed on.
In discussing the simple self-defense argument (p. 38 ),
I noted that it was a possible view that when two innocents were
involved the person imposed on could~ to stop the other, but the
innocent threat could defend himself even by attacking the person who
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is defending himself. I take this to imply that the person origin-
ally threatened does not have a right to have the other person stop-
ped at whatever expense to the innocent threat he is himself allowed
to try to cause. So a rights enforcer should, on this view, remain
neutral when, e.g., it is'a question of killing the innocent threat.
But the imposition can still be of concern to a rights enforcer and
if a perfectly innocent procedure for stopping the th,reat is avail-
able, then he should side with the person being imposed on. l If a
rights enforcer may always side with the person threatened, and he
could not kill, then it would be because no one, not even the first
party, could kill.
Whether there is a difference between the case where the
innocent threat comes at you and where it is in residence in you, as
to what a rights enforcer can do is discussed in Chapter 3. At this
stage I am only concerned to show that boundary crossings resulting
lIt is of some importance that, at least when the removal
or deflection procedure is innocent, all right is on the side of
the person to be imposed on. This· is because later I will argue that
when the procedure involves taking only what the innocent threat would
get from ilnposition, even if this involves killing, all right is also
on the side of the person imposed on, so a third party should act when
ALN sat.isfying residence is wrong. This will mean th'at it is not only
not unjust to try to remove/deflect the threat, but proper that they
be removed/deflected.
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from accident can be of concern to a rights enforcer in a way simple
misfortunes also caused by accidents are not.
This view that residence on private property requires jus-
tification implies that simple absence of injustice in the cause of
residence does not make residence legitimate, let alone give someone
a right to stay on. But this view need not be associated with a sup-
posed right to have one's property be in a state one wants it to be
in, where this implies a right not to have rocks or people blown in.
In giving an explanation of this view, it is important to
note the distinction between having unwanted people and unwanted ob-
jects on one's property: if a rock is blown in, it does not in fact
seem correct to say that there is something morally inappropriate
with its being there, something that should prompt the attention of
a rights enforcer (except possibly in his role as simple distress re-
liever). But if a person is blown in, it seems quite appropriate to
say that there is a prima facie morally inappropriate situation in
his unwanted residence. Given the fact that a person has a claim to
his private property in both cases, this seems to indicate that the
crucial factor in distinguishing the cases is the moral inappropriate-
ness of people being where they do not have a right, or are not at
liberty, to be. It indicates, further, that they get this right when
on private property only if there is justification for their residence,
because the owner gets preference when it comes to the use of their
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own things.! Absence of injustice in how they get there, and the
fact that they came to be there accidentally, do not provide the
necessary justification. It is only people, not inanimate objects,
of whom it makes sense to say that a right/liberty they lack to be
somewhere can make it inappropriate. (in a morally significant
sense) that they are there. Rocks do not have rights to be in one
lThe view that justification is needed to make the use of
what belongs to someone else morally unobjectionable, could be much
narrower than the view that someone gets preference in the .use of
their own things, depending on how "preference" is interpreted.
Justification (and owner's preference) might only mean that an ade-
quate reason must be given by a non-owner to have his use of some-
one else's object justified, whereas the owner needs no reason at
all (i.e., no justification besides ownership) to have his own ob-
ject, when no one else has a reason for having it. But "preference"
need not mean that if both owner and non-owner have the same reason
for the use of an object, the owner has first option on having it.
The reference to owner preference, on the other hand, might be taken
to mean, at least, that when equally weighty reasons for use are giv-
en, the owner has preference. The notion of preference might be fur-
ther strengthened in the owner's favor as follows: the ownership adds
its own weight to any given by the owner's (other) reasons, in 'a
match against the non-owner's reasons, so that even with a less weigh-
ty reason the owner has preference. Thomson brings up "prior claim"
to what is ours in discussing the Coat Case, where the reasons are
equal on both sides (i.e., both owner and non-owner need the coat to
save their life), so this might coincide with a second notion of pre-
ference. In her discussion of the body in the violinist case, the
"owner" has a weaker reason than the non-owner, and the owner's pre-
ference would involve the stronger notion of "preference." (As Thom-
son uses "prior claim" it is not clear if this refers to: (a) a pre-
ference, whether strong or weak, which we have, even if our thing is,
finally, justifiably used by someone else against our wishes, or to
(b) our, in fact, finally having the right to use the object as we
see fit.) I shall discuss the notion of prior claim further in Chap-
ter III.
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particular place as opposed to another, because they are not the re-
pository of rights at all, and no absence of rights to be someplace
makes it inappropriate for them to be there. People can have rights
and liberties posited of them, and because they can have rights and
liberties it is legitimate for them to be only where they have the
right or liberty to be, unless the owner is responsible for their
continued presence (without necessarily having given them a right to
be there). So, the fact that it is a person who is blown in (a) makes
continuance of presence a matter of concern for the rights enforcer,
and (b) makes residence inappropriate, from the point of view of
both the person in residence and the person who is occupied. It does
not befit a person to be where they have no right to be, any more than
it befits the person occupied to be occupied unwillingly, in the ab-
sence of justification. (One might go even further and claim that it
befits a person to accept responsibility for preventing the harm he
would cause even if he is not morally responsible for being the cause
of the harm. (Even though he couldn't be punished for it.) This would
imply that accidental boundary crossings are not only problems of con-
cern to a rights enforcer but that a rights enforcer can act against
the threat rather than remain neutral.)
I place emphasis on prima facie wrongness/inappropriateness
of residence, and associate it more closely with unjust acts and
states than with merely distressing or unfortunate events. (An un-
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just state of affairs would be the one where someone is kidnapped
to be used to help the violinist; a prima facie wrong/inappropriate
state of affiars would be one where someone is blown into someone
else's body and remains there; an unfortunate state of affairs is
one where a tree accidentally falls on someone or a rock blows into
someone. (Both the inappropriate and unfortunate state of affairs
can cause someone else's life to be saved.)
One of the reasons I emphasize these distinction is that
I do not wish to argue that in determining what actions we may take,
we do not care whether or not someone comes to be in a situation
which is bad for them as a result of injustice. For example, the
claim might be made that if someone is dying we wouldn't care, in
deciding whether to help, whether they came to be in this condition
because of an injustice or an accident. Or, if two people were on
the point of death, we wouldn't decide who to help on the basis of
whether the origins of the problem of one involved injustice while
the origin of the problem of the other did not. I think it is quite
possible that we ought to decide how to act on the basis of whether
an injustice causes the problem. It is because I think more .may have to be
done to relieve an injustice, that I have argued for the view that a
wrong/inappropriate residence has more in common with an unjust resi-
dence than with a mere unfortunate occurrence. If we decide whom to
help on the basis of an injustice in the cause of the problem, we may
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also decide whom to help on the basis of a wrong/inappropriate sit-
uation in the cause of the problem. But drawing together unjust and
inappropriate residence is not incompatible with the view that cor-
recting for injustice is still the most important. l
In summary, I have argued that the narrow interpretation of
the violinist case is incorrect. Residence in another person's body
(not merely forced entry) requires justification. Continuation of
residence can be wrong, and of concern to a rights enforcer, in the way
simple misfortune is not, if there is no justification for it. Adopt-
ing this point of view need not commit us to saying people have a
right not to be harmed by acts of nature, and it does not commit us
to the view that injustice in the cause of harm is not of greater sig-
nigicance than other wrongs.
(c). Given that continuation of residence calls for justification
we must consider the sources of its justification. I will (re)argue
lSince first discussing the question of how to treat cases
which differ on the basis of the injustice or non-injustice in their
causes, I have learned that both Thomas Scanlon and Thomson also discuss
whether an injustice in the cause makes a difference. I have discus-
sed this in detail, elsewhere. Furthermore, Nozick notes that there
is a tendency to disapprove of one person benefiting at the expense
of someone else's misfortune. But, in keeping with the distinction
between unjust, inappropriate and unfortunate occurrences I think
that we shall be able to rectify unjust and inappropriate occurrences,
by eliminating their consequences (e.g., eliminate the benefit some-
one gets from the occurrences), even though we cannot "rectify" the
unfortun'ate occurrences by eliminating their consequences.
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that deliberately introducing someone into one's residence or body,
does not by itself, justify their continuing stay. I claim that
this fact implies that Thomson's Argument I is relevant to the cas-
es of interest to us, because it eliminates the possibility that there
is some other reason, peculiar to our cases,why the person has a
right to residence, even if they don't have a right to it because
they need it for life. I note that Brody and Thomson disagree about
whether avoiding killing justifies continuing residence. I give a
more general characterization of the types of reaso-ns which can jus-
tify residence. I claim that it is reasonable to think that both
Thomson and Brody agree that sometimes consideration of the means of
removal may lead to someone getting a right to remain in residence.
Having concluded that the need to save one's life does not
give one a right to reside in another's body, Thomson also concludes
that one does not acquire a right to reside simply because one falls
in by accident (her seed case). She discusses incompletely what
would be true if one's act caused someone to be brought in or if one
intentionally brought someone into one's body. (She confuses matters
a bit by introducing a case where we create a situation someone else
can act to take advantage of, i.e., we leave a window open and a burg-
lar enters our property. Certainly, here there is no right on the
burglar's part to reside in our house, despite the fact that we left
the window open. But someone may argue that the burglar has no right
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to reside only because the burglar made the illicit entry himself,
he wasn't brought in.)
I have already noted, but it bears repetition at this
point, that it doesn't seem that any form of entrance onto private
property, by itself, uncombined with other factors, will give some-
one a right to remain against the will of the person whose property
it is, not even a right to !!X to remain. (However, the manner of
entrance in combination with other factors may make a difference in
whether someone has a right to remain in residence.) For example,
the person who is on the property may have been deliberately brought
in, may be present legitimately for as long as efforts, which are the
responsibility of the person who brought him in, are not successful
in removing him, and still have no right, in virtue of manner of
entrance alone, to go on staying. Responsibility for presence may
mean responsibility for concomitants of presence, but this responsi-
bility doesn't mean one necessarily can't act to terminate the con-
comitant. An implication of this, and one that both Brody and Thomson
would probably agree with is that, at a minimum, if there were no in-
jury to the person removed involved in removing him from someone's
body, he could be removed even if he wanted to stay and had been in-
tentionally brought in by the person whose body it is. On the other
hand, all this does not mean that your intentionally introducing some-
one may not (1) alter the obligations a rights enforcer has to aid
you in this legitimate removal, if you can't accomplish it yourself,
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and (2) alter what you can do to the person in order to remove him.
The person may have no right to remain, but if you have introduced
him you may have no right to demand someone else's help in getting him
out. If the person will be worse off than he would have been if you
had never introduced him, you may not be able to remove him.
In addition, we can point to another difference between
the case where someone is intentionally brought in and the case
where they are blown in: Bringing someone in voluntarily may not by
itself give the person a right to continue in residence, or resist
removal, but the owner, in virtue of his responsibility for intro-
ducing the person, and independent of whether other people prevent
him from removing the person, cannot complain that the residence is
a wrong, illegitimate, inappropriate. Roughly, if we can account
for the presence by the deliberate introduction of the resident by
the owner of the property the continued presence is no longer inappro-
priate, because it is the responsibility of the owner. (If removal
is safe to all concerned and could be effected by the owner, but he
is interfered with, then the residence may become a wrong, and even
unjust.) Therefore, I shall distinguish between wrong and merely un-
rightful residences. The wrong residences are ones where there is no
justification for residence to begin with, the residence is inappro-
priate while it lasts, and there is also no right that it continue.
Unrightful residences are ones where the owner is responsible for the
Absence of injustice in the cause of presence is also
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residence beginning, but is unwilling to have it continue, but it
is not inappropriate while it lasts, -- so long as the reasons it
lasts have nothing to do with interference with the right to remove,
-- though the person in residence still has no right to continue in
residence, and no justification has been given for their continuing
residence.
I have argued that continued residence in someone else's
body requires justification if something wrong/unrightful is not to
b · Ie gOlng on.
not ~nough. I have now argued that continuation of presence is also
not justified simply by the person having been deliberately intro-
duced.
This point makes clear why Thomson's Argument I applies to
cases where someone has deliberately introduced someone into their
body. It might be argued that Argument I does not apply to the cases
of interest to us for the following reasons. It might be granted that
justification is needed for residence not to be wrong/unrightful, and
lsomething unrightful could be going on even if it was jus-
tified: justification for residence could be present simply if the
owner wanted it to continue, but because this needn't involve giving
the resident a right to stay· (merely permission) the residence would,
strictly speaking, be unrightful. Use of "unrightful" would not have
the function of a complaint. Since I shall be dealing with cases
where the owner doesn't want the resident, I shall assume there is no
justification via permission. (I discuss the possible difference be-
tween a right and a permission to stay in Chapter V.)
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also granted that justification is not provided by either (1) ab-
sence of injustice in the initial cause of residence, or (2) the
need for life-saving support. But,if deliberately introducing the
person justifies his continued residence, giving him a right to stay
on, then we could not kill to remove him. Thomson's Argument I would
be irrelevant because even if the.need for life didn't give him the
right to residence, having been deliberately introduced did. But, I
have argued, deliberate introduction does not give a right to remain
in residence so Thomson's argument for the permissibility of killing
is applicable to the cases of interest to us.
I have presented an account of the need for justification
for presence in someone'sbody that does not conflict with any of Thom-
son's or Brody's arguments. They both could agree that there is some-
thing wrong/unrightful going on if residence is not justified. But,
obviously, the basic particular difference that divides the position
of Brody and Thomson on justification of continuing residence is whe-
ther having to avoid the killing required for removal is a justification
and one which gives a right to reside.
I will now try to give a somewhat more general analysis of
the possible alternative grounds for justifying continuing residence.
This will show that despite the differences between Thomson and Brody
as to whether avoiding killing justifies residence, it seems reasonable
to think that they both agree that consideration of the means of removal
is part of deciding if residence is justified.
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We might distinguish between 3 sources of the permissibil-
ity of continuing residence: (1) What I shall call positive right,
e.g., need, or responsible-making action by which, it could be sug-
gested, we become obligated to let someone stay. The factors which
give a positive right precede, or are present at, the time of resi-
dence, before we have to make the decision about continuing residence.
(2) Decency, where there is no right or obligation, but nevertheless
we should let someone stay, and (3) Negative right - they get a right
to stay because we are not allowed to employ the procedures for re-
moval.
One interpretation of Thomson's argument (discussed in Chap-
ter III) allows that a right to stay can stem only from factors
noted in (1). In particular, if there is no right to stay independent
of consideration of the means of removal, consideration of the means
can't provide it. This approach would make it impossible to say that
although voluntarily introducing someone would not, by itself, give
them a right to stay, yet this factor in combination with the fact that
the removal procedure would make the person worse off than' 'he would
have been without attachment would provide grounds for his right to
stay. It is also difficult to see how this approach would handle cas-
es in which someone would have a right to stay if he needed it to save
his life, but in actuality he has no positive right to remain because
he doesn't have an HLN/ALN. For example, suppose the need the person
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actually has is not strong enough to be the source of the right to
stay, because, e.g., the only need the person has is for support to
cure his headache. Suppose someone does have a right to the support
in question in order to save his life. If the means of removal requires
killing the person, and we ignore the nature of the means of removal in
deciding whether the person has a right to support, don't we thereby
fail to allow someone to use our bodies to save his life when we are
required to do this? Whenever Thomson speaks of the favor we do some-
one in allowing him to stay in residence -- a "favor," on her assump-
tion that we aren't required to support
-- it is
always because we save his life by some causal process which occurs
while he is present, not because we spare him from removal-by-killing.
But it would seem that not killing someone, at the very least, is a
requirement if saving his life is a requir~ment. Failure to consider
negative rights «3) above) as a contributing factor to the right to
stay would make us negligent, if saving a life by body support were a
duty.
Someone very firmly committed to settling the question of
the right to stay independent of consideration of the means of removal
required, even if someone had a right to have his life saved by resi-
dence, might counterargue along the following lines: if there is no
positive source of a right to stay, as well as no positive source of a
right to be there to start with (e.g., no original need to have one-
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self saved accounts for the original presence), then sparing someone
from being killed should not be given as much weight as saving some-
one to begin with. This is because some penalty should carryover
from the fact that the problem of keeping the person in residence if
we don't kill arises because of an initially unjustified residence.
(The same argument might be made against a right to stay based on a
need for life-saving support which develops only once the person is
attached, when the original presence was not justified.) The ques-
tion of whether the duty to save a life via support would straight-
forwardly imply the duty not to kill is really the question whether
the fact that a residence is judged to be wrong, except possibly be-
cause we may not be able to kill to stop it, makes any difference to
how we can act.
A different, and more reasonable, interpretation of
Thomson's Argument I would make consideration of the means of removal
a proper part of deciding whether residence is justified. So, even
if the need they actually have (e.g. for headache relief) does not
give them a positive right to stay, if they had a right to have their
life saved by the use of the body in case they had HLN/ALN, this would
give them a right to stay rather than be killed. Therefore, if it
isn't exactly clear how not having to save someone's life with the use
of one's body speaks to the question of the permissibility of killing
to remove them from the body, it would seem to be clearer that having
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to save makes killing to remove impermissible.
So it is reasonable to think that both Thomson and Brody
agree that the right to stay may arise negatively, even though they
differ on whether it in fact does arise negatively when we needn't
let our body be used to save a life.
To summarize the most important points of the previous dis-
cussion: I have shown that residence in an unwilling supporter is
prima facie wrong/unrightful, and stands in need of justification.
I claimed that justification for continued residence is not provided
by the fact that residence was deliberately begun by the supporter
himself, and this fact means that Thomson's Argument I is applicable
to cases (A), (B), and (C), as well as to her violinist case. Finally,
I noted that while Thomson and Brody differ as to whether avoiding
killing can justify continued residence, they can be taken to agree
that consideration of the means of removal'is a necessary part of
deciding whether residence is justified.
E. I will now return to consider the merits of Brody's type of
criticism of Thomson's Argument I. I will present 4 criticisms of
the Brody-type position (henceforth BTP) and argue that none of them
succeeds. In particular, I will show the following: (1) it is not
correct to criticize the RTP on the grounds that requiring residence
rather than kill just is the impermissible act of requiring residence
in order to save a life; I will argue that it is not
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correct to identify requiring residence rather than kill with requir-
ing residence to save a life, since one may be in favor of ·the former,
in order to avoid negative characteristics that are present only in
killing, but n~tpresent in letting die. I also argue that it is not
Thomson's intention to equate saving a life with supporting someone
rather than kill him. What she means by efforts we needn't make,
even to save a life, are efforts we needn't make even to provide ALN-
satisfaction; (2) it is not correct to criticize the BTP on the grounds
that the claim that we needn't allow residence in order to save a life
implies that no one has any right to life if the effect of the supposed
right is that someone gets a right to the life-saving residence. I
will argue that the evidence for the claim that we need not support
someone in our body merely to save a life, does not imply that it is
impossible that a right not to be killed could lead, as one of its
consequences, to a right to get life-saving support; (3) it is not
correct to criticize the BTP on the grounds that it is as objectionable
to use someone to prevent a killing as to use someone to save a life.
I will argue that there is a difference between (a) using someone to
prevent a killing and (b) someone being used because we cannot kill.
The latter can be permissible, even if the former is not; (4) It may
be correct to criticize Brody for not emphasizing that someone can
wind up, all things considered, doing what he needn't do, not all
things cansidered,but this does not show that avoiding a killing is an
improper reason for someone having to do, all things considered, what
he needn't do, not all things considered. I will argue that, if we
86
modify Thomson's argument somewhat, we can show that giving a dif-
ferent reason (i.e. can't kill) for requiring support does not mean
that the supporter is not doing what, not all things considered, he
needn't do (i.e. supporting someone merely in order to save a life.)
I argue that when we cannot use the means necessary to stop something
wrong going on, the wrong continues, even if it is right that it
continues. I then argue that it may sometimes be right that we don't
stop a wrong. In particular, I show that just because we needn't support
someone merely in order to save his life, this does not mean that we
needn't support someone merely in order to save their life rather than
kill him.
(1) The BTP depends on its being true that deciding to keep
someone in one's body, as an alternative to killing him, is not itself
only a straightfoward instance of saving someone's life. If having to
keep someone in one's body, because one is not allowed to kill, is just an
instance of having to keep someone merely inorder to save a life, then
one might say that the reason theperson gets a right to stay is that we
wanted to save his life. Since this is what we all (including Brody)
agreed was an inappropriate reason for allowing someone to be in
residence, the BTP would fall through.
But this argument against the BTP will not work. Even if
not removing from residence is an instance of saving a life (by saving
from death-by-killing), it is more than that, and so long as the
reason we want to avoid killing points to these additional factors,
we will not be letting the person stay merely in order to save his life.
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For example, the reason we want to avoid killing may not be because
it is saving a life, but rather because we wish to prevent a certain
relationship between two people from occurring. This relationship is
one where one person deprives another of their life. The same people
who are concerned with not killing, need not be concerned with saving
the life of the person when it is a question of beginning attachment.
Seeking to avoid a certain type of relationship is not merely a case
of seeking to save a life, even if a life is saved in the process.
Furthermore, note that we should distinguish between when a
life is saved and when it is spared. If I decide not to kill someone,
I will have spared their life, not saved it, unless I am also providing
ALN-satisfying support. But, if a prohibition on killing; or those
who institute such a prohibition, is what stops someone from killing,
then it or they have saved a life, since they rescue it from some fatal
event that would otherwise have occurred. If the supporter in a non-
ALN case does not kill, because of a prohibition on killing, he does
not save a life, even though a life is saved (by the prohibition).
The fact that he continues to give non-ALN support, because he doesn't
kill, doesn't make him a life saver, though it makes him the one who
bears the burden of saving a life. Those who, in instituting the pro-
hibition on killing, save a life, do not necessarily do it in order
to save a life. As noted above, they may do it not merely to have a
life continue, but to see that it doesn't end in a certain way i.e.
by killing.
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When Thomson says that if a killing doesn't take place, then
the supporter will wind up saving a life, she doesn't seem to be refer-
ring to his winding up saving someone from the death-by-killing. Rather,
she is still referring to their winding up satisfying the ALN, e.g.
the kidney deficiency. Keeping-in-residence-because-avoiding-killing
is not what she is straightforwardly referring to' as ,"saving a life,"
and the correctness of her argument should not depend on it being
the case that keeping someone in residence rather than kill him just
is saving his life. In the first place, her strategy in constructing
the violinist example seems to be to have someone actually doing some-
thing we would have no doubt about calling "saving a life." One
way of providing this is by giving a case where someone gets something
they needed before they ever became attached, i.e. supplies from some-
one else's body. If Thomson ':s claim that we may kill, because if we
don't the kidnapped person will wind up saving a life, were based on
the view that having to keep the person rather than kill him is itself
straightforwardly an instance of saving a life, then, even in cases
where there was no ALN -- where e.g. the person gets nothing from
residence except avoiding the procedure of removal -- a life would be
being saved if we refrained from killing. Furthermore, in non-ALN
cases we would be saving a life if we refrained from killing only
once we did consider killing and refrained from it. In the violinist
case the life saving is taking place prior to any decision to refrain
from killing.
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If what Thomson meant by "his doing what we agreed he needn't
do," and "his carrying someone merely to save his life," were the sup-
porter keeping someone in his body because he cannot have him killed,
the permissibility of killing would be the consequence of just working
out a definition. This is so because wherever "saving a life" oc-
curred we could substitute "carry-someone-'because-refraining-from-killing, "
so not (saving) would = not (carry-because-refraining-from-killing) =
to kill; if "I needn't aid merely to save someone's life" just means
I needn't carry-because-refraining-from-killing, then it follows as a
matter of definition that I may kill. l
lIn getting clear about Thomson's cases and Argument I, it
is important to distinguish both her Argument I and an argument for
killing based on definition (as described above), from two other kinds
of arguments. First, an argument such as the following: (a) something
is (or will be) happening that we already agreed needn't happen, and
(b) we may kill to stop what needn't happen, as well as not aid to
avoid what needn't happen, because (c) killing and not aiding are
morally equivalent. In this argument, a claim about the moral same-
ness of killing and not aiding, (c), stands in the relation of evidence
to a conclusion, (b). It does not stand in the relation of a defini-
tion (i.e. that not killing just is aiding) to its implication. Further-
more (c) makes reference to moral sameness, not strict identity, and
this sameness has to be argued for. The fact that Thomson's second
paper has a claim which functions like (c) would be further evidence
that the definitional argument [that killing just is not (aiding in
order to save a life)] is not hers.
The second type of argument to contrast with both Thomson's
Argument I and the definitional argument, can be described as the two-
sides of a coin argument. It involves the claim that not killing just
is aiding and not aiding just is killing because an ALN-satisfying
system (aid) continues if there is no killing and ending the support
(aid) is the means of killing. There is no need for a definition here,
to the effect that aiding is carrying-because-refraining-from-killing,
because "aiding" refers to an ALN-support system, which is straight-
forwardly an instance of aiding.
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The possible confusion over whether acquiring a right to
continued residence rather than being killed is, by definition, merely
a case of being saved, may have its source in the fact that Thomson
shifts between ALN and non-ALN cases in her discussion. First, she
contrasts what one may do to sorneone who threatens the life of another
person, when both .are on property which belongs to neither of them,
with what one may do to the threatening person when he is on property
which belongs to the person threatened. From this the logical transi-
tion. would be to want to know what one may do when (a) the threat
presented by someone in one's residence is non-fatal, and (b) the
threatening person would lose his life if he is evicted. But to
consider the question of non-fatal threats, Thomson shift~ to cases
where one person provides ALN support to another, whereas the original
case just involved residence without ALN support. So when she answers,
in the latter case, that "1 need not even suffer a loss less than life,
even to save a life," the implication might be that this conclusion
is meant to apply straightforwardly to the extensions of the original
case, where there was no ALN, and where "saving a 1ife"-- in lieu of
any other appropriate interpretation might be taken to refer to
not evicting the person. Hence, the possible equation of "I needn't
suffer residence merely to save a life," with "I needn't suffer resi-
dence merely to avoid a killing." This sllifting between ALN and non-
ALN cases may also give the impression that, on the basis of a con-
clusion in ALN cases, one has also shown that killing to evict is
permissible when there is no ALN being satisfied and residence by
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another person ,presents a non fatal threat.
In summary, I conclude that it is both not correct and not
Thomson's claim in Argument I, that the desire to refrain from killing
is only an instance of ·the desire to save someone' slife. This is true,
even when the consequence of not killing is that the supporter does
save someon'e ',s' life. I showed that this equation is not correct, by
arguing that one may be concerned about properties peculiar to kill-
ing someone. I showed that this equation is not what Thomsons means,
by noting that she points to ALN-saving processes as the life saving
aid in question, and that her argument is not meant to be one that is
true by definition.
(2) There is yet another construal of Thomson's first ar-
gument which would make the conclusion that we can kill a matter of
definition, and so defeat the BTP. Thomson says (and Brody agrees)
that a person's right to life does not imply that he has a right to
\
get support he needs to save his life. One possible construal of this
is that a person has no right to life which would imply that he has
a right to whatever support he needs to keep his life..This is meant
in the sense that he has no right to life, if this supposed right
implies a right to support he needs to keep his life. This construal
would imply -- quite straight-forwardly -- that a person has no
right to life in the sense of a right not to be killed, when his not
being killed would give him a right to remain where he gets the
support which has the effect of keeping him alive. This is because,
in virtue of having a right to life (a right not to be killed) he
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would acquire the right to what he needs to keep him alive. So, on
this construal, it seems that he cannot have the right not to be killed,
if it is true that his right to life does not imply that he has a
right to life support. Formally, we may represent this interpretation
as follows: where p= right to life; q = right to get life-support,
then - (p -+ q) -+ [(p -+ q) -+ -p] •
This construal of the claim that both Brody and Thomson
agree to, makes it seem that the question of whether we may kill, (i.e.
whether there is no right to life, in the sense of no right not to be
killed) is settled once we know that a consequence of having this
1
right is getting life-saving support. But this construal is incorrect.
The claim that Brody and Thomson agree to is only based on
the intuition that we needn't give some types of aid in order to save
a life. Perhaps there is a right to life which involves not being
able to kill, even if a consequence of this right is that someone
gets a right to use a life-supporting system. For there is a dif-
ference between: (1) denying that a right to life, just in virtue of
what it is, will give someone a right to get aid for the sake of
saving his life, and (2) denying that a right to life can lead, as a
consequence of its enforcement, to a right to life support, gotten
not for the sake of saving a".life, but as a consequence of avoiding
killing. (Analogously, my being an official in government may not,
lAs we shall see in Chapter V this conclusion, or something
very much like it, is true. But the proper derivation for it is not
the one described above.
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in itself, imply that I have a right to something for the sake of im-
proving my image. But this does not mean that it must be false that
I am a government official, if a consequence of some part of my job is
that I get a right to something which improves my image.) It may t·urn
out to be true that any interpretation of "a right to life" which
has the effect that someone gets a right to life-saving residence,
must be incorrect. But to prove this we must show more than that we
needn't allow residence just in order to save someone's life. l
Therefore, it is not correct to criticize a BTP on the grounds
that the claim that we needn't allow residence just in order to save
a life, itself, implies that no one has any right to life which has
the effect that someone gets a right to life-saving residence. The
evidence for our not needing to support in order to save does not
support the implication. There may not be a specific right to get
life-saving support, but this does not mean that there can be no
right of which the right to support is a consequence.
(3) A third suggested criticism of a BTP agrees that deciding
to let someone's body be used rather than have a killing, may not ex-
hibit the fault of using someone merely in order to save someone else.
lAnother way of putting this point is that a right to life
does not necessarily lead to a right to have the life-saving suppor~
if a right to life necessarily implied that we had to support someone
to save his life, it would imply that we had to support him for the
sake of saving his life. But this does not mean that a right to life
cannot lead to a right to have life-saving support.
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But, it does exhibit an equally objectionable fault, i.e., deciding to
use someone in order to prevent someone else from being killed. This
criticism is based on the following assumption: if A will be killed
by B, it is not permissible to put D inside C, even if this is the
only means of preventing A from being killed.
In answer to this objection we can note the following: Saying
that someone is allowed to stay inside someone else in order to avoid
a killing increases the tendency to think that what is going on, if
we are not allowed to kill, is that remaining attached is causally in-
volved in, has as its consequence, preventing a killing. But, actually
close to the reverse is true, i.e., the person remains attached because
we cannot kill. ~he proper analogy to the order in which things happen
in our cases, is not the case involving A, B, C, and D noted above, but
the following one: We cannot have B kill A, in order to remove D from
C. In both cases C supporting D means that A is not killed, but in
the second case, it is not true that C is being used to help prevent
A's killing.
In summary, having to keep someone in residence, because
we have to obey a constraint on our acts, is different from having to
keep someone in residence in order to achieve some end. There is a
difference between someone being used because we can't kill and using
someone to prevent a killing. The former can be permissible when the
latter is not. So this criticism of a BTP attempts to assimilate two
different types of cases, and fails.
95
(4) The fourth objection to Brody depends on distinguishing
between whether (a) third parties, who decide that residence must
continue because killing is impermissible, are doing anything already
agreed to be wrong; and whether (b) the supporter is doing what it was
agreed he needn't be doing, as a result of the decision. In discussing
Brody's objection to Thomson I noted that an implication of Brody's
objection is that when third parties decide that the person must remain
in residence, because it is impermissible ot kill, they are not deciding
to use a person merely for the sake of saving someone else's life. So
they do nothing that both Thomson and Brody have agreed it is wrong
to do; they offer no reason for residence which Thomson and Brody agree
is inadequate.
But Thomson's argument can be taken to exhibit a concern
not merely with whether those who decide removing is not permitted,
do so for a reason we have already agreed is wrong. With appropriate
modification, her argument can also be taken to be concerned with what
the consequences of this decision a~e, namely, whether, because of
their decision, the supporter winds up doing what we agreed he needn't
be doing. What we (Brody and Thomson) agreed he needn't be doing is
supporting someone merely in order to save the latter's life.
The fourth objection to a BTP is based on the following modi-
fication of Thomson's argument: Thomson, to the extent that her claim
is agreed to by Brody, says that we can kill to stop the support because
the person needn't support in his body, merely in order to save a life.
To this Brody answers that just because he needn't support merely
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in order to save a life, this does not mean that he needn't support
rather than kill. Thomson's argument isolates supporting as what we
do, and "m~rely to save a life," as a reason why we needn't do it.
Brody just says that there may be another reason why we must do it
(i.e. support). The modification of Thomson's argument isolates not
"what we needn't do, (i.e. support), merely to save a life," but
rather "what we needn't do" (e.g. support merely in order to save a
life). "What we needn't do" refers not only to support, but the reason
for it. Using this modification, objection 4 argues that it is permis-
sible to kill, because: (1) if we do not kill, the supporter will go
on doing what it is already agreed he needn't do, and (2) in doing
what he needn't be doing (e.g. supporting merely in order -to save a
life) he will be doing something (supporting) which he needn't do, merely
to save a life. The supporter continues to be used merely in order
to save someone's life in the violinist case, he continues to do what
he needn't do, even if the reason for the decision which results in this,
is that he must continue to support someone rather than kill, and not
that he must continue to support someone in order to save their life.
A possible answer to his fourth objection is that the person
does not, in fact, do what it is agreed he needn't do, if it is decided
that he must continue supporting rather than kill. For example, it
might be argued that if it is alright for 3rd parties to decide that
residence must continue, rather than have a killing, it is alright
because the supporter needs to carry somone, rather than kill him, i.e.
this is something he needs to do, not something we already agree that
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they do not need to do. Such a cou'nterargument ,would show how the de-
cision which 3rd parties make, is related to what the support"er ,'needs
to do.
Above, in filling out Brody's point I presente'd: anOther:' way~
in which someone might counterargue against objection 4. I showed', the
relationship (or rather, the lack of it) betweenwllat one 'n'e'edn't'do'
and what one needs to do. The point of that discussion was to show
that the supporter might need to carry someone rather than kill him,
so he wouldn't be doing what it was already agreed he needn't be
doing if the reason why he was required to support was to avoid a'
killing. 1
I will now argue that both these ways of counterarguing
against the fourth objection to Brody's position are to some degree
lIn that discussion I said that just because the supporter
winds up doing something (supporting) which has an effect which wouldn't
itself be a sufficient reason to justify what the person is doing, this
doesn't mean he is doing what we agreed he needn't be doing, since what
we agreed was that he needn't do something merely for the sake of this
insufficient reason. This means that it will not be sufficient, in
order to show that he is doing what he needn't be doing, if we don't
kill him, to point to the fact that, if we don't kill, then the sup-
porter will (1) be doing what we agreed he needn't do for an inadequate
reason, i.e. he will be doing what he needn't do merely to save a life,
and the supporter will (2) be doing what has an effect, which' when pointed
to as justification for residence, is inadequate to justify residence.
It can be true that he will do what he needn't do for the sake of saving
a life, and also have the effect of saving a life, i.e. he supports with
his body with the effect of saving a life, and he neen't do this merely
for the sake of saving a life, but this doesn't mean he is doing what
we agreed he needn't do, since what we agreed he needn't do is supporting
in his body merely for the sake of saving a life. Analogously: if I
needn't go to the store merely to make my father happy, this doesn't mean
I needn't go to the store to make the king happy, even if my going will
have the effect of making my father happy.
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inadequate. I will argue that, contrary to their claim that the sup-
porter wouldn't be doing what it was already agreed he needn't do, he
may still be doing something it was already agreed he needn't do, at
least on one level, even if he is doing what he needs tobedbing, at
another level. I will argue that this can occur in cases where the
reason proposed to justify doing something, a reason which we 'have not
already agreed is inadequate, is a negative reason. So, even if we need
to support rather than kill, this doesn't necessarily mean that we
aren't, in supporting, doing something else which we needn't be doing.
We can agree that the fact that we do what-we-needn't-do-for-
a-certain-reason, doesn't show that we are doing what we needn't do.
But, this, in turn, does not show that we are, therefore, not doing
.what we needn't do, i.e., supporting merely for the sake of saving a
life. We can agree that the decision, which results in our doing what-
we-needn't-do-for-a-certain-reason, does not itself decide that we
ought do what we are doing for that inadequate reason. But, this also
does not show that we are, therefore, not doing what we needn't do,
i.e. supporting merely for the sake of saving alife. In short, while
supporting with the effect of saving doesn't necessarily mean someone
is doing what it is agreed they needn't do, the fact that they remain
supporting because of a decision made for reasons other than that they
save the life, leaves it open that at least one of the things they are
doing is what they needn't do.
To show this I must examine further how the decision to
allow residence rather than kill affects whether: (1) the wrong of
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"residence merely for the sake of saving someone's life" -- as opposed
to the wrong of "our decision to' allow residence merely for the sake
of saving a life" -- takesplaqe, and.whether: (2) some other wrong
takes place. I will present two"view~ oh this issue. I argue that
the second view, is correc,t. I argue".,thatthe second view allows that
the supporter is still doing .something he'n~edn1tbe doing,but it also
allows Brody to make his point against Thomson. This is because, if we
describe what the person needn't be doing as "supporting merely in
order to save a life," he may need to support merely in order to save
a life rather than kill.
The first view of how the decision (to allow residence rather
than kill) affects whether something agreed to be wrong is going on,
is based on the following position: the reason which prompts the
decision not to interfere with a chain of events, which was started
or even which will start -- for a different reason, is the reason
which explains why the events take place. In Thomson's violinist case,
a kidnap merely.for the sake of aiding someone initiates the residence.
According to this first view, the fact that the reason residence con-
tinues is to avoid killing, makes it the case that continuing residence
does not involve the use of someone merely for the sake of saving some-
one else.
On this view, whenever there is any legitimate reason for a
person's not being able to defend himself against what is, initially,
correctly described as his being used illegitimately for someone's sake,
the situation will automatically turn into one where there is no longer
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any illegitimate use of an.yone occurring. This is because the losses
they suffer will occur for a different reason, namely the reason which
made retaliation impermissible. This first view would lead us to con-
elude that tllere is nothing whicllW~ have alre~dy agreed is wrong, going
on, if the support. conti~ue$ rather than. k.ill ~ I. call this view the
redescriptivist view, ·since the d.e~c:ri.pt,ion of what is go.ing or! changes
so radically.l
Now, for the second view of how the decision (to allow resi-
dence rather than kill) affects whether something agreed to be wrong
is going on. This view is consistent with Brody's position, i.e. what
is important in arguing against Thomson, is to show that the reason
for someone's getting a right to stay is not the desire to save his
life, but the desire to avoid a killing. But according to the second
view, the fact that the reason he stays is to avoid a killing, does not
mean that what we agreed to be wrong is not going on. If the events we
do not interfere with are, e.g., the result of a kidnap merely for
the sake of aiding, an illegitimate use may also be occurring. Here
there is no automatic redescription of what is occurring as in the first
approach.
This non-redescriptivist approach seems more in keeping with
how we would actually speak of what is going on. For example, if we
10n this view the cause of someone's death can be the pro-
cedure started in order to use him, but the reason he dies is supposed
to be the reason why we decide not to take the steps that could have
,:~aved' .him.
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could not kill the violinist, the kidnapped person could say, "It is
allowed that I be occupied merely for the sake of saving the violinist's
life, because you are not permitted to kill." He still thinks of him-
self as being occupied merely for the sake of saving the violinist's
life, the original intention behind his situation.
When the decision to use the person,~vhich leads to the pre-
sence of the cause of his death, comes after the decision that we can-
not intervene because we may not kill, matters seem even more clear.
For example, suppose we must just stand by when we know a person will
be used to save someone's life. A third party then does start to use
someone to save someone else's life. It would be very odd to say that
the person who is used, is not doing what he needn't do, i.e. is not
supporting someone in his body merely for the sake of saving a life,
just because he wouldn't be doing it if we hadn't decided before-hand
that we could not intervene. Likewise, suppose someone is being strangled
without adequate justification and it is impermissible for us to inter-
vene by killing the murderer. It would be wrong to say that the person
isn't suffering in a way he needn't suffer, just because it is right
that he suffer rather than have us intervene by killing.
The point I am making can be summarized most simply as:
when something wrong (or unrightful) is going on, e.g. doing some-
thing without proper justification, and we can't correct it, because
there is something impermissible about the only means of correction,
the wrong (or unrightful) event continues to go. on, even if it is
right that the wrong (or unrightful) event continue to go on.
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It will be,useful to have some terminology which expresses
the fact th~tsomet.hingwrong/unrightful is still going on, even if
its going on is justified. I employ the notion of All Things Considered
(ate), and N,qt AIl·Things Considered (nate) for this purpose. I
say that if we may ,not kill the person, then the supporter has to do,
and is doing, .atc.~ what: he needn't do, nate. These terms, ate and
natc, in context, work as follows: In the violinist case (1) natc
(i.e., independent of considering that we'd have to kill the resident
to remove him), the supporter needn't support the resident, since
there is no reason for his supporting, aside, possibly, from the fact
that it is impermissible to kill; (2) nate, he needn't support some-
one merely in order to save a life; (3) it is natc wrong that he is
supporting someone, because the reasons offered for the support are
inadequate, i.e. residence is nate wrong; (4) it is natc wrong that he
is supporting someone in order to save him; (5) if killing is impermis-
sible, then atc (i.e. in particular, considering the fact that we must
kill to remove someone), he has to support someone, i.e., residence
which is natc wrong is atc right; he needs to do, atc, what he needn't
do natc; (6) If killing is impermissible, then, atc, he needs to support
someone merely in order to save him; (7) if killing is impermissible,
then, ate, it is right that he is supporting someone; -(8) if killing
is impermissible, then, ate, it is right that he is supporting someone
merely in order to save his life; (9) if killing is impermissible, he
must, ate, support somone rather than kill him; this is something he
needs to do. (10) It is ~ wrong, both ate and nate, that he is
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supporting someone merely in order to save his life. If killing is
impermissible, then it is not wrong atc that he is supporting someone
in order to save his life, but. his supporting someone in order to save
him is a wrong. That is, it is right atc, that the wrong exist, but
it is still ~ wrong (atc and natc) which exists. When I say that the
·residence is right atc or wrong nate, I mean that its existence is
right or wrong. .When I say residence is a wrong, this does not refer
to its existence at a certain point in time~
Suppose there is no kidnap but, e.g. an accidental place-
ment in the body. In keeping with what I said above, (P.69) there is
something wrong with a presence having this sort of beginning too,
because it is unjustified. Therefore, even if the reason we give for
a right to stay atc -- that we must avoid killing -- is correct, the
supporter will continue to do what it is natc inappropriate that he
do; a wrong which is uncorrectible, given the only means available for
correcting it, is still going on. In the case of voluntary introduc-
tion, since there is no inappropriate origin for residence, but only
no positive right to continue to stay, there is (at least) a natc
unrightful residence taking place, i.e. residence without positive
justification continues, if we may not kill to stop it. If we may not
kill to stop it, it is right that what is natc unrightful (i.e., some-
thing whose existence is natc unrightful) should exist.
The difference between the non-redescriptivist approach and
the redescriptivis.t approach points up an oversimplification in the
previous discussion about the way in which reasons which are
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thought to be stronger than other reasons, can justify doing what the
weaker reasons cannot. It will not always be correct to say, when some-
one does something for one reason, when they needn't do it for another
reason, that they need to do atc, and· are doing, what they needn't do
natc (where "what they needn't do" refers to doing something for a
reason which doesn't justify it). For example, suppose I need not go
to the store merely to please my father, but I need to do it to save
a life (even if it also pleases my father). If the reason I wind up,
atc, going to the store, is to'save a life, this doesn't mean that I
still am doing, atc, what I needn't do~natc.
The new reason justifies going to the store in such a way
that there is no wrong going on which it is right should continue.
So justifying doing something (e.g. supporting) for a stronger reason
mayor may not result in a wrong continuing. If we could justify the
person supporting the violinist by saying he made a contract to do
this, this stronger reason (vs. the supposedly stronger reason, we
can't kill) would not result in a wrong still continuing.
Note that there can be two things which are wrong natc:
(1) having to support someone/go to the store. (Because there is not
a sufficiently strong reason, natc, to justify it.) and (2) Having
to support someone in order to save a life/go to the store to please
my father. In the cases where we may not interfere with what is,
nate, wrong, someone winds up doing what is natc wrong in both sense
(1) and (2) of natc. In the cases where I have to go to the store to
save a life and this has the effect of pleasing my father, someone
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winds up doing, atc, what is natc wrong only in sense 1. It is doing,
atc, what one needn't do natc in sense (2), which is important for
Objection 4. Futhermore, it is only if someone is doing what he needn't
do, nate in sense (2) that something wrong/unrightful is continuing.
1 2(I shall refer to these two senses of nate, as nate and nate when
occasion calls for the distinction.)
One of the functions of noting that what is nate wrong!un-
rightful is going on, is to emphasize that, if the means of ending it
were innocuous, then something ought to be done to end it, and we
should be concerned to find an alternative means to end the residence.
We might also be concerned to make a world where people do not need
us to go the store to save a life i.e. a world where the stronger
reason does not exist. But, if life saving justifies our going to
the store, we are not concerned with the need for it not existing
because there is something wrong/unrightful taking place when I go to
the store to save a life. [Even when we (justifiably) override some-
one's rights for a great cause, there is not something wrong going on,
in the way something wrong goes on, when we can't interfere to stop
a wrong.]
In the earlier discussion of the role of stronger reasons
there was, at the very least, a failure to distinguish cases in which
a(proposed) stronger reason would initiate doing something and where
it is merely a reason for not interfering with continuation of some-
thing. Pointing to someone winding up doing something (supporting)
which it is agreed another reason does not justify, and even pointing
level. This is
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to the effect of doing it as the effect which isn't sufficient to serve
as a reason for requiring that it be done, doesn't show that he
needn't do it for a better reason. But it also doesn't show that we
are not doing what we needn't be doing at a natc2
because it doesn't distinguish cases where the stronger reason is
merely a negative reason (i.e. we can1 t stop the process), from cases
where the stronger reason is a positive (initiating or maintaining)
reason. When the stronger reason is a negative reason, there is a
wrong going on if we don't intervene. When the stronger reason is a
positive reason there is no wrong going on.
Use of "doing what he needs to do atc" and "doing what he
needn't do nate," helps us to distinguish between two senses of "if we
don't kill he will wind up doing what he needn't do": (1) not allowing
killing will be wrong. (This implies that ate he needn't support in
order to save and he needn't support rather than kill); (2) if you
don't kill, something wrong, independent of the possible wrong of
not killing, will occur. (This implies that he is doing something he
2
needn't do natc.) It is only sense (2) which can serve as an argu-
ment for killing being alright. In fact, we can see the point of
Objection 4 as: Why should one have to continue doing, atc, what one
2
needn't do, natc • That is, why should it be right that some wrong/
unrightful situation continues? Why should it be impermissible to kill
to stop someone doing what he needn't do, thereby making it the case
that they need to do it.
i''-''
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To the extent to which Brody deals with the supposedly stronger
reason for continuing support -- we aren't allowed to kill -- as if it
were a positive reason, rather than the negative reason it is, to
that extent will he: (1) overlook that there is a residence going on
whose existence is, at least, natc2 wrong/unrightful, a.nd which
serves as an argument for the pennissibility of killing, "and (2)
interpret the claim, "if we don't kill he will wind up doing what he
needn't do,1f as a characterization of not killing which assumes that
killing is alright, instead of as a reason for why killing is alright.
I have argued that: (a) the person would continue to do what
he needn't do natc (where what he does includes the reason for which
he needn't do it and also where it doesn't, i.e. "support in
order to aid1f and "support1f ), and (b) ~ wrong/unrightful scenario
would continue, if killing is not permitted. I argued that this
happens even if not killing is a stronger reason for having to support
than saving a life. I argued that this is not true in all cases where
the stronger reason justifies doing something that a weaker reason
doesn't, but is true where the stronger reason is a negative (as opposed
to a positive) reason.
But, does the fact that what is wrong/unrightul, except pos-
sibly because we cannot kill to stop it, i.e. what is wrong/unrightful
natc, (the existence of the wrong/unrightful scenario) is going on,
show that we can kill to remove the resident, as Objection 4 says?
The answer to objection 4 is not that the person doesn't, at
all, do what he needn't do, but that sometimes it can be right atc
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that the person does what he needn't do natc. More is. needed. to: show,,'.
that killing is permissible, more is needed to show that it is.wrong
to decide the person must stay in residence rather' than kill him,
than that something we agree to be a wrong will c·ontinue.if wedon',.-t·
kill. The fact that we needn't support someone merel'yin ,order't,o
save his life, does not mean that we may not have to suppor·t s.otneOne
merely in order to save his life, rather than kill.
Nor is this view unusual. There are many cases where a
wrong continues to happen but we cannot kill to stop it from happening,
because it would be wrong to kill, even to correct a wrong that will
continue if it is not corrected. There are many cases where people
will continue to do what there is no positive justification for their
continuing to do, but there cannot be a killing, because the killing,
itself, is inadequately justified by the fact that other events, lack-
ing positive justification,. will continue if we do not kill. The
existence of a wrong/unrightful scenario becomes right, in the sense
that we must tolerate it, because we may not kill to stop it.
Furthermore, one consequence of moral theories which emphasize
the role of side-constraints on action, is that a heavier burden usually
falls on justifying the correction of an evil by an evil, than on
leaving the first evil uncorrected. This is true even when the event
to be corrected is equal to or worse than the corrective event. So,
e.g. suppose A will be killed as a consequence of some plan to save
B, unless we employ a plan to save A from her fate. This plan causes
C's death. We cannot correct A's fate, if this means killing C.
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There was a constraint on killing A, as there is on killing C, but
the last link the constraint chain is the hardest to justify·'breaking.
(This may be because it makes direct reference to the previous links
in the chain as things for the correction of which we Inay not do some~
thing to someorie, i.e. it encompasses, provides a directive fo~, the
very situation we are in.) The constraint is especially strorlg' WIlen"
we want to kill someone as a means. It says we may not violate his
rights, even if we do this to protect someone else's rights. So we may
not be able to kill the resident even to protect the rights of the
1
supporter.
A reason must be given for thinking that the case of the
violinist is not one of the cases where killing to correct a wrong!
unrightful scenario is not permitted. Perhaps there is something
significant about the particular events which will continue to happen
if there is no killing in this case, or perhaps there is some further
aspect of the fact that a need for life-support does not give a right
to residence, or perhaps there is some combination of these, which
provides the reason why we can kill. Otherwise, we must go back to
dealing with self-defense arguments, complemented (or not) by the fact
that the threat occurs while on one's own territory, to provide the
missing link between something wrong or not justified by a positive
reason happening, and the permissibility of killing to stop it.
lElsewhere, I have discussed possible explanations for why the
last person in line is always protected on constraint views.
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In summary, Objection. 4 says that ,someone may wind up doing
what it is agreed he needn't do, even if the reason for our decision
requiring him to support is to avoid a >.killing, and not to save someone' s
life. We may kill~ because otherwise· the. supporter will wind up doing
what he needn't do. I noted responses to ;thisobjection, the aim of
which was to show that the supporter.wo~'t·bedoingwhat we agreed he
needn't do, if we don't kill. These responses were the following:
(1) He isn't doing what we agreed he needn't do, because he may need to
avoid killing and our decision reflects this. (2) His not needing to
support someone merely in order to save him, does not show that he
may not have to support him rather than kill, even if an effect of
this is that he saves him. I argued that these responses do not show
that the person isn't doing what it is agreed he needn't do, at the
same time that he is doing something it is not agreed he needn't do.
To show that the person is doing what he needn't do, I discuss two
views on how the decision that a person must maintain a position, be-
cause we may not kill, affects whether he continues to do something
for the sake of the goal which initiated his position. On one view,
the person does something only for the sake of·the reason which moti-
vated the decision that he must continue supporting. I argue that the
correct view is the one on which someone does continue to do what it
was agreed he needn't do. If we cannot do what is necessary to stop
his doing what he needn't do, then it is correct to say that he needs
to do, atc, what he needn't do, natc. (It is not correct to say that
III
he doesn't, at all, do what it was agreed he neednttdo.) This amounts
to saying that, if we cannot correct ·some wrong,itis right that the
wrong continue. The point of objection 4 is·:· why should one have to
continue doing·, atc, what one needn't do, nate? Why should it be
right that some wrong/unr;ightftil .situat'iori: 'continues? ··Whyshould it be
impermissible to kill to' stop 'someone from doing what he needn't do?
I argued that the answer to objection 4 is·ridt that thep~rson doesn~t,
at all, do what he needn't do,but that sometimes it can be right, atc,
that the person does what he needn't do, natc. More is needed to show
that killing is permissible, than that something wrong/unrightful will
continue if we don't kill, or that the person will wind up doing what
he needn't do natc.
F. I conclude that Thomson's argument, as it stands, does not make
clear why we may kill. The particulars of a justification of killing
are still needed. I will now argue that it is also true that the BTP
does not give a justification for not killing. I will show that a BTP
is even true of cases where we agree that it is permissible to kill.
I conclude, therefore, that these two arguments leave us without a
justification for either killing or not killing.
Brody argues that giving as a reason for the right to stay
in residence, that we cannot kill to end residence, is not the same
as giving as a reason for the right to residence, that residence will
save someone's life. But the truth of this claim does not justify
our not killing rather than killing. It only tells us that this reason
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for allowing residence is not the particular wrong reason which
Thomson identifies, i.e., this reason does not try to justify using
someone's body merely to save a life. It is still quite possible that
this new reason for allowing residence is also a wrong reason. (For
example, if killing were justified, then avoiding killing would not
be a reason for allowing residence to ·continue, and it would be wrong
not to permit killing.) To show that one reason is not identical with
one wrong reason is not to show that it is a right reason. Likewise,
to say that killing might be unjust therefore we would have to support
someone, doesn't show that killing is unjust.
An additional way to show that a BTP doesn't prove that
avoiding a killin~ is a justification for continuing residence -- one
way to show that a BTP doesn't prove that we can't kill to stop life-
saving support -- is to show that it applies to cases where even Brody
would say that killing is permissible. And, indeed, a BTP does apply
to cases where Brody himself would say that it is permissible to kill.
Consider Case (D): Z has deliberately put himself into Y, for the
purpose of saving his own life. Z, is, therefore, a guilty aggressor.
Y will not die if Z remains. Z, however, will die if he is detached
prematurely. Suppose a pacificist argues that one may not kill Z,
even in self-defense. (Because of the correctness of a policy of
non-resistance to evil, minimization of total number of killings, or
some such reason.) This pacificist can note that if Y, or someone who
would act on his behalf, is not allowed to kill, because killing is
wrong, then, although Z is allowed to remain in Y, and although he will
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benefit from the presence, he gets to stay only because we can't kill,
not merely in order :to save his life. So, in this case also, the
reason for letting the person stay is not to use the supporter to
save someone else's life. But Brody would allow Case (D) to be a case
where Y could legitimately defend himself by killing Z, or by having Z
killed by a third party. Therefore, showing that we can offer
"avoiding a killing" as a reason for continuing residence, and showing
that this reason is different from merely wanting to save a life, will
not show that we can't kill.
Clearly then, the truth of Brody's description of what would
be going on in Thomson's case if we gave "we can't kill," as a reason
for continuing residence, need not rule out the permissibility of kill-
ing in Thomson's case, any more than it rules out killing in Case (D).l
And, in fact, Brody does not claim that his point concerning the dif-
ference in reasons, itself, rules out killing in Thomson's case.
(It only shows that Thomson's argument isn't sufficient to justify
killing.) He realizes that to show that killing is, in fact, impermis-
sible, one must show that in this particular case, killing is not
justified. He argues that killing:'is impermissible because we can't
justify killing an innocent, passive threat. I shall not argue against
this view here. My only concern has been to show that a criticism of
1Furthermore, from Case (D), we can also tell that Brody's
justification for not killing is not based on attaching overriding
value to minimizing the total number of killings. For, if he wanted
to minimize killings he would be against permitting killing in Case (D).
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Brody's, which shows that Thomson's Argument I, as it stands, is in-
sufficient, does not show that killing is impermissible.
I began this Chapter by considering two arguments to justify
killing: (1) simple self-defense, and (2) Thomson's Argument I. I
did not conclude that simple self-defense was inadequate, but I
abandoned it, at least temporarily, to consider Thomsons's Argument 1.
This Argument says that we can kill to stop supporting someone in our
body because we needn't support in this way merely to save someone's
life. I focused on Thomson's argument because it was an attempt to
make use of the fact that the person to be killed, unlike the standard
innocent threat, is using what is mine. I then presented Brody's
criticism, i.e. showing that someone need not support someone merely
in order to save a life does not show that he need not support for
a different reason i.e. rather than kill. I argued that Thomson's
Argument 1 applies to cases where there is no injustice in the way
the person is introduced into someone else's body. I also showed the
degree to which Thomson and Brody could share a common perspective that
residence in someone's body must be justified. I then considered 4
objections to Brody's argument. I concluded that his criticism is
successful against Thomson's Argument I, as it stands and even
against a modification of it. 1 Brody's criticism shows that Thomson's
IBY "as it stands" I mean, e.g., that it is not presented in
combination with the explicit premise that there is no morally signifi-
cant difference between killing to terminate support and letting someone
die to begin with. By "modification" I mean the way Objection 4 to
Brody's argument modifies Thomson's argument.
115
Argument I does not show how we can justify the leap from the premises:
(1) I needn't share my body merely to save a life, and (2) If there
is no killing, then I will do what it was agreed I needn't do merely
in order to save a life, to the conclusion: I may kill to end someone
sharing my body. Brody's criticism shows that she does,not justify
the leap because (a) she does not show how not having to support for
one reason (to save a life) bears on not having to support for another
reason (to avoid killing), and (b) she does not show why we can kill
to correct situations the existence of which are wrong/unrightful, at
least natc. She does not show this, because she does not show why we
cannot be required to, e.g., support merely in order to save a life,
rather than kill, even if we need not support merely in order to save
a life.
Since Thomson's Argument I, as it stands, seems to be in-
sufficient to justify killing in the casesof interest to us, we must
consider other ways in which killing can be justified. These other
ways may, or may not, use premises (1) and (2) (above) of
Thomson's Argument I. to reach the conclusion that we may kill.
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CHAPTER III
In Chapter II, I argued that the basic principle at the
heart of Thomson's Argument 1, was that it is not unjust to kill the
violinist "because he has no right to be there merely in order to
save his life." I presented a criticism based on one that Brody
presents, which asks why, if we agree that he has no right to be
there merely in order to save his life, this should mean that he has
no right to be there rather than be killed. That is, if we needn't
support someone in our body for one reason, why should we think that
this shows that we needn't support him for another reason.
One answer which Thomsons suggests to a Brody-type argument
is made in her second paper "Rights and Deaths." The crux of this
response is as follows: If I needn't do something merely in order
to save someone's life, I needn't do it rather than kill him to
stop doing it, because there is no significant moral difference
between killing someone and letting him die, when all other factors
besides killing and letting die are held constant. I will not discuss
this suggested response in detail here. This is in part because I
think Thomson:s analysis of the question of whether killing is
morally more objectionable than letting die is inadequate. But
also because cases which I will present below in connection with
further consideration of Argument r indicate that it is either
(a) not true that there is no moral significance to the difference
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between killing and letting die, per se, or to the presence of
killing as opposed to letting die, in which case Thomson's response
to a BTP would be wrong, or (b) there is some other morally signifi-
cant difference between the cases where we do not start life support
and where we kill to terminate it, in which case Thomson's response
to a BTP would be insufficient.
In this chapter I will present three different ways, in
addition to discussing whether killing is morally equivalent to
letting die, in which Thomson's papers suggest that we might try
to answer a BTP by showing that killing in the violinist case is
justified. The first is simple self-defense. The second and third
ways involve defending the particular thesis that if we needn't
do something in order to save a life then we needn't do it· rather
than kill to stop doing Lt. In particular, the second involves
the claim that killing is nothing but a denial of life supporting
aid and therefore is permissible. The third is that we may deduce
the permissibility of killing in the violinist case, because we
needn't support someone in our body even to save their life, from
the permissibility of killing in other cases. I examine in detail
why killing is not unjust in these other cases and I examine the
role of "it's mine" in making killing permissible. I claim that
all these three approaches are inadequate to justify killing in the
violinist case. The failure of these approaches leaves Thomson's
claims about when we can kill unproved. It does not show them to
be wrong, however. I then consider exactly when Argument I predicts
that killing is not unjust and is permissible. I show that at least
some of its claims about when killing is not unjust and when it is
permissible are wrong. I conclude that these countercases show that
it is not always permissible to kill to stop use of what we wouldn't
have to give (either as a matter of right or decency) mer~ly to
save someone's life, I claim that this is because the cases show
that either (a) the fact that a killing takes place makes a morally
significant difference, and we must do more to avoid killing than
to avoid letting die, or (b) because some other factor besides the
presence of killing -- though perhaps still reflecting on whether
killing differs from letting die per se in a morally significant
way is presen~ when we kill to stop support and is absent when
we let die to begin with.
A. The first additional way suggested by Thomson to justify killing
in the violinist case is simple self-defense. l At one point in
"Rights and Deaths" she defends killing on the grounds of simple
self-defense, not making reference to the peculiarities of the
violinist case in particular. She discusses the permissibility
of intentionally killing "innocent" children -- the case she gives
involves active children -- who are threats. She suggests that
when someone in one's body is an innocent threat to us we may
lSometimes Thomson just seems to assume that the violinist
case presents intuitively clear case of permissible killing and no
justification is needed.
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likewise kill, even intentionally. This sort of defense raises
all the questions I have discussed in ~hapter 11,_ in particul~r how
we decide how large a threat must be before we allow, killing in
self-defense. It does not emphasize the fact that one's own property
is being occupied by the threat, that the threat is benefiting from
this residence, and it does not give a crucial role to the principle
at the heart of Argument ~I i. e. that one needn't support someone
merely to save his life. I will put aside discussion of the simple
self-defense argument to see if something better can be found.
B. The second additional argument suggested by Thomson's papers
claims that we may kill when killing just consists in stopping aid
which "7e needn't give even to save a life: weare only taking away
use of what belongs to us in doing this, and the person dies because
of lack of support (not trauma of removal). The trouble with this argu-
ment~ in addition to the fact that we are not told why taking
away use of what is our own is not impermissible when it does lead
to someone being left open to a threat of death, is that it does not
apply to cases where we directly attack the person who is getting
life support and kill him in order to remove him. Thomson is
willing to allow that a direct assault on someone with death intended
as a means (not mere detachment) is permissible. The defense of kill-
ing in this way could not depend on the factors emphasized in this
justification of killing.
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c. The third additional way suggested by Thomson's papers to justify
killing in the violinist case is to simply deduce the .right to kill
in that case by proper steps from cases where there is assumed to
be no doubt that one can kill. I will present a detailed analysis
of these other cases which Thomson presents in her fi.rst paper'
("A Defense of Ab~ortion") and the trarlsitions between them. t clainl
that this analysis shows that such a deduction is suggested, but
that it fails.
Thomson tries to show that in some cases the fact that
someone is using what is mine gives rise to a right to kill him when
this right would not exist if he were not using what is mine. In
particular, when a threat of a certain size by itself would not give
a rights enforcer a right to kill, the fact that the threat occurs
to someone by way of the use of what is his will give a third
party a right to kill. From these cases where we are supposed to
agree killing is permissible, Thomson tries to show that we can kill
in the violinist case. Argument I merely asserts that when someone
has a prior claim to his body, even when someone else needs it for
life, we may kill to stop the use of it. It seems to me that the
cases she presents and the transitions between them indicate .that
she tries to show that we can kill to stop use of the body to which
we have a prior claim, even if someone else needs it for life,
because in other cases where it is agreed that we can kill, the
reason we can kill is that someone has a prior claim to what belongs
to him, even if someone else needs it for life. Since the cases
from which she wishes to deduce the permissibility of killing in
the violinist case are not exactly like the violinist case - in
particular they differ with respect to the size ,of the threat
facing the person - she must isolate sottle factor which makes
killing permissible in those' cases which they 'do, share \viththe
violinist case ~ So in looking at the'othe.r'~'cases it will not be
sufficient to see whether killing is, permissible there. If they
are to be evidence for the permissibility of killing in the vio-
linist case, we must see what principle permits us to kill in
those cases. In particular, I claim that these other cases are
supposed to be taken as evidence for the view that when we know
that we needn't support the violinist in our body solely to save
his life, we then also know that we needn't support him rather
than not kill him. These other cases are supposed to be evidence
for this, because these other cases are ones where we agree that
killing is permissible and in these other cases the fact that we
needn't do something solely in order to save someone's life is
what implies that killing is permissible.
I will argue (1) that the difference which Thomson claims
reference to "it's mine" makes to the permissibility of third
party killings in the Baby Case, depends on more than "it's mine."
Rather, it depends on someone having a non-overridden prior claim
to the use of what belongs to him. (2) Someone might have a
nonoveridden prior claim to what is his, without this making the
difference to the permissibility of third party killings in the
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Baby Case that Thomson suggests it has. Itif:L quite possible to
argue that having a non-overridden'prio~ claim to something, even
if someone else ,needs it for life~ gives us a.r~ght to ~ill.someone
to stop his using it, without also .arguing ~hat ..the fact that, so.meon·e
is using what we have a non-overridden prior, claim to "alL.oVl.S "lh'itd
parties to do more in our defense than they coul;d'do',wl1en we-:,:a·rie. \
attacked by someone who isn't using what we have a :non-overridden
prior to. "It's mine" may make a difference to whether we have a
non-overridden prior claim, without either it or the non-overridden
prior claim making a difference to whether a third party can kill
to help. (3) Someone can come to have a non-overridden prior claim
to what is his in different ways. I claim that the situations in
which someone has a non-overridden prior claim (henceforth NOPC) are
different in the Baby and Coat Cases than they are in the violinist
case. (4) I argue that even if the owner has a non-overridden prior
claim to what is his when someone else needs it for life, this does
not mean that he has a right to kill to stop use of what is his. So,
showing that a NOPC exists will not show that a right to kill exists.
In particular, pointing to the permissibility of killing in the
Baby and Coat cases, where the owner has a NOPC, even if the non-owner
needs it for life, is insufficient evidence for the permissibility of
killing in the violinist case where there is also a NOPC. I argue
that this is because killing in the Baby and Coat Cases may be
permissible, at least in part, because of the size of the threat
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which residence/use presentsGI Whether or not presence on my resi-
dence contributes to making a difference in how a third party can
respond to the threat to me, the fact that he can respond to the
threat by killing may be due to the size of the threat involved i.e.
death. It is possible that if the threat presented by use of
what belongs to me were lower, it might still beenollgh to give -a
NOPC, but not enough to merit my responding by killing. I argue
that there is a tendency to think that the permissibility of killing
in the Baby and Coat Cases shows that killing in the violinist case
is also permissible because (1) In the Baby and Coat Cases the
particulars of the situation are that a NOPC to the use of something
exists when a threat which is agreed to be sufficient to merit the
response of killing is present. (2) In addition, because the threat
which leads to a NOPC in the Coat Case is one which it is agreed is
sufficient to merit killing, there is a tendency to change the
procedure on the basis of which we decide whether we may kill, from
NOPC being added to the threat, to NOPC being used alone. This may
give the impression that the permissibility of killing is due simply
to someone having a NOPC, as opposed to being crucially dependent on
the size of the threat which helps give rise to the NOPC. I conclude
that on the basis of the evidence of the other cases, we cannot assume
that there is a right to kill to stop use of the body just because
there is a NOPC to the body when someone else needs it to save his
life. One must show that the threat of the use of one's body, like
the threat of death, merits the defense of killing.
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I will begin by .examining in more detail each of the cases
which Thomson presents and also those her discussion suggests. I
have arranged the cases .in· a logical order which makes clear the
deduction I claim· can.be dis.cerned.
The: first case T'homson .presents is the Baby Case (hence-
forth BCl). In this cas;e,.a~baby aIldaIlother person are both in a
house, which belongs tQneither. The baby is expanding rapidly and
threatens to crush the other person to death. Thomson claims that
the person threatened (the first party himself) can kill the baby
simply on grounds of self~defens~ But, possibly, a third party --
both ordinary third parties and rights enforcers -- should abstain
from choosing sid~s, because both the baby and the person threatened
are innocent.
In a second Baby Case (BC2) suggested by Thomson, the baby
expands in a house belonging to the person fatally threatened by the
expansion. The person threatened can say of the house "It's mine."
Thomson claims that this makes a difference to what a third party
may do. He may kill. It also makes a difference to what a rights
enforcer ought to do. He ought to kill the baby to protect the owner.
I note the following about these cases: (1) If either
(a) a third party/rights enforcer could/should kill in BCl, or
(b) he still may not kill in BC2, "it's mine" would not make the
difference that Thomson claims it does. (2) If Thomson is right
and a first party can kill in BCI and "it's mine" makes a difference
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to what a rights enforcer can do, "it's mine'" will also make a
difference to what the first p'arty can do, in the following way:
If a first party could kill even when he couldn't say of the house
"i t 's mine';" but a rightsenforcer couldn't ,this means that the
baby, if he could, would have a right. to defend himself against
the self-defensive threat presented by the first party protecting
himself. This means that the person would have a right to try to
kill the baby, but he would not have a right to his death, if that
was what was necessary to stop the life-threatening expansion. If
a rights enforcer should side with the first party, this means the
Baby has no legitimate grounds for responding to any attack on it
(except possibly, the Hobbesian one.) So, if "it's mine" makes
a difference to what third parties may do, it also makes the position
of the first party stronger, even if there are no third parties
around to help him.
(3) (a) In discussing BC2 Thomson emphasizes the fact that
"it's his house." But "it's being his" (or "it's mine,~' being the
general title of the thesis) would not make the difference she claims
it does, if it were his, but despite this, the Baby had as much right
to it as he did, at least at that time. It seems what must make the
difference is that the owner has a non-overridden prior claim (NOPC)
to what is his, with respect to the baby. That is, if the owner
had a prior claim to what is his, because it was his, but this prior
claim were Qverridden by e.g. the baby's need to be present, then it
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wouldn't make a difference between BCl and BC2 that the house belonged
to the person threatened. "It's mine" may give someone a prior
claim, but there must be a NOPC in order for "it's mine" to make
a difference to what a third party can do.
(b) Furthennore, to the extent that we wish to point to
a NOPC as a reason for the permissibility fo killing the Baby, as
a reason for removing him from the house, we should not use "NOPC"
simply to mean that the owner has a right to have his house to him-
self and so has a right to have the Baby removed. Sometimes it seems
as though Thomson uses "having a just prior claim" to mean that the
owner has a right to have what is his taken away from someone else
or has a right to have the non-owner removed, i.e. she uses it as
if it meant that he has a right to have what is his, even if it
means taking it away/removing someone who already is using it.
Sometimes, she applies prior claim to situations where the question
is whether someone else has a right to start to have what belongs
to someone else, i.e. she says the owner need not give what is his
because he (the owner) has a just prior claim to it. (Or, what
amounts to the same thing, he need not let continued use just
because someone else needs it.)
I shall use NOPC, in such away that it does not assume
that if someone has what is mine it can be taken away from them,
even if I wouldn't have to give it to him to start with and even
if the reason he can continue to have it is not merely that he needs
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it. I use NOPC to mean that when what is mine (as opposed to
manna from heaven) is not in my, or anyone else's, possession, then
if it is to be given to someone, it is to be given to me. I call
this the distribution sense of NOPC.
(c) We may consider how there comes to be a NOPC in the
BC2. A tentative suggestion is that since (1) the house belonging
to the person ("it's mine") gives him a prior claim to it, and (2)
the baby who is/would be in the house has no need, to start with,
to be there (i.e. no HLN or any other need satisfied by coming
into the house), and (3) the baby would present a fatal threat to
the owner if he was in the house, therefore, (4) the owner's prior
claim is not overridden and he has a NOPC. That is, if someone
who didn't need to use your house would present a fatal threat to you
if they did use it, he has no right to start to use it. I say
this is a tentative suggestion of how the NOPC comes to exist in
this case and I will return to the question below.
(4) According to Thomson, the BC2 shows that "it's mine"
(via having a NOPC) makes a difference to whether someone (a third
party) can kill. Even if this is true, we should carefully
distinguish between (1) "it's mine/NOPC" makes a difference to whether
someone can kill, and (2) "it's mine/NOPC" is the reason for the per-
missibility of someone (e.g. third party) killing. So far as Baby
Cases land 2 show, the reason the third party can kill in BC2 is
that the house belongs to the person, he has NOPC to it and the
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baby presents a fatal threat to him. "It's mine" may make a differ-
ence, but "it's mine + (added to) fatal threat" is what makes the
killing permissible, so far as BCl and 2 lead us to believe. We
already (assume we) know that the first party in BCI could kill in re.s-
pon.se.t.O't·he fatal threat ,and in Be2 the third party gets the rIght
to do what the first party could do, to the same threat.
(5) I said that Thomson claims that "it's mine" makes a
difference to whether a third party can kill in the .Baby Cases. I
said it would be better to think of her as saying that having a NOPC
makes a difference to whether a third party can kill in the Baby
Case. I suggested how it is that "it's mine" would contribute
to giving someone a NOPC.
It is important to note that in all this two separate
questions are being raised: (A) Does (and how does) "it's mine"
give someone a prior claim and a .NOPC; and (B)Does having a NOPC
make a significant difference between the two Baby Cases as to
what a third party can do. It is possible to believe "it's mine"
contributes to someone having a prior claim and a NOPC, without
believing that a third party can act any differently in the two
Baby Cases. For example, someone might believe the answer to (A)
is Yes and believe the answer to (B) is No, because they believes
that a third party may respond to an attack on the person in BCl
by killing the Baby just as he may do in BC2. A fatal attack
on someone, regardless of whether the attacker is an innocent
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threat, should put a rights enforcer on the side of the person
attacked. Or someone, might believe that if a third party could
not kill the Baby in Case 1, when he presents a fatal thre~t, there
is nothing else that the baby could do in addition to threatening
death (including residing on someone else's property) which.would
raise the ceiling on what a rights enforcer could do to him tIl. the
way of a response.
So it is possible to believe the answer to (A) is Yes,
and the an~wer to (B) is No. (It is even possible to believe, (C)
that a rights enforcer gets a right to kill someone in order to
stop his using what the owner has a NOPC-to,-even-if-someone-else-
needs-it-to-save-his-1ife, without also believing that the answer
to (B) is Yes, so long as one believes that (B) is false because
the rights enforcer can also kill in Baby Case 1.)
In sununary, I have argued that the claim that "it's mine"
makes a difference to my having a prior claim and a NOPC to what
is mine, is separate from the claim that use of what's mine will
increase what a third party can do in my defense when I am under
attack. I have argued that if "it's mine" were to make a difference
to what a third party can do, it would be because there is also a
NOPC. If having a NOPC made a difference this would only mean that
the NOPC in combination with the fatal threat, gave a third party
the right to do what a first party could, even when no one was using
what he had a NOPC to. I considered how we could explain that the
owner had a NOpe, and I specified the meaning of NOPC in such a way
130
that it did not assume that someone could take away from someone else
what 'he had NOpe to. It only means that if distribution of what belongs
to someone is in question, the owner should get it.
This third case Thomson presents is the Coat C~Se. In' this
case someone has (innocentl~) put on my coat. We both need it to'
save our lives. Thomson claims that a rights enforcer 'may take away
the coat from the other person and give it back to the owner, because
the owner has a just prior claim to it.
Thomson sees the Coat Case (henceforth CC) merely as ad-
ditiona1 support for her conclusion in BC2. She doesn't note that
it is in any significant way different from BC2. But given the sug-
gestion for how the owner comes to have NOPC in BC2, it may, at first,
seem that it would be more difficult to justify the owner having a
NOPC in the CC. This is because in the CC the non-owner needs the
coat to save his life to begin with. In the BCs the baby had no
original need to save his life by the use of the house. Greater
need would provide greater justification and greater justification
for use might make killing ~re difficult. l
But on second view, it may seem that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the cases, sillce the,.baby in BCl winds !:!E.
IWhile.this suggested relation between greater need/greater
justification for use, and greater difficulty in justifying killing
seems plausible, we shall see that it is not true. In Chapter ~, I
show that the greater the need/the greater the apparent justification
for use, the easier it is to show that killing is not unjust in cases
of interes~ to us.
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having a need to stay in the house, a need which is a matter of life
and death, given that the only way to remove him is to kill him.
The fact that Thomson sees the Coat ease as merely ad-
ditional support for BC2, implies that she sees the question of.the
owner's NOPC being decided in the Baby Cases and in the CC in asitua-
tion where both owner and non-owner have equal needs to what belorlgs
to one of them i.e. it is a matter of life and death for both.
The fact that the baby's life need to stay in treated like the
ALN need in the CC supports the view that the fact that no need was
present to begin with is not of significance in deciding what
should be done in the case where killing is necessary to remove
someone. This is in keeping with what I said in Chapter II. I
noted that whereas Thomson's paper raises the question of whether
we can kill to stop doing what we needn't do to save a life, there
was another question which might be raised, namely, whether we
might be able to kill to stop doing what we would have to do if
someone needed it to save his life when someone doesn't actually
have a HLN/ALN need that serves as a positive reason. The conclusion
was that negative reasons count as well as positive reasons. The
fact that the Baby's life need is treated in this respect like an
ALN, may lead us to' overlook the fact that there is ALN satisfaction
in the Coat Case and none in the Baby Cases.
This suggests that the analysis provided above of how the
owner comes to have a NOPC in the BC2 was insufficient, since it
did not weigh a life nee~ of the baby against the fatal threat
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he presents to the owner. Since our notion of NOpe involves de-
ciding how we would distribute the use of the house to start with,
but the life need of the baby only arises when the means of re-
moving him come into the picture, it seem's that the permissibility
of third party killings may dep·end on figuring out if·a NOPC would
have existed if the baby had had an ALN before entering. Once
we consider the baby's life need, we see the owner's'NOPC as arising" be-
cause (l)tl;1e owner has a prior claim ·to what· .is ~is, and (2) the fact
that the baby would need to be there to save his life (if he had
HLN) would not override the owner's claim, if the baby's presence
would cause the death of the owner. l
Likewise in the Coat Case the owner has a NOPC because
(1) it's his coat and so he has a 'prior claim to it, and (2) the
II am assuming only that the NOPC is a necessary condition
for the permissibility of killing, not a sufficient one, in the
sense that if we had to save someone -- take in the baby -- when
he presented a fatal threat -- we couldn't kill him to remove him
when he had no HLN/ALN, and if we didn't have to save him in these
conditions, then maybe we can kill. I am not saying that we can
kill because we needn't save. This is the question still to be
decided. Furthermore, one should not confuse the two senses in
which someone might claim that a NOPC is a necessary, if not suf-
ficient condition, for the permissibility fo killing. The sense in-
tended here is that if we had to save i.e. if the owner's prior
claim were overridden by the other person's life need, even when they
presented a fatal threat, we could not kill to stop the use of the
thing in question even if there is no actual ALN. This is to give
the negative reason as much weight as the positive one would have
had. The second sense in which someone might claim that NOPC is a
necessary condition for the permissibility of killing is the one
represented by the claim that the third party could not kill in
the Baby Cases if the owner did not have a NOPC i.e. it is what
distinguishes the Bel and BC2.
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HLN/ALN of the non--owner will not override the owner's claim, when the
owner also needs the coat to save his life. So, in ':both Coat and Bab:y'
cases "it's mine" does make a difference' t·O· 'who has ,a p'riorclaim' and'
a Nope to something. If the coat belonged to neither 'personandthey
both had an equal Ileed to have it, it would be a toss':tip ~·t:o· ·who· 'shduld
get it.
'One apparent significant difference between the 'Coat: and
Baby Cases--the apparent absence of life heed on the part of the
baby--was found to be non-existent. But there are other differences
between the cases.
(1) "It's mine" was not necessary for first party killings
in the Baby Cases. But it is important for first party as well as
third party killings in the CC. After all, if the coat did not belong
to the person, and he did not have a NOPC to it, he himself, let alone
a third party, would not have a right (outside perhaps, of a Hobbesian
right) to take it away from the person who put it on. So, if killing
is permissible, "it's mine," via a NOPC, will playa part in making
it so in the Coat Case.
This difference between the Coat and Baby Cases is due to
the fact that in the Baby Cases the threat against which the first
party can defend himself (death) comes by way of imposition on the
person himself, whereas in the Coat Case the threat against which he
can defend himself results from his being deprived of his coat.
(2) Reclaiming sole possession of the house involves an
attack on the baby, with his death as a consequence. Reclaiming
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the coat involves no attack on the person, one takes away the coat
and the person dies as a result of the threat from Wllich the coat
protected him. For reasons given in Chapter II I do not wish to claim
that this is not a killing. Still it is different, from an attack.
(3) In the CC, because of ALN satisfac.tion, thenon.....owner
who dies if the coat is taken away, loses DIlly the benefit ,he gets
from having the coat (given that he wouldn't have been alive without
it.) In the Baby Cases, because there is no ALN the baby who dies
does not lose any benefit he got from being in the house.
(2) and (3) may make it easier to conclude that a third
party can take away the coat then that the baby can be killed. (Uere I
will not say~ why this:is s~,ag.why losing only the benefit of use
of the coat makes taking it away easier, only that it may be so.)
On the other hand (1) may make it easier to conclude that the
Baby can be killed, than that the Coat can be taken away. In con-
clusion, while I think it is possible to argue that when two
people's lives are at stake (as opposed to some less but equal loss
confronting both) ownership ("it's mine") should not matter, I will
assume that Thomson is correct in thinking that in the CC as she
describes it, the owner of the coat has a NOPC (in the distribution
sense that I described above) even if the other person needs it
to save his life. I will also assume that a',thirdparty/rights
enforcer can take away the coat.
But what happens if we modify the case some'what" so·~. that
it becomes more like the Baby Case? Suppose we modify it as
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follows: (1) we have to attack him to get the coat away and this
attack kills him. That is ,we make it more clearly a killing. Sup-
pose first and third pa·rties can kill in this case also. (The
justification which' ,might, be given for taking the coat away originally,
namely, we're only,taking away what belongs to someone else, will
not be availabl·e when there.is;;a:direct attack, soa different
justification would hav,e to be· found.·) . What happens if we modify
it further as follows: (1) we eliminate HLN/ALN satisfaction, so
that the other person having my coat provides him with no benefit
at all. It is just stuck to him, and .(2) we have to attack him to
get the coat away and this attack kills him. Because there is no
HLN/ALN satisfaction he does not lose only the benefit of having
the coat. In this second modification of the CC, the owner would
still have a Nope (in the distribution sense, i.e. if the coat were
in the hands of neither party and if the owner needed it for life
the rights enforcer should give it to him.) Eliminating the ALN
would not give the non-Qwner any greater right to it when distribution
is at issue, than he had when ALN was present, reducing his need
does not put him in a stronger position. If, as in the Baby
Cases we decide NOPC by transforming the life threat of being
killed into a hypothetical HLN/ALN, this just leaves the two people
in the same position they were in with respect to NOpe in the original
Coat Case, i.e. the owneT. still has NOPC.
Despite the owner having a NOPC to something which he
wouldn't have to give someone even if the other person needed it to
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save his life when theowner.also needs it to save his life, it does
not seem that anyone can kill the nonowner to get the coat back
to the owner who needs it to save· his life, in this modified case.
That is, if someone, whose life is not being saved, innocently is in
possession of whatbelong.s ·to us,· and what we. need to save our
lives, no one- In-ay kill him to get '-it "back to 'us, even if it is
something we would not have to give the other person when he needed
it to save his life and we needed it to save our life. This is the
first clear instance we have come across where the owner has a
NOPC when the other person needs it for life, and yet we may not
kill to take it away from the other person. (In the Baby Case,
where there is no.ALN satisfaction, as in the modified Coat Case,
we may nevertheless kill. Once again, the difference seems to have
something to do with the threat of death coming from imposition as
opposed to deprivation.)
In summary, the Coat Case differs in certain respects from
the Baby Cases. In particular, since it involves the threat of death
via deprivation and not imposition (a) NOPC is necessary for both
first and third party killings, and (b) no one can kill the user in
a modified Coat Case in which the owner has NOPC (when someone else needs
the coat for life) but the actual non-owner user gets no ALN-satisfaction.
The Coat Case (unmodified) probably does not differ fromitheBaby Case,
in so far as how the owner having a NOPC is to be explained, i.e.
negative and positive sources of the non-owner's claim to use what
does not belong to him are given equal weight.
137
138
else needs it for life itself. In contrast, if the body that both
the violinist and the other person needed to use were a third body,
belonging to neither of them, the person with the strongest need
would get to use it.
In the violinist case, the non-owner has HLN and ALN. I shall
assume that his.death would result from a direct attack on him, since
Thomson explicitly denies the significance of the difference between
detachment and an attack on an innocent threat resulting in death,
even if we intend the death of the person. The threat (use of their
body) against which the "owner" defends himself comes about by
way of imposition, as in the Baby Case, not by deprivation, as in
the Coat Case.
One question is whether first and third parties can kill
in this case. Thomson claims they can. As noted, the reason she
explicitly gives for this conclusion is that the person whose body
it is is not obligated to give its use solely because the other
person needs it for life and the "owner" loses only sale use of
his body for nine months. That is, to use our formulation, she
explicitly says it is not unjust to kill because the owner has NOPC.
The adequacy of this reason, which she explicitly gives
was thrown into doubt by Brody's criticisms, discussed above, i.e.
his question was why, because we needn't save someone's life with
our body, this is a reason to think we can kill him to stop his
use of it. Our point in discussing the other cases which'i.'r.homso.n
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presents was to see whether these other cases suppott the .claim that
Nope when someone else needs to use what is ours to save his life,
is a reason for the permissibility of killing. So the question we
are interested in is whether we can decide if killing is permis-
sible in the violinist case on the basis of the (assumed) permis-
si.bility of killing in the Baby and Coat Cases. More specifically,
we are interested in whether the permissibility of killing in the
other cases shows that the presence of owner's NOPC to something
even when someone else needs to use it for life itself, is a suf-
ficient reason for the permissibility of killing in the violinist
case.
In the other cases a NOPC to something, even if someone
else needed it to save his life, was present, and because of it
(it was claimed and we assumed agreement), in one way or another,
someone was able to kill, i.e. in the Baby Case a third party got
the right to kill because the owner had a NOPC. In the Coat Case,
both first and third parties get a right to kill only because the
owner has a NOPC [i.e. if the coat didn't belong to the owner and
he didn't have a NOPC (in the distributive sense) no one could
take the coat away to give to him.] There seems to be a constant
conjunction of NOPC and a right to kill in those cases: when
NOPC is not present, someone loses the right to kill, and when it
is present, someone has a right to kill. In the violinist case, we
also have a NOPC. Can we kill the violinist because of it?l
lNote that if a third party can kill in the violinist
case because the "owner" has a NOPC, and yet he cannot kill in BCl,
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Our claim is that it is an open question, on the basis
of previous cases, whether we can kill in the violinist case. The
crucial insight behind this claim is that it is possible that some
threats are large enough to give an owner a NOPC (in the distribu-
tion sense) to his thing when someone else needs the use of it for
life saving purposes, but not large enough to give a right to kill.
For example, I have a NOPC to my $1,000 even if someone else needs
it for life. But if someone has innocently come by my $1000 (whether
or not he needs it for life in the sense that he has ALN) no one
has a right to kill him to get it back to me. Since, in both Baby
and Coat Cases the threat to the owner was death (a larger loss
than mere use of one's body for nine months) we cannot be sure, on
the basis of the previous cases, that the permissibility of killing
does not depend on this particular size threat being present. The
facts that (a) this threat of death may contribute to someone having
a NOPC, that (b) the threat of death by itself without NOPC, will
not give rise to the permissiblity of some killings and that (c)
killing is permissible when there is a threat of death and a NOPC,
do not mean that any threat which gives rise to a NOPC will also give
rise to a right to kill via the presence of a NOPC.
All this will become clearer, and we will see how the slip
from the owner's NOPC to what is his even if someone else needs it
for life, to a right to kill, comes about, if we examine more closely
Thomson's argument leads to the seemingly odd conclusion that a rights
enforcer may protect us from having our bodies used against our will,
even though he cannot protect us from the threat of death.
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what we mean when we say that "someone can kill in the Coat and
baby cases because there is a NOpe. 1f
(1) In Thomson's discussion she moves from the first Baby Case,
where the threat of death appears by itself, to the second Baby Case
where "it's mine" was added to the presence of a fatal threat, in or-
der to give a third party a right to kill. It was not "it's mine"
alone which was supposed to make third party killing permissible,
but "it's mine + threat of death." To say of Thomson's discussion
that it shows that the third party could kill because "it's mine" is
misleading, if it leads to taking part of the reason for the permis-
sibility of killing for the whole reason, where this whole reason in-
cludes the threat of death.
I said that for "it's mine" to make a difference between
first and second Baby Cases it would have to give rise to a NOPC. I
considered how someone comes to have a NOPC to his house in the Baby
Case 2. Showing how they did have a NOPC itself involved considering
that the owner 'should face a fatal threat if the baby did use his
property. That is, if the baby presented no threat to the owner,
except the loss of sole use of his house for a while, it is possible
that the owner would not have NOPC. We considered the threat to the
owner in determining whether there was a NOPC. But the overall logic
of showing that the third party could kill in the BC2 when he couldn't
kill in the BC 1 was stillto show that NOpe when added to a fatal
threat gave rise to a third party right to kill. (The threat of
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death alone gave rise to the first party's right to kill.)
(2) .If we used the same overall logic in arguing for the
permissibility of killing in the Coat Case -as we used in the Baby
Case we would show how the owner had a NOPC and add this fact to the
threat of death to show that we can kill. (In the Coat; Case, Nope
is necessaryl for both first and third party killings as explained
above. )
(2a) So first we would consider how to explain the existence
of a NOpe. The NOPC in the case of a coat, unlike in the ~£f~
body, probably wouldn't exist if the threat to the owner were merely
the loss of sole use of the thing itself, if the other person needs
it for life itself. (That is, in the case of the body, simply losing
sole use of it would give a NOPC, but simply losing sole use of a
coat wouldn't.) The owner would only have a NOPC (in the distribu-
tion sense) when the other person needs it for life if a further
threat to the owner accompanies use, besides mere use.
The actual threat in the Coat Case is the threat of death.
(By this I do not mean to deny that some other threat associated
l"Necessary" both in the sense that if we had to save some-
one we couldn't kill him, and also in the sense that if we didn't
have a NOpe to the coat and faced the same threat from the other per-
son's use of the coat, by way of deprivation (i.e., we would die if
we didn't get the coat), we couldn't kill him.
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with the use of the coat would not lead to a NOPC. Quite the con-
trary, as will become clearer.) 'So the use of his coat, added to
the threat of death yields a NOPC, even if the other person needs it
for life. Recall, the overall logic of the Baby Case was (a) NOPC,
even if the other person needs it for life + (b) threat of death
yields (c) third party's right to kill. The logic we have just de-
scribed and which may also describe the logic of Nope in the Baby
Case is (a) "It's mine" + (b) threat of death yields (c) NOPC,
even if someone else needs it for life.
(2b) If we followed the overall logic of the Baby Case in
the Coat Case to establish a right to kill we would add NOpe, once
established, to the threat in the case (death) to get the right to
kil~i.e., NOPC, even if someone else needs it for life + threat of
death, yields right to kill.
But this procedure may seem redundant, because the same
threat of death was already used to determine that there was a NOPC.
That is, we are already aware of this factor in the situation. This
factor may have two functions, i.e. (a) as a source for a NOPC and (b)
simply as a threat, but if we are already aware of it in one function,
it might be suggested, that 'we can condense the decision procedure.
So, instead of using the model NOPC (even if someone needs it for
life) + threat of death yields right to kill, we may simply uS,e NOPC
(even if someone needs it for life) yields right to kill.
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That is, the suggestion is that : In'. the Baby Cases we·
have (a) NOPC (even if someone needs it fdr life) + threat of de~t4
yields rights to kill (to a .third party). To determine ~OPCin the
Coat Case we have (b) "It's mine" + threat of death' y'ields~·'NOPC' even:'
if someone needs it for life. (Henceforth, I shall a.ssume, "i'even' if
someone needs it for life" is included in NOPC, unless otherwis.e'men-
tioned.)
To apply the Baby Case model in the Coat Case would seem to in-
volve a redundancy, i.e., the threat of death appears twice.
(c) NOPC + threat of death yields right to kill
t
(threat
of
death +
"it's mine")
So we could eliminate consideration of the threat of death where it
stands separately, leaving us with:
(d) NOPC yields right to kill.
t(threat
of
death +
"it's mine")
From this, the further condensation:
(e) NOPC yields right to kill
may suggest itself. In part, there is a tendency to suggest this
further condensation because we still have in mind the overall logic
of the Baby Case, where it didn't really matter how a NOPC to what
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was ours came about, i.e., what threat size leads to a NOPC,·because
in any case we shall be adding the NOPC to !he threat of death ~­
sidered separately (since it was separate in Baby Case 1). If we
forget that we will not be adding the threat separately lEst because
we think it already appears in how Nope comes to exist, then we will
leave explicit mention of it out of how NOPC comes about, also.
The switch in overall logic from (a) to (e) is innocent
enough in the Coat Case, because we know that the threat which pro-
duced the NOpe is the threat of death, so we are not likely to make
the mistake of taking the general category "NOpe", independent of the
factors through which it arises in the particular case, as the reason
which justifies killing. The Coat Case does not show that we can kill
in any case where there is a NOPC, only that we can kill where there
is a NOPC, because there is a threat of death to the owner in the
other person's using it. That is, we can kill because he has NOPC in
a situation where the threat of death is involved. A Coat Case, in
which we have to decide whether we can kill when the threat presented
by the use of what is ours, by itself, is so small that it must be
combined with the additional threat in the case, to give a NOPC, may
s'eem deceptively like cases in which we decide whether we can kill by
looking only at NOPC, where the mere use of what is ours is large
enough to give a NOpe. It appears that we do not add the weight of
the threat of death to the NOPC to see if killing is permissible,
but only consider NOPC, in both cases. But in the former (Coat Case)
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we~ considering the threat of death in deciding that killing is
permissible, because (a) this threat is involved in deciding if there
is NOPC, and (b) there is no reason to think it is the mere category
of NOPC, outside of how it would arise, that gives the right to kill
in the Coat Case.
So there is no reason to think that the Coat Case (or
the Baby Case) supports any of the following procedures:
(1) NOPC yields right to kill or (2) NOPC yields right to kill
- (d;;e of
my body)
or
threat of use of my body(3) NOPC +
1(Use of
my body)
yields right to kill
So far we have seen that the Baby and Coat Cases do not sup-
port the view that NOPC (a) by itself, and/or (b) indepelldent of .how
its existence is explained, implies the non-injustice of anyone kil-
ling. So far as can be told from these cases, the non-injustice of
killing may depend on the threat of death being involved.
Furthermore, there is .evidence that the threat of death is
significant enough to merit killing, at least in some cases. This
evidence comes from the first Baby Case, in which it was agreed that
a first party could kill to defend himself against the threat of death,
even without a NOPC. (The slip from NOPC to a right to kill is more
likely to occur on the basis of the Coat Case, where all killing,
i. e., first arid 3rd party) requires NOPC, than in considering the Baby
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Cases, where first party killing can arise simply from the presence
of the threat, and hence where the'significance of the fatal threat
stands out alone.) Using the shorthand "NOPC yields right to kill"
will be innocent enough when th~re is ..evidence that the t·hreat which
produces the. NOpe, e.g.,' threat 0;£, mere- use of ·the'body fo·rnine
months is, like the threat. of deat:h,·,s.igni,ficant enough to merit kill-
ing (alone or in comb~nation with NOPC). But it is dangerous to sub-
stitute NOPC (the category) when we don't have evidence that the
threat which produced it is large enough (alone or in combination)
to merit killing. And this is what is the case with the use of the
body, so far as we know from Thomson's discussion. It isn't that the
threat of the use of the body isn't large enough to merit killing.
It is just that Thomson never gives us evidence to believe that it
is large enough to merit killing. The previous cases don't supply
the evidence, since they only deal with the fatal threat. The only
other evidence that use of the body for nine months. is a large enough
threat to merit killing that Thomson suggests is that we needn't
let someone use our body merely in order to save his life, i.e., we
have a NOPC. But whether this is in fact evidence that we can kill
is what/is at issue. We were trying to see, on the basis of the
previous cases, and in the light of Brody's criticism, if having
a NOPC was evidence for the permissibility of killing. But there
is no evidence from the previous case that whenever we have a NOPC,
regardless of the size of the threat through which it arises, that
we have a right to kill.
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Therefore, we fail in our aim to deduce from previous cases
the correctness of the principle that when you have a NOPC to your
body, then it is not unjust to kill to stop use of the body. Equal-
ly, we fail in the aim of showing, on the basis of previous cases,
that it is not unjust to kill to stop use of our body for nine months.
In summary: I have argued that "It's mine" may make a dif-
ference to the permissibility of third party killing in the Baby
Case, but that whether it does or doesn't is independent of whether
"it's mine" makes a difference to having a prior claim. In both Baby
and Coat cases "It's mine" would be, or is, a significant element in
the permissibility of killing (third party killing in the Baby Case,
first and third p~rty in the Coat Case), only if it is associated
with a NOPC to what is mine. Further, if "it's mine" does make a
difference, the permissibility of third party killing will be based
on a NOPC being added to the fact that a threat of a certain size
(death) is present. {The latter, by itself, gives first parties the
right to kill, or to try to kill, in the Baby Case.) Because in the
Baby and Coat Cases, the NOPC to what is mine itself arises in a sitlla-
tion where something is mine and the size of the threat is death,
there may be a tendency to derive a right to kill from NOPC by it-
self, rather than NOPC + threat of death. But a NOPC, which may be
a necessary condition for these killings, may arise via a threat not
large enough to make killing not unjust. So it is possible that the
particular size of the threat is important in determining if killing
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is not unjust, not merely the fact that we have a NOPC. Therefore,
we must check to see if the size of the threat (in conjunction with
the use of what's mine or not) is sufficient to permit killing, as
well as whether it leads to a,NOPe. The fact that in the Baby and
Coat Cases, with their particular threats, a prior claim and a right
to kill appear simultaneously, does not mean that a right to kill
which did not otherwise exist would always appear when a NOPC did.
In the violinist case, "it's mine" is supposed to lead to a right to
kill just in virtue of there being a Nope. The previous cases do not
support the notion that all NOPCs give a right to kill. Further, it
is the threat of use of the body, not death~ which gives rise to this
NOPC, so the previous cases are not direct evidence that the threat
of use of the body is sufficient to merit killing. And finally, con-
sideration of the principle, "if we have a NOPC to something when
someone else needs it for life, then we may kill" is not evidence
for the use of the body meriting killing, since it is this princi-
pIe which we are trying to prove.
The primary point in this discussion has been that on
the basis of previous cases, we have no reason to think that
killing is not unjust when the threat presented is less than death.
This is because previous cases do not show that whenever there
is a NOpe, even if someone needs it for life, there is a right
to kill and they do not show, in particular, that when there is a
NOPC and a threat of the use of one's body, that killing is not unjust.·
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(D) A BTP against Thomson's argument did not show that we could not
kill in the cases where Thomson's argument says we can kill. It only
showed that Thomson's Argument had not shown that or why we could
kill. We failed to deduce the non-injustice of killing ~n the vio-
linist case from the non-injustice of killing in previous cases, and
we failed to show that these cases provide evidence for the principle
that if one needn't support someone in one's body, merely in order
to save his life, it is not unjust to kill to remove him. Like the
BTP, the failure to have evidence from previous cases, does not show
that we may not kill in the cases in which Thomson's Argument says we
can kill. It only shows that we have not yet been given evidence for
thinking that we can.
I will now present cases where, I claim, it is clear that
we may not kill, and yet Thomson's Argument I predicts that we may
kill. These cases extend further the insight which led us to question
the '.validity",··'·of the deduction via previous cases, i.e., that there
may be cases where the owner's losses are great enough to give a NOpe,
and yet not great enough to permit killing. Because Thomson's Argu-
ment I predicts that we can kill when we can't, we cannot trust its
prediction about the violinist case. Unlike Brody's criticism, which
does not entail that Thomson's argument ever actually predicts that
we can kill when we can't, -- only that it doesn't explain why we
can kill, even if we can, -- this new criticism of Thomson's Argu-
ment shows that it predicts that we can kill when we can't.
I will first reexamine Thomson's Argument I, to see
when it predicts that we may kill. I will argue that while the
use-of-body cases that Thomson employs to illustrate her argument
involve ALN-satisfaction, Argument I predicts that killing is not
unjust in non-ALN cases also. I consider two interpretations of
her Argument, both of which predict we can kill in non-ALN cases,
as well as ALN ,cases, and I give reasons for choosing one as the
correct interpretation. I argue that Thomson's Argument I predicts
that killing is not unjust, for the same reasons, in body support
cases where not only may the reasons for the non-injustice of
killing differ, but where our decision about whether killing is not
unjust may also differ.
I then argue that the Argument applies not only to
non-ALN cases but to cases not involving bodily support. I claim
that because it applies to non-ALN cases where far less effort is
involved than the use of someone's body, it predicts that killing
is not unjust when it is unjust. I then discuss Thomson's claim
that killing may be not unjlist and still be impermissible be-
cause it would be indecent not to help someone. I show that even
with the addition of the Decency Constraint, Thomson's Argument I
still predicts that killing will be permissible in (a) non-ALN
cases where it will be unjust, and hence also impermissible, and
(b) in ALN cases where it will be impermissible, even if not unjust.
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These are cases where it is permissible (just and not indecent)
not to begin aid and yet one may not kill to terminate aid.
I then consider the significance of the cases which are
counterexamples to (Thomson's Argument I + the Decency Constraint).
I claim that they indicate either (a) the presence of killing is
not morally equivalent to the presence of letting die, per se, and
that the fact that a killing is involved in terminating support
makes a difference, or (b) that some other" factor besides the
presence of killing (which might be some factor which can be isolated
from the definition of killing and introduced into a non-killing
letting die case) is present when we kill, which differentiates
between not starting aid to begin with, and stopping support. (If
~
the factor is one which can be isolated from the definition of kil-
ling (or bears a significant resemblance to a characteristic in
the definition of killing) then the truth of (b) wiLL show tha.~
kill~ng is not morally equivalent to letting die, per se, even if
the presence of killing is not, per se, what makes a difference to
what we can do.) Because the countercases show either of these two
things, I argue that Thomson's response to Brody's crit~cism of her,
to the effect that killing is not morally significantly different from
letting die, when all factors are hel~ constant, will not be an ade-
quate reply, because it either is (a) wrong, or (b) insufficient.
1. As described above, the core of Thomson's argument is
that it is not unjust to kill the violinist to stop the use of the
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other person's body because the violinist has no right to use the
other person's body merely in order to 'have his life saved.
The "because" in this argument is that of justification,
i.e., it is supposed to provide us with a reason, an explanation for
why we may kill the violinist. But it also implies a prediction as .
to when we can kill. It may predict successfully even if it does
not provide an adequate explanation of why we can kill, e.g., even
if it does not answer a BTP. Argument I predicts that we can kill
someone to stop their use of the body, when they have no right to
use it merely to save his life.
The violinist case Thomson uses to illustrate her princi-
pIe involves ALN satisfaction, i.e., the violinist needs kidney sup-
port and his life is being saved by ALN satisfaction. But Argument
I itself does notrequire that the cases to which it applies be ALN-
satisfaction cases, i. e., Argument I does not say: "It is not unjust
to kill to stop the use of the body because (when) someone has no
right to use the body, merely in order to save his life and the body
is saving his life." Argument I does not include the second conjunct. l
1 In Chapter 2 I discussed why an objection to a BTP
was incorrect. I said that supporting because one does not kill is
not what Thomson takes to be a straightforward instance of saving a
life. So when she says we can kill because we needn't support merel-
to save a life, it is not taken to be a straightforward instance of
merely saving a life that we support because we do not kill. By sav-
ing a life Thomson can be taken to mean support providing ALN-satis-
faction. I also said that the use of a case·where·,ALN-satisfaction is
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According to the most faithful interpretation of Argument
1, (a) it applies to cases where someone is using someone else's body,
but he does not get ALN-satisfaction. In fact, he may get no benefit
from residence at all; (b) we decide if we can kill by seeing if some-
one is using what he would have no right to use, even if he had an
ALN, even when he doesn't have an ALN. l
actually going on, helps the assimilation between not starting sup-
port and keeping it going, which Thomson is eager to encourage, i.e.,
it makes clear that the person who starts support (and the one who
doesn't stop are both doing the same thing, i.e., saving a life.
But this does not mean that the interpretation of Argument I which
c~aims that it applies to non-ALN satisfaction support cases is not
a fair interpretation of the Argument itself. So far as Argument I
is concerned, all that is important is that we are doing what we
needn't do (supporting) merely to save a life (i.e., merely to pro-
vide ALN-satisfaction). Understanding that "saving a life" (one of
the terms in Argument 1), means "providing ALN-satisfaction" does not
mean that Argument I requires ALN-satisfaction to be going on in the
case to which it applies. It is only in Argument! (discussed in de-
tail in Chapter IV) where it is part of the argument that the person
who starts support and the one who continues it, wind up doing the
same thing -- providing ALN-satisfying support -- that ALN-satisfac-
tion going on is necessary. So long as she is discussing Argument I,
the use of a case where ALN-satisfaction is going on, is, strictly
speaking, irrelevant to the Argument.
IAn alternative interpretation of Argument 1, would be that
it predicts that we can kill someone to stop his using someone else's
body, simply because (when) he has no (positive) right to be there,
even supposing he would have a right to be there if he did have ALN.
This interpretation is derived by taking the emphasis in Argument I
to be on the fact that whatever reason the person actually has for
being there, e.g., b£adacherelief, is not strong enough to give him
a (positive) right to be there, i.e., it takes the emphasis of Argu-
ment I to be that killing is permissible when the person has no (posi-
tive) right to be there. On this interpretation, the clause "merely
to save his life" (and more so the original "~ to save·his
life") only indicates· a very great reaso.n which .does not give a
positive right to be there, and which, therefore, can serve as
an indicator of .the fact that all lesse~ reasons will not give. a right
to be there. The permissibility of killing when someone who gets
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So, if the violinist got only headache relief from being in
the other person's body, he would still 'be using what he had no right
to use, merely to save his life, and so, according to Argument I, we
may kill him to stop his using it. Argument I therefore predicts (a)
that killing will be as non-unjust in non-ALN cases as in ALN-cases,
where the efforts we seek to terminate are equally strenuous, and (b)
that killing will be not unjust, when it is, for the same reasons in
ALN and non-ALN cases.
My first claim is that (a) in some body support cases,
where the efforts we seek to terminate are equally strenuous, we will
be able to give an argument to clearly show that killing in ALN-
satisfaction cases will be not unjust, but we will not be able to
show clearly that killing in non-ALN cases will be not unjust. The
headache relief is in our body, has nothing to do with whether we
would have to let him stay in our body if he had HLN. On this alter-
native interpretation of Argument 1, not only would the Argument pre-
dict that killing was not unjust in non-ALN cases, but it would pre-
dict that it was not unjust even if the person would have had a right
to use the body to save his life, when he in fact has a lesser need,
·e.g., headache relief, and so in fact has no positive right to be
there. I have already (Chapter II) suggested that one might make an
argument for treating cases in which wha·t originally brings a person
to use someone else's property provides no justification for his using
it, differently, in virtue of the unjustified origins. But, I con-
cluded, it is more charitable to assume that if (suppose) we would
have to save a life by the use of our body, then we could not kill to
remove, even if the person's positive reason for residence was only
headache relief. That is, if he has no ALN, consideration of the hy-
pothetical ALN-need and what it would require from us, will serve as
the basis for a negative reason for the right to stay, and hence for
the injustice of killing. This would rule out, the second interpreta-
tion of Thomson's argument. I shall ignore this interpretation hence~
forth.
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second claim is that (b) the explanation of why killing is not unjust
in ALN cases will differ from the explanation of why killing is not
unjust in non-ALN cases. I shall present a defense of these claims
in Chapter V.
I have argued that Argument I applies to non-ALN as well
as to ALN cases where body support is involved. I have argued that
Argument 1 predicts that killing to stop body support will not be
unjust so long,as body support is something the person would have
no right to merely to save his life, and the person will have no
right to it to save his life, even when it, in fact, doesn't save
his life. I argued that contrary to what Argument I predicts, there
may be body support cases where killing is unjust if there is no ALN-
satisfaction but not unjust if there is ALN-satisfaction, and that the
explanation of the justice of killing in ALN and non-ALN-satisfaction
cases will differ.
2. As noted, I have argued that Argument I applies to non-
ALN as well as to ALN cases, where the body is used. I will now argue
that Argument I applies to cases where the body is not being used.
Argument I specifically refers to the use of the body,
since it is developed in the context of the violinist case. But the
only reason given for why we can kill to end use of the body is that
it is something which the violinist has no right to use merely to
save his life. This Argument should, therefore, predict that it will
not be unjust to kill to stop the use of whatever (not just the body)
157
the person has !!e right to use merely in order to~ his life. l
If we combine the two points I have made about when Argu-
ment I predicts that killing is not unjust, i.e., (1) when there is
no ALN as well as when there is ALN, and (2) when someone is using
whatever I needn't give him merely to save his life, as well as when
they use the body, we can see that Argument I predicts that killing
will not be unjust in the following type of case: I do not have to
give someone my $1,000 merely to save his life. He has no right to
have my $1,000 given to him, even to save his life. Someone inno-
cently comes to have my $1,000 against my will. It does not save his,;
life, in fact it provides him with no benefit at all. It is merely
stuck to him, and the only way to get it back is by killing him.
Argument I predicts that it is not unjust to kill him to get back my
$1,000, because he has no right to it even to save his life.
~ third claim (c) is that, contrary to what Argument 1
predicts, it would be unjust to kill in this non-ALN $1,000 case. A
proportional theory of retaliation2 would rule out such strong measures
IThis point, in combination with the alternative interpre-
tation of Thomson's Argument lrejected above (pp. 134~5), leads to
the conclusion that one can kill someone who is using anything of ours,
e.g., our coat, when he has no (positive) right to use it. While kill-
ing in such cases would be unjust, and Thomson's argument, correctly
interpreted, does not seem to me to imply this, I have recently heard
someone give just t~is sort of case as an implication of, and hence, a
reductio ad absurdum argument against, Thomson's argument.
2Sanf'ord H. Kadish, "Respect for Law and Regard for Rights
in the Criminal Law," 64. California Law Review, July 1976, pp.
871-901.
158
as killing to regain the $1,000, and would require that the injured
party suffer his loss if there are no less drastic means of correct-
ing it than killing the innocent threat. So the claim is that the
$1,000 non-ALN case is one in which Argument I predicts that killing
would be non-unjust in both $1,000 non-ALN and ALN cases when it will
be unjust in $1,000 non-ALN cases.
3. Thomson says that Argument I shows when killing is not
unjust. She says that sometimes it would be wrong to kill to stop
the use of what is ours, even if it wouldn't be unjust, because de-
cency, if not someone else's right, would demand that we let someone
use what is ours. So, killing should be impermissible even if not
1
unjust in some cases.
I claim that the conjunction of Argument I with (what I
shall refer to as) this Decency Constraint, will still predict that
we can kill in cases where it is both unjust and impermissible to
kill. The argument to show this is as follows:
lIt is possible to argue that we should distinguish be-
tween the indecent and the non-unjust but impermissible. That is,
some acts could be non-unjust and indecent and yet permissible;
the non-unjust and impermissible acts, while they are indecent, are
more than indecent. This is, in fact, that notion of impermissible
but not unjust I will use in Chapter V. For purposes of this dis-
cussion I will assume the indecent and impermissible to coincide.
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Thomson does not think that there is anything about killing
to terminate life-saving support which makes it significantly moral-
ly more objectionable than not starting support to begin with. The
evidence for this claim is: (a) if she thought there were some sig-
nificant difference she would have considered it as a possible ob-
jection to her Argument I, but she doesn't, and (b) sh~ explicitly
argues in a second paper ("Rights and Deaths") that there is no sig-
nigicant moral difference between killing and letting die, per see
Therefore, cases in which she can decide that killing is not decent,
even if it is not unjust, should involve efforts which will be such
that it would also not be decent to refuse to start to make them to
save someone's life.
But ~ fourth claim (d) is that there are cases where it
would be permissible, i.e., both not unjust and not indecent, to re-
fuse to begin life support, and yet impermissible -- either because
it is unjust or because, while it is not unjust it is impermissible
for some other reason -- to kill to stop providing the life support.
That is, the efforts involved may lead to a Nope to use of what belongs
to u~ but not to a right to kill to stop use of it by someone else.
For example, it is permissible1 to refuse to give $1,000
to save someone's life, but "not permissible (because unjust and inde-
cent) to kill him to get the $1,000 back when he is not getting ALN
lIn this case, both not unjust and not. indecent.
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support from, it. Furthermore, the fifth claim (e) is that even
if, ignoring the point made above, we were to require the presence
of ALN-satisfaction1 in the cases to which Argument I is meant to ap-
ply, we would still find cases where it is impermissible to kill to
stop efforts even if one didn't have to start them to save a life to
begin with. For example, it is permissible -- in this case not un-
just and not indecent -- to refuse to give someone $1,000 to save his
life, but it is not permissible (thought not necessarily unjust) to
kill him to get back the $1,000 if it is saving his 1ife. 2
Finally, Argument I claims that if killing is not
permissible in either of the ALN or non-ALN cases where less than
body support is involved it will not be permissible in the other. But
I ·c1aim' (f) that this is not true, i.e., there will be ALN-satisfaction
cases where killing is permissible (for example, not unjust and not
indecent) when killing will be impermissible in non-ALN-satisfaction
cases. (Again, the reason why this is so will be discussed in Chapter
v.) That is, there will be cases where the efforts someone will
1And even HLN prior to entry, i.e., there is no mere ad-
diction to body support once support is begun.
21 will present my reasons for putting the $.1,000 ALNcase
in the category of impermissible but nocunjust cases, in Chapter V.
I think killing in this case is impermissible whether we take the
indecent to coincide with the impermissible, or if we think there
must be more than indecency to account for the ,non-unjust also being
impermissible.
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undergo if they do not kill will be great enough to make killing in
ALN-satisfaction cases permissible, but 'sti11 unjust in non-ALN cas-
es.
The $1,000 cases, both ALN and non-ALN, indicate that
Thomson's Argument I (even with the Decency Constraint) predicts
incorrectly when it is permissible to kill, both when it is not un-
just to kill ($1~000 non-ALN case) and when it is permissible to
kill ($1,000 ALN and non-ALN cases). It will be the case that
one needn't -- both as a matter of right and of decency -- start to
do something, even to save someone's life and yet it will not be per-
missible -- unjust or otherwise imperm1ssible--to kill to stop doing
it.
In summary, I have argued that: (1) Argument 1 predicts
that killing will not be unjust in non-ALN cases when it is not un-
just in ALN-satisfaction cases involving the same losses to the per-
son who supports in his body. It also predicts that the explanation
for the non-injustice of killing will be the same in both these types
of cases. I claimed that (a) the non-injustice of killing would be
clearer in ALN satisfaction cases than in non-ALN body support cases
and (b) that the explanation of the non-injustice of killing in ALN
and non-ALN cases would differ; (2) Thomson's argument predicts that
killing will not be unjust in cases involving losses far less than
use ofsomeone's body, and, again that, killing in non-ALN and ALN
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cases with these lesser losses will be equally just or unjust and
for the same reasons. I claimed that (c) in some non ALN satisfac-
tion cas~ki11ing will be unjust (e.g., $1,000 non-ALN case), even
when it is not unjust in the comparable ALN satisfaction case; (3)
Thomson's Argument I + Decency Constraint predicts that killing is
permissible (not unjust and not indecent) in cases such as the $1,000
ALN and non-ALN cases. I claimed (d) that killing was not permissible
in the $1,000 non-ALN case or (e) in the $1,000 ALN case. I also
claimed (f) that when killing in some ALN cases will be permissible,
it will not be permissible in the comparable non-ALN case.
So Argument I makes incorrect predictions about the non-injustice
of killing and about the explanation for the non--injustice of killing. 1
Argument I + Decency Constraint makes incorrect predictions about the
permissibility of killing and about the explanations of the permissi-
bility of killing. l
4. I noted above that the response Thomson makes (in "Rights
and Deaths") to a BTP, involves the claim that there is no significant
moral difference between killing and letting die, per see (She takes
this to mean that when all factors besides killing and letting die are
held constant,then there will be no difference between cases where ,we
lBY'predicting incorrectly the explanation for the non-
injustice (and permissibility) of killing" I do not mean to point to
the sort of failure that a BTP draws attention to, but rather that the
Argument predicts that the~ explanation will be available for AJ..N
and non-ALN cases.
kill and those where we let die. That is, Brody argued that we had
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no reason to think that just becallse we didn't have to support some-
one rather than let him die, that therefore we didn't have to sup-
port him rather than kill him. Thomson's answer is that whatever
we needn't do rather than let someone die, we needn't do rather than
not kill someone, since there is no morally significant di.fference
between killing and letting die, per see
The $1,000 countercases, because they involve losses one
wouldn't have to suffer to begin with, rather than let someone die,
but do involve losses one would have to suffer rather than kill
someone to stop suffering them, seem to indicate either that: (a)
killing is not morally equivalent to letting die, per se and the
presence of killing rather than letting die, makes a difference
or (b) some other factor in the case where we kill to stop efforts,
besides killing per se, is present, which differentiates the kill-
ing case from the letting die case, in a morally significant
I
way.
II do not wish to exclude the possibility that this
additional factor, which could be present in the abs.ence of killing,
does still reflect on whether killing, per se, differs morally from
letting die, per see
The truth of either (a) or (b) will show that Thomson's
response to Brody is either (1) wrong, in case (a) is true, or
(2) insufficient, in case (b) is true, since she would have to show
that some other factors besides killing, per se, would not make it
necessary for us to avoid killing, when we could let someone die
to begin with. That is, she would have to show that "all things
are equal," besides the difference of killing and letting die.
Suggestions for a difference between the killing and
letting die, aside from killing per se, in these cases are (1) in-
terest in the occurrence of the cause of death in the killing case,
while it is absent in the case where we let some die to begin with;
(2) using the person as a means to avoiding making the efforts
present in the killing case, absent when we let some die rather
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than save him, to begin with. When we do not give aid to begin with
(e.g., if we refuse to give aid in the violinist case and he is not
attached) out of concern for the efforts it would cost us, we do
1
not care whether the cause of the person's death takes place (or
lExcept as a sign of the fact that we have not aided. By
this I mean, that if we were asleep during the period when the de-
cision whether losses would be inflicted on us to save someone was
made and acted on, would be to see if the cause of the other per-
son's death had occurred. Since we were the only one who could have
helped him (suppose), if he is dead or the cause of death occurred,
then we know we were not used.
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whether the person dies), we do not use his death or its cause, as
a means to any end we have. But, if we have to attack and kill the
person in order to avoid continuing to make efforts, we will have an
interest in the cause of his death (our attack) occurring, and we
will have an interest in using him as a means to our liberation.
In order to see whether these factors (a) and (b) make or
contribute to making it impermissible to terminate the same efforts
we could refuse to start, we should separate them from the factor
of killing, per see We can do this by constructing a case where we
have an interest in the occurrence of the cause of death or see the
person's death as a means to ending our efforts, but where we let
him die instead of killing him. For example, suppose someone is in
my body (or using my $1,000) and, as the result of some event for
which I am not responsible, a fatal germ attacks the person inside
me (or using my $1,000). If I do nothing he will die and I will have
my body (or $1,000) back to myself. All I must do to save him from
the germ is warn him of its presence, and he will take action.
That is, the effort involved in saving his life from this threat
of the germ (regardless of whether it costs me use of my body or
use of my $1,000 to save his life from another threat) will be
miniscule--just the amount that someone might be required to give,
if he had to give anything. If I fail to warn him, I let him die.
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I do not kill him. If I fail to warn him, I would do it in order
that the germ be present and kill him, so that I may have what is
mine for myself. (To distinguish this letting die/not aiding case
from the case where we do not give life saving aid to start with
simply to avoid the effort, as in a case where we refuse to let the
violinist come into our body to beging with, I shall refer to this
new case as the Best Not-Aid Case (BNA).)
5. Finally, while I claim that the $1,000 cases show
that Thomson's Argument I (a) predicts that we can kill when we
can't, and is therefore (b) unreliable as an indicator of when we
can kill to stop our efforts, I do not claim that we cannot kill in
the violinist case.
I began this chapter by considering alternative defenses
for the permissibility of killing in the violinist case, and in par-
ticular defenses for the status of "because I needn't do it merely
to save a life" as an indicator of when killing is permissible. I
by-passed simple self-defense arguments and considered arguments jus-
tifying simple detachment as inapplicable to cases where we kill by
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attacking. I considered how we might deduce the non injustice of
killing in the violinist case and the indicator status of "because I
needn't do it merely to save a life," from other cases in which killing
was not unjust. This deduction failed. Finally, I have argued that
the $1,000 ALN and non-ALN cases indicate that "because I needn't do
it merely to save a life," even in conjunction with a Decency Constraint,
is not, at least by itself, an indicator of when killing is either not
unjust or permissible.
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CHAPTER IV
In Chapter II I distinguished two arguments that Thomson pre-
sents to justify killing in the violinist case (Arguments I and II).
In the last chapter I noted that, in response to Brody-type objections,
Thomson denies the moral significance of the distinction between kill-
ing and letting die, when all other factors besides killing and letting
die have been equalized as far as possible. This notion is at the
heart of Argument II.
Having ignored Argument II in the last chapter -- because
$1,000 ALNand non~ALNcases c'ast doubt on the proposed equivalence of
killing and letting die -- I wish to return to it with the following
aims: Thomson relates Argument II to the by-now 'standard approach for
deciding whether killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se,
viz. substituting killing and letting die in equal contexts, and
deciding whether they were each equally morally objectionable. I
will examine how the violinist case differs from standard cases used
to show killing and letting are morally equivalent, per se, and, in
some detail, consider how problems in following the prescription to
substitute killing and letting die in equal contexts creates problems
for arriving at a conclusion that killing is morally equivalent to
letting die, per se, from substitution in equal contexts.
Thomson claims that killing in the violinist case is permis-
sible. The evidence she presents for this is: (a) the very case
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itself, i.e. the "obviousness" that killing in this case is as per-
missible as letting die. Since this ver"y cas_e is·.in disput~ this evi-
dence is of dubious value; (b) kill and let die cases in which we
(supposedly) make all factors other than killing and letting die the
same (as far as this is possible). These cases are supposed to be ones
in which a killing is morally equivalent to a letting die, and all
other factors besides killing and letting die are held equal (what-
ever exactly this means). These cases are supposed to show (1) that
in all other cases it is not the presence of killing or letting die,
1per se, which makes a difference to the moral value of what we do,
but rather other differences between the killing and let die cases.
They are also supposed to show (2) that killing is morally equivalent
to letting die, per see [(2) is supposed to account for (1)]. 2
Regarding these cases (referred to as comparable cases),
I should note that if they do indeed provide the general conclusions
that the presence of killing, rather than letting die, never makes a
significant moral difference, and that killing is morally equivalent
II take "do" to refer to both acts and ommissions, without
implying that there are acts of ommission.
2When I say killing is morally equivalent to letting die,
in the context of a discussion of a particular set of cases, I mean
that a killing is morally equivalent to a letting die. When I say
that killing is morally equivalent to letting die, not in the context
of a discussion of a particular set o.f cases, I mean that in all cases
where factors other than killing and letting die are held constant a
killing is morally equivalent to a letting die. If the latter is the
case, then this implies that killing is morally equivalent to letting
die, per see
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to letting die, per se, they should differ from a case like the fol-
lowing one: We may say that it is not more objectionable to kill a
murderer than to let him die, and in this case, a killing and a let-
ting die will be morally equivalent.- However, the equivalence may
derive not from any equivalence of killing and letting die, per se, but
from the fact that we are dealing with a murderer. The nature of the
object we are dealing with eliminates significant differences between
conduct. This is not the kind of case which can be used to show that
killing in other cases, and letting die in other cases are morally
equivalent. This case only shows that a killing is not necessarily
more objectionable than a letting die, independent of special factors
(such as that we are dealing with a murderer.) Since Thomson concludes
that killing to stop support is unobjectionable, not merely that it is
not necessarily objectionable, showing that a killing is not necessarily
more objectionable than a letting die will not be sufficient for her
purpose.
So, the thesis of those who rely on so-called comparable (kill
and let die) cases, to show that killing is morally equivalent to
letting die, per se, is that, if we find a killing is not more objection-
able than a letting die, in cases where all other factors are constant,
and these factors do not involve special factors, then this implies
(a) that the presence of killing, per se, as opposed to the presence
of letting die, per se makes no moral difference, and this implies (b)
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see
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I have described the thesis so that it makes reference to
cases (plural). Those who have made use· of comparable cases have
tended to rely on a single instance where (they thought) a killing
and a lett~ng die were morally equivalent, in order to show that kill-
ing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see But if we do not
require a test for moral equivalence of a killing and a letting die
in more than one case, it will not be clear that the factors in the one
case we do use do not constitute special factors -- even if not so
obviously special as that the person involved is a murderer -- in
the presence of which a killing. and a letting die are morally equiva-
lent. This point will recur at various:poirttsin the discussion.
Examples of kill and let die cases thought to be comparable
cases by Thomson and others are:
PI: John puts arsenic into Mary's coffee because he intends
her death.
P2: Susan puts arsenic into her coffee by mistake. Jim
sees this but fails~ to warn Susan when there is no effort to speak
of in doing so, because he intends that Susan die.
Also:
51: Ike walks across a field. Unbeknownst to him a baby
lies under foot, whom he crushes to death.
52: Joe walks across a field. Unbeknownst to him, ·a baby
behind the bush needs minor life saving assistance. The baby dies
without the help.l
lSimilar cases presented with the aim of suggesting that a
killing is morally equivalent to a letting die, may be found in un-
published work I did in 1971-72 for G. Dworkin.
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Thomson claims that what happens in P2 is just as morally
objectionable as what happens in Pl. And what happens in 81 is not
any more morally objectionable than what happens in 82.
Note that in order for cases P1/P2 to be relevant to cases
in which we kill to terminate support or let die to begin with, they
must bear on a killing and a letting die being equally unobjectionable,
as well as equally objectionable. That is, they must bear on the moral
value of a killing and a letting die being always the same objection-
ab1e or unobjectionable -- in comparable cases.
It might also~ that in order for cases PI/P2 to be rele-
vant to deciding whether killing to terminate life support is permissible
when letting someone die rather than attach him to our body would be
permissible, they must be taken to indicate not only the equal moral
objectionableness or unobjectionableness of a killing and a letting
die, but their equal permissibilty, in case moral unobjectionab1eness/
objectionableness, and impermissibility/permissibility ·.can.diverge.
That is, if letting die is as objectionable as killing, but killing is
impermissible when letting die isn't, we will not have evidence that
killing is permissible in order to avoid being in a :.position it would
be permissible to avoid by letting die.
I will argue that comparable cases need not show that letting
die is impermissible when killing is impermissible, in order for them
to be relevant to showing that killing to terminate support is permis-
sible when letting die to being with is permissible. Before doing
this (and as an aid to doing this) I will first disnuss the particular
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thesis that a killing and a letting die might be equally morally
objectionable and yet one be impermissible and the other permissible.
For purposes of clarity I shall introduce the following
terminology: When I say that a killing is morally objectionable or
unobjectionable, I shall say that I am referring to its moral value
(negative or positive). Moral value might be thought of as a scale
with a cutting off point on it, separating objectionable from
unobjectionable. Within these two realms there will be differences
in degrees of objectionableness or unobjectionableness which will
also indicate differences in moral value. When I speak of the moral
equivalence of a killing and a letting die I shall mean equivalent moral
value.
A specific killing or letting die will have a definite place
on the scale of moral value, being located either in the region of
objectionable or unobjectionable. But what about killing and letting
die, per se? If we say letting die is less objectionable per se than
killing, per se (and so its moral value differs) are we committed to
letting die being locatable in the region of objectionable things1 If
we do not want to be committed to placing e.g. letting die, per se in
either the region of objectionable or of unobjectionable things, we
can think of the properties which contribute to the objectionableness
of something -- when something has enough of them this is what puts it
in the objectionable region -- and say that the moral value of letting
die differs from that of killing, per se (i.e. is it not morally
equivalent to killing, per se), if it has fewer of these negative
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properties. This allows us to say that letting die differs in moral
value from killing, per se, even if we don't locate it in a region
of objectionable/unobjectionable things.
When I say that a killing is permissible or impermissible, I
shall say that I am referring to its permissibility status.
Given these locutions, we can restate the problem raised
above in the following way: if moral value diverges from permissibility
status, the fact that letting die in P2 has the same moral value as
killing in Pl, will not necessarily preclude letting die having a dif-
ferent permissibility status. And if we are concerned with permissibility
of killing to terminate life support, showing that killing and letting
die have equal moral value will not show that killing is permissible
when letting die is.
It might seem that it is an untenable position to claim that
a letting die has the same moral value as a killing, and yet has a
different permissibility status. It might seem that any property of
letting die that would make it permissible when killing is impermissible
would be evidence that killing has a different moral value from let-
ting die. But on the view being considered here, it is possible for
two acts (or an act and an ommission) to be equally morally ob.j>ectionable
(have the same moral value) and yet one be permissible and the other
impermissible. For example, someone might claim that letting die in
P2 was as objectionable as killing in PI, but someone always has a right
to do with his own resources what he wants, so long as"he doesn't
harm someone else. This makes not aiding permissible, but killing
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impermissible. So, the factor making for the permissibility of the
ommission would not necessarily serve as. an indicator of the moral
inequiva1ence of killing and letting die, unless it could specifically
be shown, at least sometimes, that the property which makes letting
die permissible also makes it less morally objectionable.
Note that it is consistent with this view (and I shall assume
that it is in fact part of the view) that an act or omission can be
assumed to be morally objectionable if it is impermissible, even though
the fact that it is permissible does not mean that is less objection-
able than an impermissible act/omission. That is, a necessary condi-
tion for the impermissibility of an act/omission is that there be some-
thing morally objectionable about it. Doing something morally objection-
able, e.g. letting die in P2 might not be impermissible, but certainly
doing something that is morally unobjectionable would be permissible.
Moral obj ectionab1eness would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition
of impermissibility.l
I do not wish to defend or put it forth as my own view that
equally objectionable acts/omissions can diverge in permissibility
status. However, it might be argued for, and if it were true, then
showing that letting die is permissible when killing is not would
not be sufficient to show that killing and letting die are not morally
equivalent. It would be easier to show that killing and letting die,
per se, differ morally, if we could take difference in permissibility
~here p = moral objectionableness, and q = impermissibility,
-(p ~ q), but (-p ~ -q).
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status to indicate difference in moral value. But, in order to protect
my discussion of the question whether ki~ling is morally equivalent to
letting die, per se, from an objection based on the divergence of moral
value and permissibility status, I shall adopt the more difficult course
of seeing if there is a difference in moral value between killing and
let die, per se, where the difference in permissibility status is not
taken to be an automatic indicator of differences in moral value. l
Having discussed the thesis of the divergence of moral value
from permissibility status, I wish to return to the claim to which
it gave rise. This claim was that it would not be sufficient to show
that killing and letting die were of equally objectionableness in Pl/P2,
if Pl/P2 was to be relevant to showing the permissibility of killing to
terminate support. We would have to show that killing and letting die
were equally impermissible in Pl/P2. 2
. lNote that if (a) there is a divergence between the permissi~ .
bility status and the moral values of killing and letting die, and (b)
killing were shown to be uno~jectionable'when letting die was, in ad-
dition to letting di'e being shown to be objectionable when killing was,
then trying to show the moral equivalence of killing and letting die,
will not necessarily broaden the range of impermissible things: it may
reveal that some things we do (letting die) are more objectionable than
we thought, while not changing their permissibility status, but it
may also show that some things (killing) wethQUg~t objectionable and
impermissible are not morally objectionable and are permissible.
2So the claim is both that unequal permissibility statu's will
not indicate that killing is morally more objectionable than letting
die, and showing that letting die is as morally objectionable as killing
will not show that the two have the same permissibility status.
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The claim is wrong, i.e. it is not necessary that Pl/P2
show the equal impermissibility of killing and letting die. Suppose
it could be argued that (1) killing and letting die were equally morally
objectionable in Pl/P2, but (2) not equally impermissible. (Suppose,
e.g. someone has a right to do with his own resources what he wants,
so long as he does not harm someone else, and this makes not aiding
permissible, but no less objectionable.) Suppose that equal moral
objectionableness in cases Pl/P2 showed, at least, that killing to
terminate life support was as morally objectionable or unobjectionable
as letting die to begin with, (i.e. it had the same moral value).
Suppose further, that letting die to begin with is not morally objection-
able, given the size of the effort involved. Therefore, killing would
not be objectionable. Now, if (as described above) objectionableness
isa necessary condition for impermissibility, even if not a sufficient
condition, then, showing that killing was equally unobjectionable to
letting die would be enough to show it was permissible, when letting
die to begin with was, even if it could be argued that moral value and
permissibility status could diverge.
This means that Thomson need not be committed to the view
that killing is permissible when letting die is, in cases where she
thinks they are equally objectionable, in order for these cases to be
evidence that killing is permissible when letting die is permissible,
when letting die and killing are equally ~objectionable.
In summary if we find that letting die is as morally object-
ionable as killing in Pl/P2 even if it isn't impermissible to let die
178
when it is impermissible to kill, we may be able to conclude (1) that
killing to terminate support has the same moral value as letti~g die
to start with and (2) that it is permissible when letting die to start
with is.
So far, I have claimed (1) that if consideration of Pl/P2
is to be relevant to a decision about the permissiblity of killing to
terminate support these cases must support the conclusion that killing
is as unobjectionable as letting die, not only that letting die is as
objectionable as killing, and (2) on the assumption that permissibility
status may diverge from moral value, Pl/P2 need not show that killing
and letting die always have the same permissibility status in order to
be relevant to a decision about the permissibility of killing to term-
inate support.
I now wish to point to an additional requirement that must
be met if Pl/P2 are to be relevant to showing that killing to terminate
support is permissible when letting die to begin with is permissible:
we must show either that (a) the killing and letting die to begin with
in the violinist cases are constructed along the same lines as those
comparable cases, where a killing and a letting die are supposed to be
equally objectionable, or we must show (b) that even if the cases are
contructed .along different lines, they share all factors, besides kill-
ing and letting die. If we know that either (a) or (b) is true, and
comparable cases like P1/P2 do show killing is morally equivalent to
letting die, per se, then, we can plug the equal factors (killing and
letting die) into equal contexts in the violinist ~kill and let die~
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cases, with the expectation that a killing and a" letting die in these
latter cases will both be unobjectionabre and permissible. As shown
above, Thomson concludes that a killing to stop support in the violinist
case is unobjectionable and permissible, not merely that it is not
necessarily objectionable and impermissible. To reach this conclusion
via the evidence of cases like Pl/P2 she would have to show both that
killing and letting die, per se, are morally equivalent, and that the
contexts in which they are placed are equal contexts.
In Argument II Thomson emphasizes that the person who wants
to kill to terminate support is, in supporting someone with the effect
of saving his life, doing the same thing as the person who would begin
life support. That is, she emphasizes that the position -- supporting
someone with the effect of saving his life -- which both the person
who wants to kill and the person who would let die want to avoid -- are
exactly the same. The fact that she does this, as well as point to
cases Pl/P2, and conclude that killing is permissible in the violinist
case, implies that she believes (1) in cases where we avoid being in the
same position, regardless of whether we avoid by killing or letting
die, all factors aside from killing and letting die are equal, and
(2) killing is shown to be morally equivalent to letting die, per se,
by the use of cases like Pl/P2. So, therefore, (3) killing in the
violinist case is as permissible as letting die to begin with, because
it is an instance of placing moral equals in equal contexts. If she
did not believe (1), but did introduce killing ,and letting die as
factors already shown (via cases like Pl/P2) to be morally equivalent,
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per se, there would be no reason to think that a killing was as per-
missible as a letting die to begin with .in the violinist case. That
is, if there were some difference in the cases besides killing and
letting die, this might make killing impermissible. (Henceforth, I
shall refer to the violinist kill and let die cases as the matrix kill
and let die cases, in recognition or the fact that the same exact
position serves as a matrix around which the two routes to avoid this
position, killing and letting die, gravitate.)
In summary, it seems fair to say that Thomson accepts the
(supposed) conclusion of the comparable cases Pl/P2 that killing is
11 · 1 1· d· 1 d h ·mora y equ1va ent to ett1ng 1e, per se, an sees t e cases 1n
which we kill the violinist or leave him to die to begin with as, like
Pl/P2, providing us with comparable cases, where all factors besides
2killing and letting die are the same.
So, it seems fair to interpret Argument II as follows: (1)
killing is not morally more objectionable than letting die, per see
(2) We can let die rather than be in a certain position saving the
violinist's life. (3) Therefore, we may kill to avoid being in the
same position.
lAt least in this paper. She alters her position in a later
paper, "Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem."
2The question how both Pl/P2 and the violinist kill and let
die cases can be comparable kill and let die cases, i.e. ones where
everything besides killing and letting die are the same (to the ex-
tent that this is possible), will be discussed ~elow.
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Section" II
It is the relationship between the matrix kill and let die
cases and Pl/P2 which I now wish to examine. Before proceeding however,
I wish to deal with one immediate objection to equating killing to remove
someone from the position which provides ALN satisfaction with letting
die to avoid having someone in this position. It can be argued that
this procedure relates killing only to the position of supporting some-
one and not to any state which preceded the support. For example, if
the supporter had voluntarily introduced someone who didn't have HLN,
but acquired ALN while in residence, the supporter could not have then
killed, even if they could have let someone die rather than start to
support them. The state prior to residence must be considered in order
to decide if we can terminate residence, at least sometimes. This
means that the simple formula suggested by Argument II will be inade-
quate.
However, the fact that we have to consider the condition prior
to residence, does not mean that this has anything to do with killing,
as opposed to letting die, being necessary to avoid residence. For
example, if we have made someone dependent on us who had no need to
be attached to begin with, we would also have to give additional aid,
in the form of additional doses of support by separate acts. Other-
wise the person would be worse off than he would have been if we had
never started support. He would have a right to get support which does
not depend on any objection to an act which kills to terminate support.
Thus, if we wish to deal with an objection to killing that does not
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depend on the objection from non-HLN states prior to residence, we should
restrict the discussion to cases where there was HLN before residence
was begun. In what follows I shall assume Argument II is being applied
to such a restricted range of ALN support cases.
I said that P1/P2 are taken as r~presentative of the Comparable
cases showing killing to be morally equivalent to letting die, per see
I also said that the idea behind Argument II was to take this conclusion,
and use it in the violinist case. The prerequisite to reaching this
conclusion, assuming P1/P2 are the sorts of case which can yield a
decision about whether killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per
se, is to show that killing is as objectionable or unobjectionable
as letting die in these cases. So we need to render judgment and test
this. judgment.
Recall that substituting a conclusion that killing is morally
equivalent to letting die per se in the violinist cases would yield
the conclusion that a killing is as permissible as a letting die, only
if all factors besides killing and letting die were also the same. If
they are the same, the matrix kill and let die cases would seem to be
comparable cases just as much as P1/P2 are assumed to be. However, we
must ask whether these cases are constructed according to the same
principles as P1/P2, and, if we answer this question in the negative
we must analyze the significance of this difference. To know if the
violinist kill and let die cases are constructed according to the
same principles as Pl/P2 we must know what principles of construction
are at the base of Pl/P2. Therefore, I will examine the construction
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of comparable cases, and see if, in these constructions, a killing and
a letting die are equally morally objectionable or unobjectionable.
I will first make clearer what I mean by the construction
principles (CPs) of Pl/P2. I set out 5 characteristics which Pl/P2
and Sl/S2 require to be equalized, and 4 characteristics which they
do not require to be equalized.
A. By Construction Principles (CPs) of Pl/P2 I mean the rul.es by which
we construct cases Pl/P2 and cases like them, that is the principle
for determining what factors in Pl/P2 are equalized in order to make
them comparable kill and let die cases. (Comparable cases being those
which are supposed to be able to tell us whether or not the presence
of killing, as opposed to letting die, makes a moral difference, in
general, and whether or not killing is morally equivalent to letting
die, per se.) Cases that are like P1/P2, but not identical with them,
are cases which (a) are constructed according to the same principle
determining what factors must be equalized in each case and yet (b)
do not have the same factors equalized in exactly the same way as in
P1/P2. For example in P1/P2 the intent to have the person die; is
present in both cases, so we may conclude that intentions should be
equalized according to the CP of these cases. However, cases without
the intention to have the person die may also be constructed according
to the CP of Pl/P2, because they leave out intention in both cases, i.e.
they equalize for this factor by omitting it in both cases.
Some of the things to note on the basis of Pl/P2 are the
following: (le(qualized» the intention should be the same (2e) the
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motive for killing should be the same, e.g. merely to have the person
die (or in a case other than Pl/P2 cons~ructed according to the same
CP, intent to have their money, for example.) (3e) Degree of knowledge
of what we are doing, killing or letting die, should be the same in
both cases. (4e) Pl/P2 make the efforts involved for the person who
would aid as well as the efforts the killer would have to make rather
than kill small. Therefore, the efforts involved should be the same. l
(ld(ifferences)the CP of Pl/P2 does not equalize for a
death being caused by a killing in both cases. That is, the CP does
not insist that we compare letting someone die whose death is caused
by a killing done by a person with a person killing someone. It is
possible that it would be objectionable to let someone die if they were
being killed by another person, but it would be unobjectionable to let
someone die if they were dying of natural causes. If this were so, then
letting die would be just as objectionable as killing when what will
happen is that someone will be killed by another person. This would show
that one way of dying is worse than another, and it is just as bad not
to prevent it, whether by killing or letting die. In the violinist
case, if we do not aid to start with, the violinist would die of natural
causes. It is possible, therefore for someone to argue that killing in
the violinist case is objectionable when letting die to start with is
not, but not because killing is more objectionable than letting die,
per se, but rather because dying by being killed is worse than dying
IAn additional point of equalization is derived from (2d)below.
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1from natural causes. I shall aS$ume for purposes of argument that one
way of dying -is not worse than another, and the failure to equalize
for the ways of death in Pl/P2 (and in the matrix cases) is no problem.
(2d) The CP of Pl/P2 does not require that because the person we let
die is on the point of death, the person we kill should also be on the
point of death. That is, it does not require that the person is in the
same position when we decide to kill and let die. Rather we do equalize
in the kill and let die cases by seeing to it that whether we kill or
let die makes a difference between life and death in both cases. That
is, if we don't kill, the person will go on living (i.e. the person
we would kill is not on the point of death anyway); and if we do aid
the person will go on living, and if we don't he will die. (We can "
consider this to be (5e).)
(3d) Equalization of all factors besides killing and letting
die in Pl/P2 does not involve the person avoiding being in exactly the
same situation if he kills or lets die. (This equalization does occur
in the matrix kill and let die cases.) That is, the killing case which
is comparable to letting someone die according to the CP of Pl/P2
does not involve us killing someone, when the alternative to killing
is aiding someone (even with a minimal amount of effort) to the extent
of saving his life. (The alternative to refusing life-saving help
1This ties in with the point discussed in Chapter 1, whether
we have a greater obligation to stop problems arising from injustice
than problems not arising from injustice.
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in the letting die case, is, however, aiding someone, even mi~imally,
to the extent of saving his life.)l
(4d) the CP of Pl/P2 cases does not equalize for the function
of the efforts which would be made as the alternative to killing or
letting die. If we do not let die then we provide benefits for someone
which he would not have had if we hadn't come on the scene. In addition,
if we do let someone die, that person loses out only on what he would
have had via our help, i.e. the rest of his life. [The rest-of-his-
life is, then, only the "rest-of-his-life-via-our support (via us1'].
But in P1/P2 if we do not ki1l.we do not provide someone with a benefit
he wouldn't have had if we hadn't come on the scene. And if we do kill
the person does not lose out only on the 1ife-he-wou1d-have-had-via-us.
In other words, while the CP of Pl/P2 requires that the size
of efforts involved in avoiding killing and aiding be the same, it does
not require that the function of these efforts be the same; e.g. the CP
does not require that life-support with benefits over prior prospects
be provided or that the character of what someone loses out on be the
same. (That is, the character of what he loses in the kill case is not
rest-of-his-life-via-us.)
lNote that if a CP for comparable cases did require equaliza-
tion of situation avoided, the life-saving aid given as an alternative
to killing would have to arise as the alternative to killing, if it
was to have the same genesis as the life saving aid which is the al-
ternative to letting die. In other words, the life saving aid would
have to arise as the way of our avoiding killing someone who was not
already dependent on us for lifesaving aid. Neither Pl/P2 nor the
violinist case meet this requirement.
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If the CP were to equalize for function of efforts and
character of loss we would need to const~uct a comparable kill case
which stands to letting die, as the matrix killing case stands to the
matrix let die case. Thus, the comparable killing case to P2 would be:
killing someone, solely because we want to have him dead, when we
are already providing him with life-saving assistance at very minimal
cost to ourselves. In this case, if we do not kill, the person will
receive the benefits of our life-saving aid he would not have received
had we not come on the scene; if we do kill he will lose out only on
what he would have had via our help, the rest-of-his-life-via-us. l
In summary, I have noted that the CP of Pl/P2 exhibits con-
cern for equalizing for (1) intention, (2) motive, (3) degree of
lNote that equalizing for function and character of loss in
the killing case would make it impossible to also equalize for ,the fact,
mentioned in (3d) above, that the al~e~native to killing involves aid
which arises in the attempt to avoid killing. To equalize in (4d) ,
the aid (or the plan for it) which saves someone's life would have to
precede the decision not to kill, and the aid would have to be tolerat-
ed, as opposed to killing. This is because, when we save someone's
life as the alternative to killing, when this aid arises as the al-
ternative to killing, we avoid making the person worse off than he
was before we came on the scene. (The exception to this is when the
person we would kill was someone who was on the.point of death anyway.
Then winding up giving him life support as the way to avoid killing
him would make him better off. But in this case, the difference be-
tween killing and not killing, considered independent of what we would
have to do to avoid killing, would not involve (2e), i.e. that whether
we kill or not makes a difference between life and death.) However,
when we tolerate supporting someone rather than kill, we make the
person better off than they would have been if we hadn't come on the
scene. Analogously, this is the difference between swerving to avoid
killing an innocent bystander [with the result that the person (somehow)
becomes dependent on us for life-saving help] and swerving to avoid
killing someone who is already getting life-saving help from us (so
that he goes on getting the help.) In one case we have to avoid im-
posing on someone who is not already imposing on us, in the other
case we avoid imposing on someone who is already imposing on us.
188
knowledge, (4) size of efforts, and (5) that what we do (kill or let
die) makes a difference between life and death. It does not exhibit
concern for equalizing (1) same type of death in kill and let die cases,
(2) person we kill and let die both being in the same position when we
have to decide to kill or let die, (3) avoiding being in the same exact
situation, situations which would come to exist in the same way in
kill and let die cases. That is, situations where we do something
which arises as the alternative to both killing and letting die. (4)
That the person who is killed or let die loses out only on what he
would have gotten via our efforts, and what we would do as an alternative
to killing or letting die being something which offers a benefit to the
person which would not have been provided if we hadn't come on the
scene. (That is, there is no equalization for c'haracter of loss or
function of efforts.)
We can conclude from this analysis: the claim that Pl/P2
are equally morally objectionable involves denying not only that it
1
makes a difference whether we cause someone's death or not, but also
involves denying that the absence of factors noted in (ld-4d) in the
killing cases will make a difference to the moral value of a killing
as opposed to a letting die. Accordingly, the facts that the person
we kill loses out on more than he would have gotten via our support,
and that he is worse off than he would have been had we never come on
lHere, and throughout, I assume that letting someone die does
not cause a death, but killing does. I take ~his to be a difference
derived from the definitions of killing and letting die.
189
the scene is supposed to make no difference to the moral value of a
killing as opposed to a letting die, acc.ording to the CP of Pl/P2.
Section III
I will now consider cases which differ from P1/P2 in certain
particulars, but which are still generatab1e from the CP of Pl/P2.
They equalize for types of factors this CP says should be equalized
for, but the particular ways in which they are equalized is different.
I will pay particular attention to kill and let die cases
where (a) there is no intention to have the person die, and (b) where
the efforts required to aid and to avoid killing are equal, but unlike
in P1/P2, are large.
The first set of cases which are derivatives of PI/P2, and
hence comparable cases are Plb/P2b: These cases involve someone in-
tending another person's death, but the effort required to avoid
killing or letting die are large. Plb: I kill with the sole intention
that someone die, but to· avoid do~ng. the act which would kill I must pay
$1,000. P2b: I don't aid, with the sole intention that someone die,
but aiding would cost me $1,000. (That is, in both cases, the cost
is high but the person does not object to the cost of not killing or
of not letting die; he does what he does independent of considerations
of the cost of doing the alternative.)
If P1/P2 are comparable cases and show not only the equal
objectionableness of a killing and a letting die, but also that kill-
ing and letting die are morally equivalent, per se, then it should be
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just as unobjectionable to refuse to pay in Plb as in P2b.
On the basis of factors that we have so far decided P1/P2
require that we equalize in order to produce comparable cases, the
following cases should also be comparable kill and let die cases.
Thus, if killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, and
these cases are truly comparablecase-s (i.e. cases which hold all
factors besides killing and letting die equal in such a way that if
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, these cases will
show it)killing should be just as unobjectionable as letting die in
these cases., The only ways the new cases may not be comparable cases
are if they do not faithfully follow the CP of Pl/P2 or if the CP of
Pl/P2 does not provide comparable cases.
P3: I prefer not to spend $100, rather than do an act which
I know will kill someone, simply because I don't want to spend the
money. I have no interest in the person dying. (E.g. I must spend
$100 in order to drive on a route other than the one where there is
someone I will run over.)
P4: I prefer not to give $100 to save someone's life. It's
not that I have an interest in the person dying, but that I merely don't
1
want to give away my money.
IThe person in both these cases who doesn't want to give the
$100 would have one type of interest in the death occuring.· This is
interest in the death 0ccuring as a sign that he has not aided or re-
frained from killing. I shall assume that this sort of interest is
morally different from an interest we have in the occurrence of something
when it is causally necessary for our goals. I shall restrict use of
"having an interest in," to the latter.
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In both cases my motive is to avoid the loss of my $100
and in neither case do I intend the death. Furthermore, the cases
are equalized so that the person who doesn't want to lose the $100
does not seek to retain the money by using the person to be ki1led/
let die as a means to this end. That is, we don't kill someone in
order to ke~p our $100, and we do not let someone die (by refusing
minimal assistance) in order to keep our $100, where his death would
cause us to keep our $100.
Likewise, on the basis of factors we have so far decided
that Pl/P2 require us to equalize in order to produce comparable
cases, P5 and P6 should be comparable kill and let die cases:
P5: I don't want to spend $100 in order to avoid putting
myself in a position where an act of mine will kill someone, an act
which it will be too late to avoid when the time actually co~es to
act. (For 'example, I don't want to spend $100 to put a safety latch on
the rifle I will use.)
P6: I don't want to spend $100 in order to avoid missing an
opportunity to aid someone, where the efforts involved in actually
aiding the person would be minimal. (For example, I don't want to
spend $100 to have someone look out for people in distress I might be
able to help.)
There are at least two possible grounds for objecting to the
conclusion that the CP of Pl/P2 implies that killing and letting die
in P3/P4 and P5/P6 are equally unobjectionable, if killing and letting
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die in Pl/P2 are equally objectionable.
1The first objection is that suggested by Michael Tooley,
who could argue that P3/P4 are not comparable cases because only cases
involving small efforts to avoid killing and letting die can be com-
parable cases. This is because we needn't make large efforts to save
someone's life. According to Tooley, the CP of Pl/P2 calls not only
for equal efforts involved, but small efforts. So, if letting die is
not objectionable in P4, this does not mean that killing rather than
spending $100 is also unobjectionable.
This suggestion of Tooley's seems wrong. Restricting the
equal efforts to small ones seems arbitrary since the mere fact that
we may have to do more rather than kill than we have to do rather than
let die, may indicate a morally significant difference between killing
and letting die. So cases involving larger efforts may be comparable
cases, but they may just indicate that killing and .1etting die are not
morally equivalent, per see
The second suggestion as to why P3/P4 and P5/P6 are not
comparable is as follows: There is a factor present in the killing
cases which is' not present in the letting die cases, a factor which
may account for our having to pay $100 rather than kill, even if kil1-
ing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see This additional
\iichael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosoph;y:
and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (Fall 1972); reprinted in Cohen, M. et a1.
(eds.), The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion (Princeton, N. J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1974),pp. 52-84.
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factor is presence of an interest in the occurrence of the cause of
death. (Note that having an interest in the occurrence of the cause of death
is different from causing the death or having an interest in the occurrence
of the death itself.) I will go into some detail in examining this
suggestion as to why P3/P4 and P5/P6 are not comparable. I will do
this not merely for the sake of deciding if these cases are comparable
according to the CP of P1/P2 but also because it will help us to see
what the rationale behind the CP of P1/P2 is.
When we let die in P4, because we do not want to spend the
$100, we have no interest in the occurrence of the cause of the other
person's death (except, as noted in the footnote above, as a sign).
But when we kill rather than spend the $100, we do have an interest
in the occurrence of the cause of death, if only because the cause of
death, our act, is what we must do rather than pay the $100. We do
not have an interest in the occurrence of the cause of death (our act)
because it is the cause of death, but nevertheless it is the cause of
death and for some other reason, we have an interest in its occurring.
Since, by definition, all killings involving voluntary acts
will involve the actor having an interest in the occurrence of the
cause of death--since he choses to have the act occur--there should be
no killing cases (involving voluntary acts) comparable to cases where
we let someone die simply out of a desire not to make the efforts. l
lInterest in the cause of death is not strictly speaking,
part of the definition of a voluntary act whic~ kills. But it is an
implication of the definition, and I shall not distinguish between
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And since no letting die case can involve having an interest in the
cause of death merely as the flip side of making efforts to aid l in
the way in which killing in P3 involves having an interest in the
cause of death as the flip side of making efforts, there will be no
let die case which is comparable to killing in P3.
So, the suggested objection is, .that if it is part of the
CP of Pl/P2 to equalize for interest in the occurrence of the cause
of death, the CP of Pl/P2 will not necessarily imply that we need make
only the efforts to avoid killing that we have to make rather than let
die, in cases like P3/P4. This is because in P3/P4 there is no
equalization of interest in the occurrence of the cause of death.
We might show that the CP of Pl/P2 does imply that we should
equalize for interest in the cause of death by showing that in other
cases, where letting die and killing cases can share the same sort.of in-
terest in the occurrence of the cause of death, the CPof Pl/P2 would
select these as comparable cases over cases where the interest wasn't
equalized. For example; consider:
P7: I set a gas going because it will save my life, fore-
seeing, but not intending that it will kill someone else.
these two. Furthermore,interest in the occurrence of the cause of
death is not a necessary feature of killing cases where e.g., (1)
inanimate objects kill, or (2) someone involuntarily causes the
death.
lBecause the alternative to not aiding is not causing the
death.
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P8: I refuse to give minimal aid in order to st~p a gas
from going off (when I have no part in setting it to go off) because
the gas will save my life, though I foresee that it will kill someone
whom I do not intend to kill.
P9: I fail to aid someone in a minimal fashion because I am
busy setting off a gas that will (a) save my life, and (b) not harm
the other person.
If the CP of Pl/P2 requires that intending the death be
equalized between kill and let die cases, it makes sense to think that
intending the cause of death should also be equalized. If so, then
P7/P3, rather than P7/P9 are comparable cases according to the CP of
P1/P2. (P9 is a case where I fail to aid but do not have an interest
in the occurrence of the cause of the other person's death.) P7/P8
should be equally objectional or unobjectionable if P1/P2 shows that
killing and letting die are morally equivalent.
P7/P8 show that equalizing a type of interest in the cause
of death which both killing and letting die cases can share, is im-
portant for producing comparable cases according to the standard of
Pl/P2. Therefore, these cases may suggest that interest in the cause
of death of the sort present in P3 is a factor, which if not equalized,
would result in non-comparable cases.
I now wish to consider an argument against the view that
interest in the cause of death in,P3 makes it a non-comparable case
to P4. This argument will show that the fact that the CP of Pl/P2
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would select P7/p8 as comparable cases does not show that P3/P4 are
non-comparable. Furthermore, this argument will help to make clearer
a general principle at the heart of the CP of Pl/P2 because it will
help explain why the CP -of Pl/P2 does not equalize for the factors
described above (pp. 185-6).
This argument against is as follows: the interest in the
cause of death in P7/P8 is of a sort which is not necessarily present
in a killing case. Now, some sort of interest in the cause of death
is, by definition, always present in a killing case involving a volun-
tary act. The view, then, is that interest in the occurrence of death
of a sort which~ only be present in a killing case (e.g., interest
in it as the flip side of avoiding efforts required to not kill, as
in P3), should, like the general property of having some sort of inter-
est in the occurrence of the cause of death, be taken as a definitional
property of killing.
The justification for this is that if we could not have a
kill case which duplicates "the situational characteristics" of a let
die case, without introducing this version of a definitional property
of killing, though it cannot also be given to the let die case, we
must tolerate the difference in the cases. By "situational character-
istics" I mean goals or attitudes called for by the situation. For
example, in cases like P7/P8, the sort of interest in the cause of
death which is present, must be present in both kill and let die cases
if both are to be cases of doing something so that something which is
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a cause/ of death and will occur and our goal will be achieved. Some
sort of interest in the cause of death i p dictated by the definition
of killing, but the specific interest in both P7/P8 comes about because
of the "situation" of seeking to achieve a goal by assuring the occur-
rence of the cause of death. In P3/P4 interest in the cause of death
is not necessary in the let die case~ but it is in the kill case, if
we are to have a situation in both cases where we avoid efforts which
arise as the alternative to doing something (killing or letting die).
So P3/P4 and P7/P8 can both be comparable sets-of cases according to
the CP of Pl/P2. P7/P8 need not be evidence that P3/P4 are not com-
parable cases according to the CP of PI/P2.
Tolerating differences in cases necessary to create the same
situation with a kill and a let die factor is justified, furthermore, by a
more general account which can be given .of the CP of Pl/P2. The CP of PI/
P2, we can see up~n further consideration, really is recommending that to
construct comparable cases we equalize around the definitions of kill-
ing and letting die. That is, if we want to get cases which hold all
factors besides killing and letting die equal, we should take one
case (either the kill or let die case) and equalize the second case
for all factors which surround the definitional properties of killing
or letting die in the first case, leaving all the definitional proper-
ties of killing or letting die in the second case intact. So, for
example, suppose we start with the case in which we let die rather than
spend $100 (P4). That someone would have been saved by the $100 (our
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effort), and will lose out on only the benefit they would have gotten
if they had been saved, are definitiona~ properties of letting die,
so we needn't worry about equalizing for them in the kill case. (Note
that these are among the properties we have already noted (pp. ,185-6)
that the CP of Pl/P2 does not equalize for.) We do have to equalize
for avoiding the efforts as the alternative to letting die. So in the
comparable kill case we must avoid efforts as the alternative to doing
the act which kills, where killing will necessarily involve some
interest in the08use of death. Or, if we start with the killing case
(P3) , we must equalize for avoiding efforts which in the let die case
will be efforts we would make as the alternative to letting die. This
is because the efforts lie in the context of the definitional proper-
ties of killing. We do not have to equalize for interest in the cause
of death, if creating the situation of avoiding efforts in a let die
case doesn't itself call for interest in the cause of death. This is
because interest in the cause of death is among the definitional
properties of killing, it is not a property in the context of killing.
If we accept this general principle, wl1ich I call the prin-
ciple of Contextual Equalization, as a correct description of the
way the CP Pl/P2 tells us to get comparable cases, we can explain why
the factors noted above (pp.185'-6) the ones that the C;~ of Pl/P2 doe-s not
equalize for. So the fact that the CP of Pl/P2 does not require that
we equalize for those factors is evidence for the claim that contextual
equalization is the rationale of the CP of Pl/P2.
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To repeat: Let die, by definition, will involve the
person who is not saved losing out onlyDn what he would have gotten
via the support. If we want to compare let die with kill in some case
by holding all factors equal besides kill and let die one approach is
to take a let die case as a model and construct a context for the
kill case that equalizes for all the same factors that "surround" let
die in the let die case. This, then excludes concern for equalizing
any factors that are involved in the definition of letting die and
hence which are not part of the context ("not surrounding") let die.
Such an element would be the fact that the person loses out on only
what they would get via the efforts of the person who lets die. Like-
wide, it is, by definition, true that the efforts we make as the al-
ternative to letting die will have the function of providing life-
saving aid which benefits the person over the condition he would have
been 'in if we hadn't been on the scene. Therefore, according to the
contextualist approach we need not give these characteristics to the
efforts we make rather than kill.
The contextualist approach to getting all things equal be-
sides kill and let die flows quite naturally from considering the ori-
gins of our concern with kill and let dies cases. We start off by
asking "what is the difference between killing someone and letting
someone die?" We may imagine that the same person is involved in
both cases. Adopting a principle of normality, we do not add peculiar
characteristics to the person when these are not necessary to our
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imagining the performance of an act or omission. So when we imagine
killing the person, presumably, we imagine killing an ordinary,
healthy, non-dependent person. But once we consider the problem of
letting die, we must give the person a characteristic, e.g., his being
on the point of death, not called for in order to kill him, just in
order to make it possible for us to let him die. It is this charac-
teristic that makes it the case that if we let die he loses out only
on what he would get via our efforts. It seems quite natural then to
compare this case with a killing case where someone does ~ lose only
what he would get from our efforts, because we have not introduced any
non-definitional special conditions in either kill or let die cases. l
The contextualist approach starts, as noted, with the as-
sumptions that there is a killing (without adding any special factors
auxilliary to the definition of killing) and that there is a letting
lThis discussion has only offered a way of explaining the
procedure which lies at the heart of the CP of PI/P2 so as to make it
possible to see what all the cases generated by the CP of PI/P2 have in
common. It does not give us a reason for contextually equalizing, in
the sense that this reason would also explain why it would be wrong to
try to equalize for a property (such as the specific sort of interest
in the cause of death as the flip side of making efforts which is
present in P3) which follows from the definition of killing.
Such an argument can, indeed be given, I think, but I will
present it elsewhere. This is because presenting the argument now
would defeat an important p'urpose of this Chapter, namely to show
that one can argue that the directive "equalize all things besides
kill and let die" in order to create comparable cases, is ambiguous,
i.e., that it may lead us to generate different types of cases as com-
parable. It is only when we consider more carefully, as I do else-
where, what a comparable case is supposed to do for us and what would
interfere with its doing this, that the reason for contextual equali-
zation will become clear.
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die (without adding any special factors auxilliary to its defini-
tion, where its definition does call for. us to deal with a person who
is on the point of death) and equalizes for all other factors apart
from those in the definitions of killing or letting die.
There is, however, another approach to producing comparable
cases, which might be suggested. I call t.his approach cross-
definitional equalization, because it tells us to equalize for as
many factors in the definitions of killing and letting die (as well
as as many factors in the contexts of these definitions) as possible,
without causing the killing and letting die cases to cease being kill-
ing and letting die cases. (So, cross-definitional equalization in-
cludes contextual equalization.) Cross-definitional equalization takes
the directive to find out if killing is morally equivalent to letting
die, per se by constructing cases which are alike in all respects ex-
cept that one is a killing and one a letting die, to mean that we
should construct cases which are alike as possible, while still re-
maining kill and let die cases. Since it is possible to give some of
the definitional properties of letting die to the killing case (though
of course it is not possible to give these properties to the defini-
tion of killing itself), this should be done. For example, letting
die has, by definition, the property that the person who is left to
die loses out on only what he would have had via our aid. This
property can be given to a killing case without making it a non-
killing. For example, if we kill someone who is already receiving
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life saving aid from us. Likewise, once we see fit to equalize for
definitional properties of killing and letting die, we can judge a
letting die case to be non-comparable if it lacks a definitional prop-
erty had by the kill case, when we can construct other kill and let
die cases which do give to the let die case a version of this particu-
lar definitional property of killing. For example, if (A) interest
in the cause of death must be present in kill case P3, but it cannot
be present in this form in a let die case, but (B) P7/P8 provide us
with cases where interest in the cause of death is equalized, then
P3/P4 are non-comparable according to the principle of cross defini-
tional equalization.
According to the promoter of the CP of cross-definitional
equalization, if (1) killing and letting die are equally objectionable
in P7/P8, and (2) it is because there is an interest in the occurrence
of the cause of death, regardless of the particular form that this
interest in fact takes, that the killing and letting die are in fact
objectionable, then (3) we shall have evidence that in P3 it is inter-
est in the cause of death as opposed to the presence of killing, per se,
that is morally significant. (If the particular fo'rm that interest in the
occurrence of the cause of death took in P7 is what was morally sig-
nificant, then this would not bear on whether the form that interest
came in in P3 was morally significant.)
The motivation for cross definitional equalization need
only be the desire to have kill and let die cases which are as
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similar as possible. But an additional impetus for the move to
cross-definitional equalization may be the view that some killings are
impermissible, when letting dies ·are permissible, not because they are
killings, but only because they involve killing a different type of
person than we let die. According to this view, if it is permissible
to kill the type of person who is always involved in letting die cases,
e.g., one who would lose only what he would get via us, then this
should show that killing is no worse than letting die. Therefore,
this view is that it is unfair to decide if killing is morally equiva-
lent to letting die, per se, in a situation where only killing and not
letting die takes as its object something (i.e., a person who will lose
more than what he would get via us) which makes what is done objection-
able.
How would the CP of cross-definitional equalization rate the
specific cases we have considered so far? According to the CP of
cross-definitional equalization, P3/P4 and Pl/P2 would not be compar-
able cases. l (Since the person in the kill cases will lose more than
he would get via us, and in P3 there is interest in the cause of death
and none in P4.) Moreover, because there is an interest in the cause
of death when we kill to terminate support but none when we let die
to begin with, matrix kill and let die cases are not comparable
lThis means that "comparable cases" is CP-relative, i.e.,
there may be comparable l' comparable 2 • • • comparable n ~
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according to the CP of cross-definitional equalization. l This means
that killing could be morally equivalent. to letting die, per se, and
yet the killing would not be as morally objectionable as letting die
to begin with. Furthermore, if the matrix killing involves using
someone as a means to our end, or intending someone's death as a means
to our end, when matrix letting die does not involve this, this will
be an additional reason why they are not comparable according to the
CP of cross-definitional equalization (as well as that of simple con-
textual equalization). In summary, these inequalities mean that--
contrary to the implication of Thomson's emphasizing "seeking to avoid
doing the same exact thing"--avoiding the same exact position does not
entail that there are no factors present in the kill case that are not
present in the let die case, besides killing and letting die, which
might make one unobjectional and the other objectionable, even if
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see
The matrix kill and let die cases would, however, be
equalized for the following factors: (1) the person losing only
lThis difference in cases would also make them unequal on
the principle of contextual equalization alone, since interest in the
cause of death demanded by the situation in matrix killing could be
duplicated if the situation in the let die case ,fwere other than in
maxtrix let die, e.g., if the let die case were one where we let
someone die because we intend the occurrence of the cause of his
death for the sake o,f the benefit it will bring us. (Recall it is
P3/P4, not matrix kill and let die which are comparable cases accord-
ing to the principle of contextual equalization.) This means that
the matrix kill and let die cases do not place the same situational
demands on what factors should be present.
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what he would get,if he is killed or let die, (2) the efforts we
make rather than kill or let die provide support and life-saving
aid, (3) the person is no worse off if we kill or let die than he
would have been if we had never come on the scene, and (4) we have
an interest in the person losing only what he would get via us, in
order to avoid making efforts which benefit him. Despite their not
being perfect, the matrix kill and let die cases are more comparable,
according to the CP of cross-definitional equalization than PI/P2
and P3/P4.
I have considered two standards by which to measure "compar-
ability," contextual equalization and cross-definitional equalization
(which includes contextual equalization). A third standard, in addi-
tion to these two, by which to judge whether cases are comparable is
to judge whether the cases are about doing different things (killing
and let die) to someone who is in exactly the same situation. Accord-
ing to this standard matrix kill and let die cases are not comparable,
since they do not both involve dealing with someone who is already
getting life support.
Concern for cross-definitional equalization (as
well as the third standard and simple contextual equalization), would
lead us to conclude that BNAl and matrix killing are comparable cases,
IRecall, that RNA is the case in which someone who is re-
ceiving life support is attacked by a fatal germ, and requires minimal
additional assistance from us to ward off the germ. If we refuse to
give the minimal aid, it is in order that the germ, which will cause
him to be detached as well as kill him, can detach him.
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Ibut matrix killing and letting die are not comparable cases. All
the/equalization which was present in the matrix kill and let die
cases is present in BNA and matrix killing, including equalization for
interest in the occurrence of the cause of death, and equalization
for being about a person in the same situation.
Like the matrix kill and let die cases, matrix kill and BNA
cases are constructed according to principles other than the CP of
Pl/P2. The thesis of cross-definitional equalization is that even if
letting die is not so objectionable as killing in Pl/P2, and the cases
constructed according to the CP of Pl/P2 do not provide instances of
equally objectionable or unobjectionable killing and letting die, this
need not mean that killing and letting die will not be equally objec-
tionable/unobjectionable in cases constructed according to the CP of
cross-definitional equalization. Furthel~ore, the thesis maintains
that these other cases are the ones capable of showing that killing
is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, for if cross-
definitional equalization does provide truly equal contexts and we do
get equal moral value for killing and letting die in these cases,
lThere is a further reason why matrix kill and let die
cases are not comparable cases, which I shall not enter into in detail
here. Briefly, this is that, as it turns out, a decision about the
permissibility of letting die has a role in an argument for the per-
missibility of killing. But comparable cases should be such that we
can decide on their permissibility independently, or at most, can use
the decision in one case as a sign for the permissibility in the other
case, once we already know if killing is morally equivalent to letting
die, per see
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this must (so the claim goes) mean that killing and letting die are
morally equivalent per see According to the CP of cross-definitional
equalization (as well as the third standard) it i.s BNA and matrix
killing, not Pl/P2 that should be the basis on which we decide if
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see
In conclusion, in suggesting three different standards by
which to construct comparable cases, all suggested by the directive
of "holding all factors besides killing and letting die constant, as
far as possible," I have shown that this directive is ambiguous.
This is because one could use this directive to justify use of .any
of the CPs, and yet at least two of them (cross-definitional equaliza-
tion and simple contextual equalization generate different cases as
comparable).
Section IV
I began this chapter by putting forth an interpretation of
Thomson's argument according to which matrix killing is permissible,
when matrix letting die is, because (a) killing is morally equivalent
to letting die, per se, and (B) all other morally significant factors
besides killing and letting die are the same in the matrix kill and
let die cases. I said that (a) was supposed to be shown by examining
comparable cases--ones Thomson presents as those contructed according
to the CP of Pl/P2--and seeing that the killing and the letting die
in those cases are of equal moral value.
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I have not, however, yet tested to see whether our
judgments- about cases considered comparable according to the CP of'
Pl/P2 do yield the same judgments about a killing and a letting die,
I will now present four types of tests to determine whether the kill
and let die cases generated by the CP of Pl/P2 are instances of
killing and letting die which are (a) equally permissible/impermissible
(have equal permissibility status) and (b) equally morally objectio~-
able/unobjectionable.
Test (1): Can John, in PI, who put the poison in the cup
and killed Mary, be required to make efforts, if possible, to resur-
rect her? If he can, can Jim in P2, who failed to warn Susan of the
poison in her coffee, be required to make the same efforts?l If he
cannot, for some size effort which can be required of John, what does
this indicate?
We must evaluate the results of Test (1) in the light of
the distinction I noted above between those who say Pl/P2 shows (a)
letting die is just as morally objectionable as killing, but letting
die is permissible even if killing isn't, and those who say (b) that
killing and letting die are equally objectionable and equally imper-
missible.
~e can imagine that John did not also fail to aid Mary
by not warning her of the poison in her coffee (e.g., he fainted
after putting the poison in), so that there is only one wrong done
in each of the kill and let die cases.
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If letting die is permissible t then differences in the
efforts which can be required post-omission t may not tell us any-
thing about whether the letting die is morally· less objectionable
than the killing. l This is because we may not be required to make
efforts after doing what it was permissible for us to do, even if
what was permissible was just as morally objectionable as what was
impermissible. So killing and letting die in Pl/P2 might still be
equally as objectionable t and yet, if l~tting die is permissible and
killing is not permissible, after-the-fact efforts may be unequal.
If both letting die and killing are impermissible, then
unequal after-the-fact-efforts would show that letting die in PI
was Il:ot as morally objectionable as killing in P2. If we made both
letting die in P2 and killing in PI illegal and yet we attached stif-
fer penalties to PI and P2, this would indicate that we considered one
more morally objectionable than the other. Therefore t killing and
letting die could both be impermissible and yet different efforts
lThat is, whether letting die in that particular case is
less morally objectionable than killing in that particular case.
(Note that a final decision about the equal objectionableness of the
killing or letting die (if that is the decision) may be the result
of (a) differences between killing and letting die, per se, being
overridden, or (b) of there being no difference per se between kill-
ing and letting die. If the former were the case, the differences
between killing and letting die, per se should show up in our judg-
ments about other cases involving killing and letting die. Those
who have used P1/P2 as comparable cases, have held (1) that the
killing and letting die are equally objectionable, and (2) that they
are equally objectionable because killing and letting die are morally
equivalent, per se.)
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could be requireq of John and Jim. But if different efforts were
required this~ould i,ndicate that it is less objectionable in one
case to fail to do, what it is impermissible to fail to d.o, than-
it is to do what it. ·is ,impermissible to do in the other case. 1 Note
tllat if it were true that.; we·-, did.n' t ,h-ave' to make large efforts to
help someone·, ,the .upp~erlimits o-n,t'hese efforts wouldn't determine
the upper limit on efforts we could be required to make to compensa-te
for not' having given the minimal assistance that we had to give in
the first place. - 2Some have held that we needn't make large efforts
to avoid either killing or letting die, but if we refuse to make min-
imal efforts to avoid either, we ~ill have done something objection-
able and the effo~ts involved in the penalty for having done some-
thing objectionable may be much greater than the efforts we had to
make rather than do the objectionable thing in the first place.
Thus, differential results in Test 1 show either that the
letting die is not impermissible when the killing is impermissible
or that the letting die is not so morally objectionable as killing.
Derivatives of Test (1): In PI as described above John
does not also fail to give minor aid to Mary immediately after having
1Thus the fact that one had Good Samaritan laws wouldn't
necessarily mean that one thought a killing and a letting die were
equally objectionable morally.
2For example, Bruce Russell, "On the Relative Strictness
of Negative and Positive Duties," American Philosophical Quarterly
14 (April 1977), pp. 87-97.
,)
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done the act that will kill· her. But let us now suppose, along
with Thomson, that John does also fail to provide minor aid after
doing the act which kills. In the course of arguing for the claim
that Pl/P2 are equally morally objectionable, Thomson says the follow-
ing: Just because John, who killed, also did not give minor aid, we
do not think he did something more objectionable than Jim, who only
did not give minor aid. That is, she claims that John's killing has
the same moral value as Jim's letting die (x=x), and also that 2x
(John's killing and John's letting die) is not of greater (negative)
value than x. (This is a rebuttal to the view that even if killing
is morally equivalent to letting die, the killer does a worse thing
than the person who lets die because he does two wrong things rather
than one.)
Using Test (1), it does seem that we would not increase
John's maximum required efforts (after-the-fact) if, after knowing
that he is the killer, we also found out that he failed to make small ef-
fo.rts t~Qai.d. So, if the letting die is as morally objectionable
as the killing, then, by the measure of Test (1) Thomson is right to
say that John's kill and John's letting die is not of greater (nega-
tive) weight than Jim's letting die.
But note that if, knowing that Jim (in P2) failed to aid in
some minor way, we found out afterwards that he also put the poison in
the coffee, it does seem that we would increase the efforts required
of him to bring his victim back to life. Since it would be
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contradictory to believe that the combination of killing and letting
die is not of greater weight than just letting die in John's case,
but killing and letting die is of greater weight than just letting
die in Jim's case, the solution is as follows: (a) the killing dif-
fers in either moral objectionableness or permissibility from the
letting die, (b) the greatest efforts which can be required after-the-
fact are already required for the person who kills, so that adding
let die to kill (in that specific order) does not increase the ef-
forts required, and (c) the efforts demanded for letting die are lower
than those for killing, since adding killing to letting die (in that
specific order) does increase the efforts demandable.
So, in Thomson's attempt to show that the person who kills
doesn't do anything more objectionable than the person who lets die
simply because he does two objectionable things, rather than one,
she provides us with a way to show either (1) that the killing is not
morally equivalent to letting die, or (2) that it is not permissible
when letting die is permissible. The way to show this is to note the
significance of the order in which we find out that the same person
both lets die and kills.
The following two points could be made in rebuttal of Test
11): (1) If the person who only lets die does indeed have to make
fewer efforts to correct his objectionable behavior than the person
who kills, it is only because the person who lets die (but not nec-
essarily the person who kills) is always in the position of having
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an "accomplice." This accomplice either is the person who will have
initiated the cause of death, or else whatever natural occurrences
initiates the cause of death. It is right, therefore, that the
person who let,s die only share the efforts demandable. So, lesser
burdens assigned after-the-fact, need not imply that a letting die is
morally less objectionable than a killing. (This rebuttal also pre-
dicts that when the person who lets die is also the killer, the burden
of efforts on him goes up. This is because there is no longer an ac-
complice.)
The second point in rebuttal to Test (1) is as follows:
(2) Unlike 2 joint killers who act together, the person who lets die
does so after his accomplice has done his part, and perhaps this
should also reduce the burden on him, even if what he does is as
morally objectionable as the person who kills.
Neither of these two points seems adequate. So fare as (2)
is concerned, if one of two killers started the murder and the second
finished it (both steps being necessary for the person to die), it
seems that the second killer might have even greater responsibility
for compensating for what is done. He actually completed the killing.
Therefore, unless the killing is either more morally objectionable
than the letting die, or impermissible when the letting die is per-
missible, letting die after someone else has initiated the threat
should result in the heavier burden of after-the-fact penalty being
placed on the person who lets die. So far. as (1) is concerned: If
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one of two joint killers is not available for carrying out compensa-
tion (e.g., he is dead), the one that is available can be required to
carry the entire weight of compensation. ~Vhat someone did (partici-
pating in the killing) can give high the highest responsibility for
compensating for what was done. Thus, unless the killing and the
letting die in Pl/P2 are differentially objectionable or permissible,
the following should be true: (a) when the person who initiated the
cause of death is available for carrying after-the-fact burdens, the
burden is at least split equally between him and the person who let
die, and (b) if the "causing accomplice" is not available for carry-
ing burdens, e.g., he is sick or nature is the "accomplice," the same
burden that is given to the killer whose accomplice is also unavail-
able for carrying burdens, should be given to the person who let die.
I call tests applied after someone has done the thing which
it is claimed is equally morally Qbjectionable/impermissible, second level
tests. They contrast with first level tests, which involve seeing
what efforts a person must make to avoid killing or letting die, pefore
he has done what will make him a killer or a person who has let die.
I will now consider, in more detail, whether first level
tests show a difference between the efforts required for kill and
let die in cases constructed according to the CP of Pl/P2.
Test (2): T(l): I am walking along in the field, innocently,
non-negligently etc., and, as I am about to take a step, I notice a baby
underfoot whom I will kill if I take the step. I have just had leg
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who ki11s. 1
If we assume that the CP of P1/P2 does generate comparable
kill and let die cases, then, the claim is that before~t4e-fact ef-
forts tests do show that killing per se and letting die per ~~ dif~
fer morally. If I do not have to avoid letting die by.:maki,ngcerta:i.ll
efforts and it is not objectionable for me not to avoid..it, but I h·ave
to avoid killing and it would be objectionable for me not to avoid it,
this shows that a kill and let die differ in moral value, per see
Note the procedure involved here: we do not merely see the situation
as a whole, i.e.', say that it is not objectionable to (refuse to break
a leg rather than let die), but it is objectionable to (refuse to
break a leg rather than kill). We analyze the case as showing that
the moral value of let die, per se differs from that of killing, so it
isn't objectionable not to break a leg to avoid doing it, when it is
objectionable not to break a leg to avoid killing. (Recall: A given
letting die may be objectionable or unobjectionable. If it is ob-
jectionable it may still be less objectionable than a killing in a
comparable case. We do not need to conclude that letting die, per se
is morally unobjectionable. If we assume that letting die, per se
has a negative value of some sort (so that per se it is morally ob-
jectionable) we only need to conclude that letting die is less
INote that I do not wish to foreclose the possibility that
the interest in the cause of death could reflect on whether killing
is morally equivalent to letting die or not.
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objectionable, per se than killing per se, in order to say it ha.s a
different moral value. But we may not think that it is correct to
say that letting die, per se, aside from a particular letting die,
falls in the category of things which are objectionable and saying
it is less objectionable than killing, per se, seems to imply that it
Iis objectionable to some degree. If we do not assurne that· letting
die, per se, has a negative value, we could still say that it has
fewer of the negative properties which make for objectionableness
than killing, and in this way, without locating it in the region of
objectionable or unobjectionable, say that its moral value differed
from killing, per see It is in this sense that I take Test 2 to show
that letting die differs in moral value, per se from killing, per se.)
In opposition to this conclusion we might argue that TI/T2
only indicate a difference resulting from the fact that not killing
is a duty and letting die is not a duty, per see That is, one might
reason as follows: Although letting die and killing are morally
equivalent, per se, two things can be morally equivalent per se and
yet we may have a duty not to do one but no 2duty not to do the other.
11£ we represented the things on an objectionableness scale--
that went from 0 (which would be identical with at least some unob-
j~ctional things) to IOO--then we could say letting die was less ob-
jectionable without implying it was objectionable at all. But I have
used a scale of moral value that can itself be divided into objection-
able and unobjectionable regions.
2This is the claim which gives rise to the original distinc-
tion between those who say letting die in P2 is as objectionable
as killing in PI, and they are therefore, both impermissible, and those
who say that they are just as objectionable but one is permissible and
the other isn't.
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We have a duty not to kill, but letting die is always permissible
(barring special agreement to aid). 'We' have:no' duty to aid. There'-
fore, we needn't make large efforts rather than I'et die: That is,
even if letting die rather than break a; leg is unobjectionable (not
only permissible) when killing rather tha.nbreak"a.\ leg:'is:":obj eetion-
able, this only reflects the" fa~t·that it isn' t'·objectionable 'to re--
fuse to make efforts to avoid what it'ispermissible to do. If we
have no duty not to do something, 'then it is unobjectionable not to
make great efforts to avoid doing that thing. But, it is our duty
not to kill, so it is morally objectionable not to make efforts to
avoid killing. Therefore, differences in efforts required and differ-
ences in efforts considered morally objectionable to refuse, indicate
only that not letting die, per se, is not our duty when not killing,
per se, is. It does not indicate that letting die and killing per se
are not morally equivalent.
The claim I shall now argue for is that this reasoning is
improper: (1) we can decide that not to make the effort is morally
objectionable or unobjectionable without considering whether letting
die is permissible or not a duty. For example, suppose letting die is
always permissible, it is never a duty not to let die. Then it is
permissible in P2. Suppose, too, that we decide that it is morally
objectionable to refuse to do very little to save the person, regard-
less 9f whether or not it is, as objection~ble as killing. (It would
not be argued in P2 that it is not objectionable to refuse minimal
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aid because it is not objectionable to refuse aid which it is per-
missible to refuse. ) Therefore the objectionableness or unobjection~
ableness of refusing aid can be determined independent of t~e permissi-
bility of refusing aid/lack of a duty to aid. If refusing aid. rather.
than saving a life could be objectionable,.e\Ten. if s?-ving atif~.~s
not required, then if re~using aid ,is not obj~ct~9n~~le thi~~~~~icatest
at least, that letting die, per se, is not objectionable enough to
merit avoiding it by the effort in question. Also, given that some-
what lower efforts are also not required, it is not objectionable
enough to merit avoiding it by somewhat lower efforts. If we decide
in T2 that it is unobjectionable to refuse to sustain an injury in
order to aid, but it is objectionable to refuse to sustain the injury
rather than kill, we decide then, independently of the claim that let-
ting die is always permissible and never a duty.
(2) Furthermore, we can decide that it is objectionable to
refuse to make the effort rather than kill, without considering that not
killing is a duty. This is noted in response to those who would say:
It might be granted that we decide that not spending $1,000 rather
than let die is not objectionable, independent of being committed to
the view that letting die is always permissible. But it is possible
that it is objectionable to not spend $1,000 rather than kill only
because it is our duty not to kill. (This claim implies that efforts
which it is objectionable to refuse are greater merely because it is
our duty to avoid the act.) Thus, it might be claimed, that if the
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unobjectionableness of refusing $1,000 rather than 'save is
independent of the permissibility of letting die in general, the· ob-
j ectionablene8s of refusing $1, 000 rather than not k.illing may still be
independent of any difference in moral value between killing and
letting die, per se, since it would o'nly reflect on the fact that not
killing is a: duty~ not on tIle degree of :objec.tionablenessof killing.
We would then know that.letting die, per se wasn't objectionable
enough to make refusing to avoid it objectionable, but we wouldn't
know that killing differed in moral value from letting die, per 1see
This argument seems untrue. First, if the efforts we must
make rather than kill did not reflect at all on the moral objection-
ableness of killing per se, then not killing wouldn't even be a duty.
Having a duty to refrain and moral objectionableness may diverge such
that we have no duty to avoid what is morally objectionable, but they
may not diverge such that the unobjectionable is something we have a
duty to refrain from. Second, the above argument depends on avoiding
INote that if the efforts required to avoid one act vs.
another could differ simply because it was our duty to avoid one act
and not the other, though the two were equally obj ectia:lab1e acts, it
is also possible that the efforts required to avoid each of two acts
can be equal and yet the two acts be unequally objectionable. This is
because it might be our duty to avoid one, but not our duty to avoid
the other. (That is, just in virtue of their degree of objectionable-
ness, it would be more objectionable to refuse to make efforts to
avoid one than the other, but it happens to be our duty not to do the
less serious one.) This would mean that equally objectionable results
from placing entities in equal contexts (i.e., equally high efforts
required to avoid the acts) would not necessarily mean that the enti-
ties were morally equivalent, per see This is a possible objection
to the methodology behind the use of comparable cases.
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the injury rath.er than iiot killing being as unobjectionable as avoiding
the injury rather than saving a life, if killing is considered inde-
pendent of there being a duty not to ,kill. Duties, however, are
sometimes overridd,en, '. if the efforts: required to fulfill them are
too great. In par,ticula,r" ;of:, two;,~dut-ies:, one may be overridden and
the other not, ,b'ythef'aet .t·ha.t.~ t·h.e.. effort,s involved in avoiding vio-
lating our duty are too great. That is, it would be objectionable to
refuse to make efforts to do x, but not objectionable to
refuse to make efforts to do y, ,where both x and yare duties.
If one duty is overridden and the other isn't, by the same size effort,
we would know that x involved the more objectionable act (or omission).
Since they are both duties, the difference in objectionableness of
refusing to make the efforts must indicate, not that one is a duty and
the other isn't, but the relative moral value of the two acts/omissions,
per see
Therefore, the fact that in Tl, the desire to avoid injury
does not override the duty not to kill is evidence that killing, per
se, is objectionable enough to make it, in turn, objectionable to
avoid the injury rather than not kill, ind,ependent 'of its being a duty not
to kill. But if killing is objectionable enough to have to make the
efforts, this means that it differs from letting die in moral value,
per se, since it was granted that letting die was not sufficiently
objectionable (if it was objectioanble at all, per se) to have to
avoid by making the efforts, in question, or even somewhat lower
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ones.
In summary, if the cases generated by the CP of Pl/P2 are
comparable, Test (2) shows the unequal moral seriousness of killing
and letting die, per se, because (1) We can decide on the objection-
ableness of n6t making large ~fforts rather than letting die i~depen-
dent of considering whether letting die is permissible (as is done in
P2, when it is said that letting die is morally objectionable, even
though it is permissible). So, if refusing to make efforts rather
than let die could be morally objectionable even if letting die were
permissible, it's not being objectionable indicates (at least) that
letting die, per se, is not so morally objectionable that not making
the efforts to avo.id it is obj ectionable. (2) Having to make the ef-
forts rather than kill, but not rather than let die, does not indicate
merely that killing is a duty and not letting die isn't, since duties
can be overridden by the size of efforts necessary to carry them out,
and if they are not, it is because the act is objectionable enough so
that it would be objectionable not to make the efforts to avoid it.
But then (1) and (2) show that killing differs from letting die, per
se, in moral value, since letting die was not so objectionable that
not making the same or somewhat lower efforts to avoid it is objec-
tionable.
II mention the somewhat lower efforts in case it might be
thought that it is the combination of the objectionableness of killing
and the fact that it is a duty that makes undergoing ·the particular ef-
forts in question necessary.
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I conclude that our decision that efforts should be made
to avoid killing but not letting die in TllTZ reflects on the relative
moral value of kill and let die, not on the fact that letting die is
permissible, but that there is a duty not to kill. We think it ac-
ceptable to refuse injury rather than not let die, but we think it
unacceptable to refuse injury rather than avoid killing because let-
ting die differs in moral value from killing, per see
The above discussion involved the assumption that letting
die is always permissible. Suppose letting die is not always permis-
sible. For example, suppose it is impermissible in P2. One way to
account for this is that (a) whatever factor counts in favor of the
permissibility of let~ing die is overriden by (b) the smallness of
assistance required, (c) the consequences of not aiding (death), and
(d) the bad motive involved. So, e.g., we weigh (b), (c) and (d) against (a)
and find that letting die is impermissible. Letting die may not be
impermissible for the same reasons as killing is impermissible, but it
would still be impermissible. In a case involving $1,000 aid we would
weight the $1,000 and the consequence of death against the factor mak-
ing for the permissibility of letting die, and the factor would not be
overridden. Since it has not been agreed that letting die is always
permissible prior to our deciding that we needn't spend the $1,000,
what we do in deciding if it is permissible is see how morally objec-
tionable we think it is to fail to give the aid.
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So, if we use the moral objectionableness of refusing to
give aid to decide if not giving aid is permissible, we cannot use
the permissibility of refusing to give aid to decide the moral unob-
jectionableness of not giving aid. The (im)permissibility depends on
the moral objectionableness/unobjectionableness, not the 'other way around.
Likewise, if 'killing,per se, is not always impermissible
(i.e., if the duty can be overridden), we can decide on the permis-
sibility of killing as opposed to sustaining an injury, by see1ng how
objectionable it is to kill rather than suffer the injury. Therefore,
the objectionableness of not sustaining the injury to avoid killing
would be decided independently of the impermissibility of killing.
We use the moral objectionableness of refusing the efforti to decide
whether killing is permissible or impermissible in the particular
case (i.e., if the duty is overridden or not). Thus, the moral ob-
jectionableness of refusing the efforts does not depend on the imper-
missibility of killing. l
If we decide letting die rather than sustaining injury is
permissible but killing rather than sustaining injury isn't, this is
because we have decided that doing the first wouldn't be morally ob-
jectionable, but that doing the second would be. And this in turn
means letting die, per se, differs in moral value from killing, since
we can make fewer efforts rather than let die, even though it is not
lThis point is also implied by the earlier remarks on the
fact that duty can be overridden.
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known that letting die is always permissible. We don't have to sus-
tain the injury and it is unobjectionable not to sustain the injury,
not because letting die is always permissible, but because it differs
in moral value from killing, per see
In conclusion, the cases TI!T2, generated by the CP of Pl/P2
do not provide instances of equally objectionable killing and letting
die. Furthermore, if these are comparable cases we can conclude that
the objectionableness of refusing to make efforts rather than kill or
let die is a response to neither a difference in permissibility!
duty between killing and letting die, but to their different moral
value, per see
The results of Test (2) imply that if letting die in P2 were
as morally objectionable as killing in PI, it would be because factors
override the moral difference between killing and letting die, per see
So even if Pl/P2 were equally as objectionablel and Pl/P2 provided
comparable kill and let die cases, this would not mean that ,killing
and letting die were morally equivalent, per see
The third type of t~st for whether cases generated by the
CP of Pl/P2 yield cases in which killing and letting die are equally
objectionable or unobjectionable/equally permissible or impermissible
involves situations where there are conflicts or choices between
\ lRecall, that the assumption that they were both impermis-
sible ~nd yet Test (1) still differentiated between them was meant
to show they weren't equally objectionable.
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allowing a killing or a letting die to occur. (The previous tests
involved deciding about a killing and a letting die that occurred in
two separate cases.) In conflict or choice tests, the prospect of
killing or letting die occur in the same case.
Test (3): T3: Susan knows that at some point"'fnthe
future she may face the following situation: She is wa'lkin'g across
the field. By taking her next step she will (unknowingly) step on
and crush a person underfoot. She can refrain from taking the step
with no bad consequences to herself. Also, by failing to snap her
fingers at the next moment she fails to rescue a dying baby in the
field. She cannot both stop her next step and snap her fingers at
the same time. There is a computer which she can program now so that
it (1) can detect situations of this sort when she cannot and (2) can
tell her which act to do in the situation, given that she will program
it, with her decision, about what to do. If she choses to prevent the
killing rather than the letting die, what will this show?
It may only show that letting die is permissible when kill-
ing isn't, and we must see to it that a person gets what he is owed
(not to be killed) before he gets what he isn't owed (aid). If both
minimal aid and not killing are required, then what we do in the con-
flict case should indicate whether the killing is morally more objectionable
than the letting die. This in turn, will show (a) either that killing is
not morally equivalent to letting die, per se, or (b) that cases
generated by the CP of Pl/P2 are not comparable cases, and that
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there is some inequality accounting for the decision to avoid the
k · 11 · h h ·d hI· d · 11 1ng rat er t an aV01 t e ett1ng Ie.
Note that conflict cases may indicate whether it is more
important to avoid a killing than a letting die, when efforts tests
(such as Tests land 2) might not. This is because it is possible
that one would have to do as much to avoid one act as' another, whe'rt
each is considered in isolation, and yet when we have to chose to
avoid one rather than the other our rating of their moral value
exhibits itself.
The fourth test for checking if the cases generated by the
CP of Pl/P2 are cases in which a killing and a letting die are equally
objectionable or unobjectionable/permissible or impermissible, in-
volves (a) altering the motives of the person who kills or lets die
towards the person who is to be killed or let die, from bad or
1Recall that Thomson presents separate cases, ones I have
described above (p.l7l) as 81/82 involving the following killing and letting
die situations: (a) the person who steps down while innocently walk-
ing along, unbeknownst to him kills someone, (b) a person, as he walks
along, unbeknownst to him fails to save someone's life. Thomson asks:
Is what is done in one case (killing) worse than what is done in the
other (letting die)," implying that the answer is no. But if the
person would chose to prevent his killing rather than his letting die
via a computer as in Test (3) this indicates either (a) killing is im-
permissible when letting die isn't or (b) the killing is more morally
objectionable than the letting die (which in turn means either that
killing is morally objectionable than letting die, per se, or the
cases generated by the CPof Pl/P2 are not comparalie. While it may
be true that a person in 81 and 82, who does what he does unknowingly
in both cases, has the same moral standing, this need not mean that if
he knew what was going to happen he shouldn't prefer 82 to 81 and be
blameable for not preferring 82 to Sl.
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indifferent motives to benevolent ones, and (b) altering the conse-
quences of the killing or letting die from negative to positive for
the person killed or let die. l
T4: Someone is dying a terrible death. It would be a
benefit to him to die immediately, but he doesn't want to die. In
such a situation (a) I may not kill them in order to benefit him;
(b) I may permissibly refrain from giving (even minor) aid which would
keep him alive, in order to benefit him, even though he wants to go
on living and hence wants to be aided. 2
These kill and let die cases involving beneficent~ motives
indicate that letting die can be morally unobjectionable (as well as
permissible), when killing in the comparable case (according to the
CP of Pl/P2) is morally objectionable, and impermissible.
Furthermore, if the kill and let die cases involving bene-
ficent motives are comparable, they would show that there is some dif-
ference between killing and letting die, per se, which makes benefits
which can be achieved by either relevant only to the unobjectionable-
ness of one of them (letting die). There is something wrong with
killing which makes it morally objectionable to use it as a route to
1These cases are suggested by Philippa Foot in her paper
"Euthanasia."
2It would be permissible and also not morally objectionable
to do this. Note that in this. case my intent is to benefit the person.
My intent is not merely that I not be involved in promoting some situ-
ation (his being alive) which-r think is wrong.
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achieving a good end. If it is not object:tonable to refuse minimal
life saving aid for a good motive, but it is objectionable to 'kill
for a good motive, this indicates that letting die;'per se,is not so
morally obj ectionable a thing that we can't do it as" a means': to some-
thing good, but killing is so morally objectionable, per"'se,:that we
cannot do it as a means to something good. l
It might seem that a further interpretation bf'the results of
Test (4) is the following: The duty not to let die (if there is one)
can not be so strong as the duty not to kill, even when aid is very
minimal. For, if a desire to promote someone's welfare cannot over-
ride someone's right not to be killed, the desire to promote someone's
welfare shouldn't be able to override the right to minimal aid, if the
right to minimal aid were as strong as the right not to be killed. But
if we needn't aid in T4(b), we can conclude that when the motive for not
aiding is malevolent rather than beneficent there is also no right to
have even minimal aid.
However, this interpretation seems incorrect. If the grounds
for having a right to minimal aid were, in part, that the consequences
2
of not getting aid are bad, then if the consequences are good there
lIt does not indicate (only) (a) that not killing is a duty
and letting die never is, since letting die could be objectionable even
if it isn't a duty not to let die, and the duty not to kill could be
overridden by a good motive (as e.g., the duty not to lie might be),
if killing, per se were less objectionable a thing to do.
2Even though they are not desired by the beneficiary (i.e.,
the person who dies).
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would be no right to have the aid. It could be C011sistent with not
having a right to minimal aid in T4(b) t11at OIle has a right t:omin~mal
aid (and as strong a right as not ,to be killed in PI) . We would have,
to find some other way besides pointing to T4to show that there, was
no right or not as strong a right to th~. minimal ,ai.d: ,;whenthe ,cpnse-
quences for the person who would die are bad. Wha;t. ,T4s,hows ist.ha,t
the objection to killing in PI would arise from at least some differen,t
source than objections to not aiding in P2, since T4 shows that killing
has some pr'operty which makes it more objectionable than letting die
(if T4 involves comparable kill and let die cases).
In short, the four tests show that cases generated by the CP
of PI/P2 are not instances of killings and lettings die which are
equally permissible/impermissible, or equally objectionable/unobjec-
tionable. Therefore they do not show that the presence of killing and
the presence of letting die are morally equivalent, per se, or that
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see Therefore, we
could not yet follow the plan suggested by Thomson's argument, of
taking killing and letting die, which we know to be morally equivalent,
per se, and put them in the equal context said to be provided by the
matrix kill and let die cases, so as to get the conclusion that kill-
ing to terminate life support is as permissible as letting die to be-
gin with.
Still, the tests were applied to cases generated by the CP
of PI/P2, i.e., by the procedure of contextual equalization. We have
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already examined an alternative procedure suggested for producing
equalized cases, i.e., cross-definitional equalization (taken to in-
clude contextual equalization also). Perhaps theCP of Pl/P2 did not
generate equalized cases, perhaps some factor besides killing and
letting die, per se,introduces a moral difference in the cases, and
that is why they do not provide a killing which "is lndrally equiv~i'ent
to a letting die. Perhaps we should use cases equalized according to
the CP of cross-definitional equalization, in order to get cases where
a killing is morally as objectionable/unobjectionable as a letting die,
and perhaps these cases will show that (a) the presence of killing is
morally equivalent to the presence of letting die, and (b) killing is
morally equivalent to letting die, per see
Section V
I will now consider cases equalized according to the Con-
struction Principle of cross-definitional equalization and see how we
could use our judgments about a killing and a letting die in these
cases to test whether the presence of killing is morally equivalent to
the presence of letting die, per se, and if killing is morally equiva-
lent to letting die, per see
I will review which kill/let die cases are more and most
equalized according to this CP. I claim that unequal judgments about
the objectionableness of a killing and a letting die in the most
equalized cases are due to differences of moral significance between
killing and letting die, per 1see
I characterize these differences as either (a) morally pos-
itive properties of l~ttingdie,~hichkilling lacks,or (b) morally
negative properties of killingwJ::1iell letting die lacks. (I claim that
any negative propertyoft>rohib.itin.g l,;etting die may be analyzed so
that its presence rneC,ln$.,eith~r th~t lett~ng die has some positive prop-
erty or killing has,a negative pro.perty.)
I note, that the comparable cases generated according to the
CP of cross-definitional equalization are supposed to show not only
that any difference in judgment is due to a difference between killing
and letting die. They are also supposed to show that if there is no
difference in moral judgment, this means there is no difference between
killing and letting die, per see I consider how these cases, equalized
according to the CP of cross-definitional equalization are supposed to
be used to show the latter. I claim that it is not enough to use one
specific set of cases, with definite values assigned to such factors
as efforts, motive, etc. 2 We must vary the value assigned to the
variables in these cases, to be sure the unobjectionableness of a
lIn this discussion I shall assume what was shown above,
i.e., that a difference in the size of efforts which it is objection-
able for us not to make rather than kill and let die, indicates not
(only) that killing and letting die differ in their status as duties,
but in their moral value, per see
2Although one such case, where there is a difference in
judgment about the killing and letting die would be enough to show
there was a difference between killing and letting die per see
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killing is not dependent on the presence of a factor which is unnec-
essary for the unobjectionableness of a letting die. I then distin-
guish between the variables and the constant, and argue that there are
reasons for having certain constants.
I shall then .~rgue .that.if judgments, are found to be the
same in these cCl.ses, and ~f we can conclude that killing is·morally
equivalent to letting die per se, this will not help those who have
argued that a killing is morally equivalent to a letting die in Pl/P2
and cases generated by the CP of Pl/P2.
Moreover, the results of the cases generated by the CP of
cross-definitional equalization are of no use in judging whether ma-
trix killing is permissible when matrix letting die is. I argue that
this is so, because we would have to know whether killing is permis-
sible in the matrix kill case before we knew that killing was morally
equivalent to letting die, per se, via the use of equalized cases.
We could then compare killing .immediately with letting die to see if
it is permissible when letting die is. Therefore, (1) use of our
findings from cross-definitionally equalized cases would be redundant,
and (2) without a prior judgment about the permissibility of matrix
killing we could not reach a judgment about whether killing is morally
equivalent to letting die, per see
If we do not know that killing is morally equivalent to
letting die, per se, the permissibility of matrix letting die cannot
be a sign for the permissibility of matrix killing, no matter how
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equalized the cases are. Therefore, if our intuitions fail us about
the permissibility of matrix killing we must provide an argument,
one which does not need to assume that killing is morally equivalent
to letting die, in order to show that the killing is indeed permis-
sible. Furthermore, this need not imply that killing is morally
equivalent to. lettirlg die, per se, so ·it allows us to -see if a killing
is permissible when a letting die is, even if killing is not morally
equivalent to letting die, per see
I indicated that according to the CP of cross-definitional
equalization, the matrix kill and let die cases were more equalized,
in some respects, than were Pl/P2, and that therefore they differed
from Pl/P2. In p~rticular (and as opposed to Pl/P2), the person loses
only what he would get via support in both kill and let die cases.
Furthermore, what he loses would have been a benefit over the condition
he would have been in if the supporter hadn't come on the scene. There
is an interest in his losing only what he would get via the support.
The effort required as the alternative to killing and letting die
have the same function, i.e., saving someone's life. Killing and
letting die are done for the same purpose, avoiding efforts.
There was, however, an inequality of interest in the occur-
rence of the cause of death, and an interest in using the person's
death as means to some end. This inequality is not present in Pl/P2.
There is, furthermore, the inequality that the person killed is made
worse off than he would have been if not killed (even if not worse
235
off than he would have been if 'he hadn't been supported and then
killed), whereas the person who is left to die is not worse off than
he would have been. In addition, the efforts we wish to avoid do not
arise as the alternative to killings (while they arise as the alter-
native to letting die). Rather they pre-exist the question of kill-
ing. In the kill case, we avoid making efforts by killing and killing
is the cause of the end of efforts. However, in the let die case,
letting die does not merely allow a cause of the avoidance of efforts
to exist,it just is the avoidance of efforts.
I said that better equalization, according to the CP of
cross-definitional equalization, was provided by BNA and matrix kill-
ing. Here we had all the equalization of matrix killing and letting
die, and in addition, (1) intention that the cause of death occur,
and (2) intention that the person die as a means of ending great
efforts, and (3) the large efforts that we wish, to avoid exist prior
to the decision on whether to kill or not aid in a minimal way, i.e.,
someone is already being support in both cases. l
lSince I imagine that in RNA the efforts we are already
making equal the ones we want to terminate by killing,givingthe min-
imal aid in BNA will make the total aid in question slightly higher
than in the killing case if we don't kill. We may lower the "internal
aid," the support already being given, to equalize total support in
question in both kill and let die cases. We should be careful not to
increase the amount of additional aid needed to combat the germ, since
the more weight we shift from the "internal aid" to the "external aid,"
the more likely we will have a case where someone wishes to avoid mak-
ing the "external efforts" for their own sake, and not merely in order
to stop the internal efforts. If this happens we once again do not
have a let die case where the person intends the occurrence of the
cause of death in order to stop having to make efforts. That is, if
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Any difference in moral objectionableness between the ma-
trix killing and BNA are due to differences between killing and letting
die, per see If there is a difference in permissibility or objection-
ableness between BNA and killing to terminate life support, this may
mean that killing has some negative characteristic let die lacks or let
die has some positive characteristics which killing lacks. l
they only want to stop the "external efforts," they have no need for
the person to die, or for the cause of their death to occur, except as
a sign that they didn't aid, minimally.
lIt may also mean that not permitting letting die in BNA has
something objectionable about it, which prohibiting matrix killing
doesn't have. But this property, which not permitting letting die has,
and which serves as a reason for permitting letting die, may reflect
on whether killing differs morally from letting die, per see That is,
if preventing a killing in a killing case had this property, and in
the killing case this property was not a sufficient reason for allowing
the person to kill, the fact that the property was sufficient for allow-
ing letting die in a comparable case would indicate that killing dif-
fered from let die, per see That is, a certain property would be
enough to make a letting die permissible/unobjectionable, but it wouldn't
be enough to make a killing permissible/unobjection~ble.
The negative property of not permitting letting die in BNA
which I have in mind is that it would be objectionable to require some-
one to help someone else harm him. In the matrix kill case, not kill-
ing, itself, does not help someone harm the supporter, though if we do
not kill, the supporter will be left helping someone to harm him (by
saving the life which imposes a burden on him). But a killing case
could be constructed in which our not killing, itself, helps someone
harm us. Suppose, someone was harming me, but not to such an extent
that I could kill him to stop it. In order not to kill him I have to
make a minimal effort which requires me to step on a button, and step-
ping on this button happens to also help the person continue to harm
me, by making him stronger. In this case, we could say that not kill-
ing, itself, involved me helping someone to harm me. However, this
wouldn't be reason for the permissibility/unobjectionableness of my
killing. Whereas this factor would be a reason for the permissibility/
unobjectionableness of letting die in a comparable case. So, even
though the factor of helping someone harm us is present only in BNA
and not in matrix killing, we should take the fact that it is a reason
As noted above
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the suggestion may be made that if
the matrix kill and let die cases or BNA and matrix kill cases provide
better instances of equalization according to the CP of cross-
definitional equalization it may be that these cases should be used
to get instances of a killing which is morally equivalent to a letting
die, and to see if killing is morally equivalent to letting 'die',' per-
l
see
The first thing to note in discussing how these cases should
be used to find out if killing is morally equivalent to letting die,
per se, is to note that the phrase "these cases" is ambiguous. It may
mean the specific BNA or matrix kill/let die cases involved in the
for the permissibility/unobjectionableness of letting die as indicat-
ing either that killing has some negative property which letting die
lacks or that letting die has a positive characteristic which killing
lacks.
II said above that any differences between BNA and
matrix killing will be due to differences between kill and let die, per
see So, if the cases differ in the objectionableness of a killing and
a BNA this will show that killing differs from letting die, ,per se,
morally. But this is not the same as saying that if killing and letting
die differ morally, per se, these are cases that will show it. For
example, they may be so constructed as to compensate for some morally
significant difference between killing and letting die. If these
cases conceal some differences between killing and letting die, then
they will not tell us if killing is morally equivalent to letting die,
per se, even though they may tell us if killing is not morally equiva-
lent to letting die, per see But what is called for in comparable
cases are cases which will equalize for all properties besides killing
and letting die in such a way that (1) a difference in judgment about
the cases is due to a difference between kill and let ~die, per s~, and
(2) differences between kill and let die are not concealed. Those who
suggest that we use BNA/matrix kill as comparable cases must think
they provide both (1) and (2).
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violinist case, .i. e., the ones involv:lng body support. These I shall
refer to as BNA(s) (specific) , matrixes) kill and matrixes) let die.
BNA(s) is a particular case which exhibits certain construction pri~-
ciples which require equalization of certain factors. By it being a
particular case--rather than a type of case--I mean that the efforts
involved are bodily support efforts. If we ask if killing in the
matrixes) case is as unobjectionable as letting die in BNA(s), we want
to know if, with this effort involved, the two are equally unobjec-
tionable.
But "these cases" may refer to other BNA, matrix kill and
let die~ cases, where the efforts are not bodily support efforts.
There are other cases which have the same CP but different values at-
tached to such things as efforts. I refer to all cases generated by
the CP of cross-definitional equalization, with different values at-
1tached to variable factors, as BNA(t) (type) , matrix(t) kill and
matrix(t) let die cases.
Pointing to one case where a killing is as unobjectionable
as a letting die does not ne~essarily give us any evidence that kill-
ing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see There may be par-
ticular explanations for why killing is as unobjectionable as letting
die in this one case, explanations having nothing to do with equals
being placed in equal contexts. Indeed factors, aside from kill and
lJust which factors are variable factors I discuss
below.
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let die may be unequalized. But even if we have one case where
killing and letting die are placed in equal contexts (whatever these
are) and the particular killing is as morally unobjectionable as the
particular letting die, we also shall not have shown that killing is
morally equivalent to letting die per see We must, at least, vary
the factors which should be varied" in both kill and let die" cases
equally to see if moral equivalence holds up. For example, BNA(s)
and matrix(s) killing, as particular cases may not be equally unob-
jectionable. Moreover, it is not necessarily only one parameter
that we must vary to see if killing is morally equivalent to letting
die, per see If a difference did not show up between killing and let-
ting die as we varied efforts involved, it might show up as we varied
another factor equally in both kill and let die cases. By relying on
one specific case, where those factors which may vary equally are given
a fixed value, we run the risk of missing a moral difference between
killing and letting die. This is because one particular value given
to a factor maybe necessary to make killing unobjectionable, even
though it may not be necessary to make letting die unobjectionable,
even if the factor is present equally in both kill and let die cases.
However, if killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se,
the factors necessary to make killing morally unobjectionable should
also be necessary to make letting die unobjectionable in comparable
cases. If a difference in moral objectionableness of a killing and a
letting die shows up when we vary certain factors equally, then killing
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is not morally equivalent to letting die, per se.
Which factors must vary their values? I noted thatumatrix(t)
killing and BNA(t) describe cases where we kill someone to stop life
support, regardless of the size of the efforts involved,and. where> we
refuse minimal aid in order to stop lifesupport,rega'rdless: of;·the·
size of efforts' involved. So siz,e of' effort 'should" be,:, allowed' to- var,y
equally in th'e kill and let die cases. Indeed the value' ofall.faetors
should be allowed to vary equally, except (1) those that are necessary
to make a killing case have as many of the definitional properties of
letting die as it can have without it ceasing to be a killing and (2)
those that are necessary to make a letting die case have as many of
the definitional properties of killing as it can have, without it ceas-
ing to be a letting die. In other words, everything should vary
equally so long as doing this does not violate the construction prin-
ciple of the cases, cross-definitional equalization. l
Requiring that the person in all the kill and let die cases
lose only what he would have gotten via the support--henceforth I shall
refer to this as requiring equalization of object lost--restricts the
range of object lost and the type of person killed--one who is being
provided with life support. It is important to see that this is not
an artificial, ad hoc restriction, such as restricting the size of
lIn discussing the cases generated by the CP of Pl!P2 in
addition to Pl/P2 and testing to see if a killing was morally equiva-
lent to a letting die in those cases, we were in, effect, varying the
variables of that CP.
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efforts i~volved would be. The restriction on object lost and type of
person is not ad hoc because it duplicates a characteristic which is a
necessary part of letting die. If it were ad hoc, we would have. to
also consider cases where, in being killed, someone loses more than
what he would have had via support. It would be ad hoc, so far as the
CP of cross-definitional equalization, if we: restricted' the objects
lost of both killing and letting die, when there could be cases of
both killing and letting die with a different type of object lost.
But it is not as if letting die could involve someone losing out on
more than what he would have gotten via the aid. There are no kill
and let die cases constructed according to the CP of cross-
definitional equalization where the object lost is other than what
they would have had via us, because there is no such let die case. If
letting die always has a characteristic which a killing case can be
given, killing should always be given it, according to the CP of cross-
definitional equalization.
Restrictions which could be eliminated and yet we would
still have kill and let die cases which are cross-definitionally
equalized are ad hoc, even if the restrictions are applied equally.
A conclusion of moral equivalence of a kill and a let die in cases so
restricted need not mean that a killing will be morally equivalent to
a letting die in other cases where all factors are held equal besides
killing and letting die.
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In summary, I have described how BNA and matrix kill cases
should be used according to the CP of cross-,definitional equalization'
to find out if killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see
The values of variable should be varied equally, results with one set
of values will not be enough to tell if killing is morally equivalent
to letting die, per 5e, even assuming that cross-definitional1y equal-
ized cases are suited for the purpose of finding this out.
It should be noted that even if we could show that a killing
is morally as objectionable or unobjectionable as a letting die in
cases more equalized according to the CP of cross-definitional equali-
zation, this would not help those who recently have pushed the claim
that killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se.· These
philosophers are concerned with a killing and a letting die being just
as objectionable/unobjectionable in cases where there is no equaliza-
tion other than that represented by Pl/P2. As we have shown by our
discussion of the CP of Pl/P2, it is a point of cases like Pl/P2 not
only to deny the significance of the fact that someone causes a death,
as opposed to allow~g it to occur,l but also to deny the significance
of differences between killing and letting die cases based on the
following considerations: (1) whether or not what the person loses
out on is what he would have gotten via support of the person who
kills or lets die; (2) whether the person who doesn't aid or does kill
lThat is, it is the fact that a decision in either case
makes a difference between life and death, that counts.
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would have wound up supporting and benefiting someone over the pros-
pects the latter had. Those who introduced cases Pl/P2 originally
wanted to show that a killing and a letting die, in those particular
cases, were equally objectionable, and that the objectionableness of
killing and letting die in other cases will not be affected by the
differences noted in (1) and (2).
One way of reading this attempt to equate killing and
letting die is that it is the state of the person whos~ life our de-
cision concerns that is important. What counts is whether they are
alive or not, not whether they have their life via our efforts or via
other efforts. Concern with the state of the person in terms of ben-
efits/harm to him simply focuses on whether the person would have
his life or not, thereby ignoring whether he would have it via us or
not via us.
On this view, looking at matters from the side of the per-
son who acts: It will be insignificant that in one case an effort
produces a benefit over prior prospects and in another an effort pre-
vents a worsening over prior prospects. It is the efforts involved,
simply (their size), that is considered, not their function with
respect to prior prospects.
So, according to this approach it is the person dead or
alive, and the degree of effort involved for the person who acts,
that are the bases on which we decide the permissibility of killing
and letting die. On this view, what I have described as equalization
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of what the person loses and equalization of the fun'ction of efforts
becomes superf luous. In summary', the usual aims of those who have
used Pl/P2-type cases to showa'ki'lling is morally equivalent to a
letting die, and killing is mdrally ~quivalent to letting die, per
se, are not at all served by tonsiderations of matrix(t) kill or BNA(t)
cases, these being the ~a~es generated by theCP of cross~definitional
equalization. Behind the attempt to show there is no difference be~
tween killing and letting die has been the specific goal of showing
that it is just as objectionable to not aid someone as it is to inter-
fere with someone who is just an ordinary passer-by, i.e., specifically
not just a person we are already aiding. Showing that a killing is as
morally unobjectionable as a letting die in cross-definitionally equal-
ized cases but not in Pl/P2, runs directly counter to the aims of those
who have made use of PI/P2.
The primary question, however, is I,how useful the results
derived from the use of cross-definitionally equalized cases will be
in our deciding if matrix killing will be permissible, when matrix
letting die is permissible. Recall, that we began by saying that a
reasonable interpretation of Thomson's Argument II was that the kill-
ing to terminate support is permissible because (a) letting die to
begin with is permissible, (b) all factors besides killing and letting
die are the same in the matrix kill and let die cases, and (c) there
is no moral difference introduced by killing and letting die. The
conclusion that killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se,
245
or that the presence of killing is morally equivalent to the pres-
ence of letting die, per se, was to be used to show that a killing
is morally equivalent to a letting die.
Now if we overlook the fact that (b) is not true of the
I
matrix cases, and we suppose the cross-definitional~yequalized cases
can show us whether killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per
se, there are still major problems with using BNA/matrix kill cases,
to reach a conclusion about the permissibility of killing to stop
life support. The problems are as follows:
(1) The original strategy was to find out that killing is
morally equivalent to letting die, per se in order to then put these
equals into the (supposedly) equal contexts of matrix kill and let
die cases, to get the equal permissibility of a killing and a letting
die. If we use BNA and matrix kill cases to see if killing is morally
equivalent to letting die, per se, we would decide this by rendering
judgment on the moral value of killing in the matrixes) killing case,
as well as in other matrix(t) killing cases. So, it would be
redundent to use the conclusion, that killing is morally equivalent
to letting die, per se, to arrive at a judgment about whether matrixes)
killing is permissible, since we would have had to use this judgment
to reach the conclusion. If we already had the judgment about when
killing to terminate support was permissible, and there is no problem
lThere is interest in the cause of death and/or use of the
person as a means which is absent in not starting aid to begin with.
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about our knowing when matrix letting die is permissible, we could
have just compared our judgments in matrixes) kill and let die cases
immediately, to see if killing is permissible when letting die is,
without having to know whether killing is morally equivalent to
: 1letting die,~er see
(1) Implies "(2): 'The use of either BNA/matrix' killing
cases to show that killing is morally equivalent to letting die, re-
quires us to reach a conclusion about the permissibility of matrixes)
killing, which is just what is in dispute. How are we to know that
matrixes) killing is permissible. Even if we know that (1) matrix(t)
killing is more like matrix(t) let die than PI is like P2, and (2)
that we can matrix(t) let die or BNA(t), we still will not be able to
tell when we can kill in the matrix(t) cases or, in particular, if we
can kill in the matrixes} kill case, since we do not know that killing
lHowever, if we already have a judgment that matrixes)
killing is not permissible when matrixes) letting die is permissible,
it rnight be suggested that if we wanted to find out whether this was
because killing differed from letting die, or because of some other
inequality between the cases, then comparison of (a) BNA(s) with
matrixes) kill, and (b) BNA(s) with matrixes) let die would be useful.
That is, the comparison in (a) involving cases which are equalized for
interest in the cause of death/using someone as a means, would show us
if the moral difference between matrixes} kill and let die cases was
attributable toa.moral difference between kill and let die, per se.
~~: comparison in (b) would show us whether a difference in moral
value was produced by the addition of interest in the case of death/
using someone as a means. Note that difference in moral value due to
interest in the cause of death/use of someone as a means, may not make
letting die in BNA impermissible (even if it makes it more objection-
~le), but it might have this effect when a killing is involved.
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is morally equivalent to letting die, per see We are supposed to be
in the midst of using the BNA/matrix kill cases to find this out.
The objectionableness of letting die in a comparable let die case
cannot be a sign for the permissibility of killing, unless we know
that killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see This role
of being a sign is essentially the one· Argument II gives to the unob-
jectionableness of matrix letting die.
If we cannot use the unobjectionableness of letting die as
a sign for a decision on matrixes) killing, until we know that killing
is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, we cannot know the latter
until we have a decision about matrixes) killing and other matrix(t)
killings, and our intuitions are in dispute about matrixes) killing,
then we will have to look for a reason for the permissibility or im-
permissibility of killing in the matrixes) kill case in the form of
an argument for its permissibility. Once we have this argument we
won't need to consider if killing is morally equivalent to letting die,
per se, to see if matrixes) killing is permissible when matrixes)
letting die is.
Answering "why" we can kill by giving an argument will be
very different from pointing to another act (or omission) which, it is
agreed, we may do in a similar context and saying that because we can
do that act (or omissi.on) we can also kill. As noted, this is to use
the second act (or omission) as a sign for the permissibility of
killing. But doing this would not give us an explanation of, argument
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for, the permissibility of killing even if we did know that killing
and the other act (omission) were morally equivalent entities, per
see And, certainly, using the sign does not give us an explanation
for why we can do the other act (o,r omission). An argument for the
permissibility of killing might even do the latter.
Furthermore, an argument would explain why killing is per-
missible (or impermissible), independent not only of knowing whether
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, but independent
of whether killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per see That
is, an argument may show that killing is permissible when letting die
is, in certain cases, without implying that, therefore killing is
morally equivalent to letting die, per se or that the presence of
Ikilling is morally equivalent to the presence of letting die, per see
This is because the factors referred to in the argument for permis-
sibility may be present in some kill cases and not in others, although
letting die in the let die case used for comparison is still permis-
sible.
In the next chapter I will attempt to provide an argument
for the permissibility/unobjectionableness of killing in the matrix{s)
case, which will also bear on the question of why matrix letting die
is unobjectionable/permissible.
lIt may also show that a killing is permissible when a
letting die is, even if it would continue to be preferable, in just
those very cases to have a letting die, rather than a killing.
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In .summary, I have shown how cases equalized according
t:;:o ·'~eh¢ :CPofcross-definitional equaliza·tion would be used to see if
~ki~llltfg is mora.lly equivalent to letting die, per se (assuming these
cases can show it). But, I have argued, if we can do this, we won't
,ne'ed t·o, at least not in order to know if killing in the violinist
·c,a:se is permissible when letting die is. This is because if we can
go through the various matrix(t) kill and BNA(t) cases, we will al-
ready know if killing is permissible in matrixes) killing. And if we
don't know if killing in the matrixes) case is permissible, we won't
be ·able to know if killing is mo~ally equivalent to letting die, per
.se, by using the matrix(t) and BNA(t) cases. If we don't know if
·kl.l1ing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se, we can't use it
t'o find out if killing is permissible in the violinist case, and the
p"e:'r;missibility of letting die will not be a sign for the permissibil-
:a.~'.ty of killing. So, we will need an argument for the permissibility
o:f killing.
CHAPTER V
In this chapter, I will present an argument (The JU'stice
Argument) which, I claim (1) makes the best use of the factor
which Thomson emphasizes, namely that we needn't support someone
in our body merely in order to save their life, and (2) shows that
killing is not unjust in any case (regardless of how residence
is begun) where (a) we can say of the efforts being made that we
needn't have made ,them merely in order to save someone's life,
(b) there are no other grounds for residence, except possibly
because there is something morally objectionable about killing, and
(c) where the person supported receives ALN-satisfaction from the
efforts. Killing may still be impermissible in some of these cases
even if it is not unjust. The primary aim in presenting this
Justice Argument is to show how one might recast Thomson's argument
and make a stronger case using the same significant premise she
uses G If one is to use the factor Thomson emphasizes, it is the
Justice Argument, not the one she presents, which has the best
chance of being correct.
7he intuition behind this argument is that if you have no
right or permission to use something, losing the benefit of having
it cannot, as a matter of justice, stand in the way of your losing
the use of that thing. This is true, even where the benefit you
will lose is the continued retention of what belongs to you.
l?urthermore, there is no injustice in someone using the object you
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retain, i.e. directly manipulating it, destroying it, in order to
eliminate or compensate for the state which makes existence of the
object possible. The existence of this state was not justified by
its making the 'existence of the object possible, nor by any other
right or permission the person who will be deprived had to have the
state exist. When nothing justifie~ residence (the state), aside
from, possibly, killing being impermissible, the benefit of residence
can be classified as an ill-gotten gain, and"use of it to correct
the state which made it possible will be an instance ofa principle
which should find its place in our views on corrective justice,
and in our views on' the correction of illegitimate, if not
unjust states. When something does justify the existence of the
state, the benefit of it may not be an ill-gotten gain, strictly
speaking, but it may still not be unjust to destroy it in order to
eliminate the state.
I
I will first present the Justice Argument for cases where
the supporter is not responsible for the presence of 'the resident~
and is, in fact, unjustly forced to start supporting. I will
divide the argument for this sort of case into two parts. The
first part shows that killing is not unjust when the only objection
to removal is that killing is unjust, the second part argues the
killing is not unjust even when there are non-justice objections
to ending residence.
I shall present the Justice Argument employing the use
of someone's body for 9 months, but the argument will apply to use
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of anything of ours whose use we needn't give merely in order to
save a life. As noted, I will first argue for the jus~iceof
killing in cases like the violinist case where the person whose
body is used is clearly not responsible for the introduction of
the person who uses their body. I claim that to show that killing
is not unjust in this case the 'best strategy, is to argue as
follows:
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(1) Residence in the body is unjustified, except possibly
by the fact that we can't kill to stop it.
That is, we are in the position of having found no other
reason which justifies use of the body--not the violinists ALN-need,
nor the means of entry--and then someone suggests "we can't kill
to remove him and therefore continued residence is justified."
We have not yet decided, that, in fact, we can't kill; it is a
suggestion put forth that we must consider. So, all things
considered (ate), possibly, the violinist will have a right to stay
in the body. But, consideration of all factors besides the import
of killing (i.e. not considering all the factors, not all things
considered (nate)) he is not known to have a right to be in residence.
(2) So we must see why we can't kill, we must see what
is wrong with killing.
(3) Usually, it is said that killing is wrong because
it would be unjust, i.e. it is wrong to kill because someone has a
right not to have his life taken away_ So we must first see if
killing is unjust.
( 4 ) The claim (of this argument) is that it" is not'unjust"
to kill the violinist. So, that the killing would be unjust cannot
be a reason for not killing, and hence cannot be a reason justifying
residence.
253
To show this, I will first assume (for the sake of argument)
that there are no other reasons why residence might be justified"
aside from killing being unjust, and show that, on this assumption"
killing is not unjust. Then, I will assume that there is some· ot11er
reason why residence is justified, having to do with the killing
having negative characteristics aside from its being unjust. (I do
this in 5'.) I will show that on this assumption killing is also
not unjust. So given that (A) the only objections to removal (i.e.
the only reason residence might be justified) have to do with killing
and (B) that the obj ections to killing fall into 2 categories: (a)
injustice and (b) non-justice negative characteristics, showing
that killing is not unjust when there is and isn't a non-justice
objection to removal will be sufficient to show that killing is
not unjust. (That is, I show that killing is not y when it is not z
and I," sho'tv that killing is not y when it is z, when only y and z are
objections to removal.)
First, assume there are no other justifications for
residence (i.e. no objections to removal) besides the injustice
of killing. Then, the Justice Argument says that it is not unjust
to take the violinist's life away, deprive him of tIle rest of his
life, because (1) it is not unjust to eliminate the benefit (e.g.
continued life), (2) of a state (e.g. residence in the body) whose
existence (a) is not justified by the production of the benefit, nor
(b) by anyt"hing else we know of nate (3) in order to eliminate or
compensate for the state. I shall refer to (1), (2), and (3) as the
Corrective Principle. When the state we seek to eliminate is unjust
I suggest that the principle should be part of our views on
corrective justice. In the particular case where the residence is
begun through an injustice, i.e. the person is kidnapped, killing
the person in residence is a matter of correcting/compensating for
an injustice, and so killing should be considered a matter of
corrective justice. By corrective justice I mean that part of
justice which concerns itself with undoing or compensating for
unjust states. I do not wish to suggest that there is a well-worked
out theory of corrective justice to which I can safely refer, nor
that the Corrective Principle should constitute the whole of a
suggested theory of corrective justice. I only wish to suggest
that it makes sense to think that the Corrective Principle should
be a part of our views on corrective justice.
In cases where the supporter is not responsible for the
presence of the resident but there is no injustice involved in
residence, the residence is merely a wrong of some sort. I recommend
that the Corrective Principle should be part of our views on the
correction of wrongs. In these cases killing will not be unjust.
(In the following discussion, to make clear that the Justice
Argument applies to cases where residence is not begun by injustice,
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I shall often refer to residence as:a wrong~) In all these cases--
both where res idence is originally l.lnj ~s t Cln.d where it isn' t--apart
from the possibility that the l~illing i~ unjust, the benefit is an
ill-gotten gain. That is, it is, at the very least, an ill-gotten
gain, nate. The fact that someone wil~ lo$e.a~.i~~-gotten gain if
residence is ended, cannot, as. a ~a~ter of jU$tic~, ,make removal
"t\ ;" ..:. '., .... ,'.;' ., ..
impermissible, i.e. it cannot make the benefit a"noI).~ill-gotten
gain ate.
To elaborate on (1), (2) and (3) above: The violinist's
right not to have his life taken away is overridden, because (1)
what we deprive him of in taking away his life is (a) only what he
wouldn't have had but for the residence, i.e. he would have been
dead if not for it, and (b) what is made possible by something for
which residence is causally necessary, i.e. the rest of his lif~ is
made possible by his being alive no~y, and his being alive now is
causally dependent on the residence. 1
II speak of the residence being causally involved in the life
being saved because this seems to be a characteristic distinguishing
our case from cases where the person would also not be alive if not
for something wrong being done to someone else, and yet the Corrective
Principle does not apply. For.example, if it were not for the fact
that A was mugged by a criminal, that criminal would have mugged B.
So B is alive now only because A is dead. B had no right to have A
die in order to save his life. Yet if it were possible to resurrect
A by killing B, we could not do this. It is not sufficient for the
applicaton of the Corrective Principle described above that someone
would not have had something good if something unjust had not
happened to someone else. The injustice done to someone must be a
cause of the benefit to the other person. I shall elaborate on this
below.
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To elaborate on (2): So far as we know, the residence is
unjustified and hence illegitimate. (So far as we know, it is also
unjust, given that kidnap was used in its origins.) We are in the
process of looking for reasons why it,is legitimate. So what we
deprive the resident of is an ,ill-gotten gain, at least natc. In
particular, so far as (2) (a) is ,concerned, we know that the existence
of the state is not justified by the prod~ction of the benefit,
because we know that we may let die rather than start the residence
which will produce the benefit of extended life, i.e. we know that we
needn't support in the body merely in order to save a life.
So far as (2)(b) is concerned: We have assumed that there
are no other objections to removal apart from the injustice of
killing. We have no reason to believe anything else justifies
residence. We are in the process of looking for reasons.
So far as (3) is concerned: We deprive the resident of
his benefit (continued life) in order to eliminate the illegitimate
source of the benefit. If we were using it for some other purpose
this might involve an injustice to him. This is because the life
we take from him is his own, so that he has a claim to it. This
claim must be overridden, and it is overridden (because in depriving
him of his life we deprive him only of the benefit of residence)
by the need to correct a state which is not justified by the fact that
it provides for his retaining his life (nor by any other right he has
to it, nor by anything else that we know of). It can be inappropriate
to be in possession of what qelongs to us, if the means of having it
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are wrong, and the wrong can be corrected by taking away what belongs
to us. But, just because his ownership claim is overridden for this
reason, does not mean it is overridden for other reasons.
Overriding his claim can be seen as a weighing process.
In deciding we needn't do something merely in order to save someone's
life, we are weighing letting one person die, against using the other
person as a cause of the former's continued existence. ~~at the Justice
Argument (given above) does, in saying that killing is not unjust is to
eliminate the particular way death comes about (letting die) from
the weighing process. That is, it is right not only that someone
should be left to die rather than that someone else should carry
them in their body to save them, it is also right that one person
be dead rather than the other be the cause of their existence by
carrying them in their body, even if the means to this is killing,
at least if there is nothing wrong with killing aside from the
question of its justice. The argument says that one thing that
cannot be wrong with killing is that it is unjust that one person's
life will, be eliminated in order to stop the residence. But when
we ···'le~·8h letting the person die against"other efforts besides
residence in someone's body, it may not be decided that it is right
that they be left to die. \~atever these efforts are, with respect
to them, not only will it be wrong to (a) apply the Justice Argument,
even if these efforts are providing life-support, but it may also be
wrong to (b) kill the person who is being supported in someone's
body, if we kill for the sake of stopping the lesser efforts, not for
the sake of stopping the body support.
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Furthermore·, if the wrong which caused the person to be alive
when he would·>otherw-ise have b'een dead is not correctible by killing
the person, we may·not·kill· him merely because he came to have his life
by inappropriate means. l He may have come to have his life inappropriately
but it wouldn t;tbe .inappropriate for him to go on having it. Thus,
the Correctiv'e Princlple'd'Oes 'not say that we may always put a person
back into the' po·sf:tiort, he would have been in but for the wrong which
caused him to·be in his present position. It is having the prior claim
that makes the specific purpose for which we kill important. If what
we had to take away from someone was something that (a) did not belong
to them prior to their being in possession of it, and (b) was something
they came by solely in virtue of the illegitimate residence, then they
would have no claim to it at all that needed to be overridden. Because
of this we might take the thing away from them without having to give
any reason at all. Our right to take it away wouldn't be tied to any
particular purpose for which we took it away.
This completes the discussion of (1), (2) and (3) of the
Corrective Principle. Before continuing with the presentation of the
Justice Argument I will examine the Corrective Principle in more
detail. First, I shall re-emphasize that it applies to cases where
lNote that we would still have a principle of correction--
though not the specific one I refer to in the Corrective Principle--
if we kill someone who is in residence in our body and is having his
life saved, in order to correct for some injustice unrelated to
residence in our body. This would be to use the benefit of one
wrong in order to correct another wrong. I would suggest that this
sort of principle of correction is more debatable than the Corrective
Principle.
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what belongs to someone is in question. I will then examine in more
detail some issues about the relation between residence and the
benefit which Part (1) of the Corrective ~rinciple raises.
I have said that the fact that the person has a prior
claim to what is taken away from him accounts for the importance
of the purpose with which we kill him. I now wish to emphasize that the
Corrective Principle involves applying a more general principle,
i.e. the benefit of a wrong can be used to correct the wrong
specifically to cases where the benefi t is possession of what is ours
already. In particular, the application of the Corrective Principle
to the violinist case extends a part of our views on correcting
injustices--namely that ill-gotten gains can, without injustice,
be eliminated in order to eliminate the unjust neans of their
existence--to cases where the ill-gotten gain is retention of what
belongs to someone. Ordinarily such removal of ill-gotten gains to
correct thei:r unj ust origins is done in situations 1;vhere the il1-
gotten gain is not continued retention of what belongs to someone,
but retention of something someone has no prior claim to, and
which they first come to have any relationship with via illegitimate
means. In these latter cases, it is clear that there is no injustice
to the person from whom we take the entity in order to correct
the state. The Justice Argument extends the principle to cases
where there is a prior claim to the object the retention of which is
the ill-gotten gain. It claims that the prior claim does not override
the weight of the Corrective Principle relating to the use of i11-
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gotten gains for a specific purpose. It claims that it can be just
as inappropriate to have what belongs to us as to have what doesn't
belong to us.
Above, I noted that the Corrective Principle does not apply
in all cases where one person enjoys a benefit he would not have had
but for an injustice to another. I distinguished between cases
in which someone or something done to someone can be said to cause
another person's life to be saved and cases where this cannot be
said. In the cases of interest to us the residence is causally
productive of the life, i.e. there is some input into the life
process. In other cases someone may not die only because something
wrong/inappropriate or unjust happens to someone else, but what
happens to the latter person is not causally productive of the
person's life. For example, to use the case given above, if the
only reason I fail to be killed in a mugging is that the mugger is
busy with someone else, this doesn't mean that the other person is
a productive cause of my existence. We must beware of seeing all
cases where someone benefits as he would not otherwise have benefited,
to the extent of retaining his life, as situations where we can
kill the person benefited in order to save the person wronged. So,
in the mugging case, if the only reason I fail to be killed in a
mugging is that the mugger is busy with someone else, this doesn't
mean I can be killed if only this will save the victim's life. There
are various degrees of intimacy and dependence between a life and the
event without which it would not exist, and these different degrees
may make a difference as to wheth.er we can kill someone to wipe out
the wrong without which they would not exist.
While a causal role seems necessary, it is important to
note that the Corrective Principle can come into play even in
situations where the efforts of one person are not completely
causally responsible for the existence of the benefit. This means,
in part, that the efforts need not create the object which will
be destroyed nor need the efforts be causally sufficient for its
continued existence, in order for the Corrective Principle to
apply.
In the violinist case, the residence does not create the
person. The person existed before residence and is having his
life retained. Furthermore, while the residence is causally
productive, it i"s not the only input which keeps the person alive,
i.e. some of the person's own bodily processes must be functioning
in order to make use of the input residence provides. So, at the
time when "we do provide the input we are necessary and not:-sufficient
conditions for his being alive at that time.
The intuitive basis of the problem which this latter
point presents for the justice of killing is as follows: If both
I and someone else are jointly responsible for the existence of
something (each person is necessary, neither is sufficient and both
are jointly sufficient, suppose) then it seems that to destroy that
thing for my sake is to rob the other person of wha"t he also has a
claim on. This claim arises not in virtue of his o~vnership of the
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thing, since, as theCorr;ec,ti.ve Principle implies ,my, s:upporting the
thing may overrule his' claim of' ownership,~ His claim, rather, arises
in virtue of his alsb"belng the 'cause of 'the existence of the thing,
and this additional C'8use' being a perfectly appropriate one. 1
The sol,ution·to· the problem presented by joint sou·rces of
the benefit ·seems to· b:e 'tha.t tIle" parallel dr·awn between cases where
two people both produce or contribute'to ma~ntaihing the exist~n~e
of something, and the life support cases of interest to us, is not
correct. This is because the former cases involve someone who
provides the appropriate part of the cause (1) doing something
they wouldn't otherwise do, (2) making efforts which could have been
employed elsewhere profitably, and (3) losing time and effort if the
product of their input is destroyed, so that they will prefer that
INote that this problem of multiple sources for the existence
of something would not arise for killing someone at a certain time
if we were totally ~ally responsible for its existence at that
time. The fact that if they weren't killed then they would go on to
support themselves, at a future time would not create the problem.
One might think the problem does also arise in such a case because
the life we would deprive the person of--seenas "the rest of their
1ife"--will have multiple sources, i.e. what ~ do now and what they
will do later o What is important to remember is that the product
of what they will (would do) later does not yet exist. So we are not
depriving them of what is their product. Similarly, on a social
scale, we do not say that we may not eliminate what is now totally
the product of slavery in order to eliminate slavery because it
would eventually be sustained by non-slave labor. What is significant
is that the appropriate (non-slave) source has not yet produced
anything. So, it is sufficient (even if it isn't necessary) for
the Justice Argument to work that we are producers of the rest of
someone's life in the sense of making it possible that he have a
future because of our totally sufficient causal role now. It is not
necessary that we would be productively involved in the rest of his
life at each of its stages in order that killing now be not unjust.
they had never done what was involved in providing their input.
But in the life saving case the person wllose life is being saved (who
is supposed to be comparable to the person providing the appropriate
part of the cause) (1) does nothing more than what he would ordinarily
do, i.e. his body functions to the extent to which it can; (2) he
would not l1ave chosen tb:at his body do otherwise than this, even if
he had known that the product would be destroyed, (3) if the
product is destroyed it is not true that he will lose time and
effort, so that he will wish that he had never expended it. Wishing
that he had never expended it would mean that he wishes he had died
earlier than he will die, and this isn't so. A more appropriate
parallel to the roles of the supporter and resident in the life
saving cases might be found in the following case: The partial
source of the continuing existence of A's house is B's inappropriately
acquired labor, assuming the amount of this labor is more than B
would have to donate to save A's house. The other source for
maintaining the house was the ordinary position and functioning of
its heating system, i.e. B couldn't have melted chemicals if the
heat hadn't been on. There are no out of the ordinary efforts on
A's part, nothing A would have done differently with his house's
heating system if it hadn't been used to help maintain the house,
and no loss to A in the heating process having contributed to the
maintenance of the house. In this case, A's contribution to
preventing his house from collapsing is not the sort that would
give him a claim to his house "if his claim is to be based on his
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role in maintaining it. So that if we wanted to destroy his house
to compensate B for his labor, A cannot claim that we deprive him
of what he has a claim to on account of his (or what belongs to
him) being a cause of the house's existence.!
In s.ummary, I have argued that it is··no"t unjust to use the
benefit ofa:residence which is unjustified--exceptpossibly because
destroying the benefit would be unjust--in order to eliminate the
residence. I have ar'gued that doing this in cases where the residence
is an injustice to begin with should be seen as involving part of our
views on corrective justice. I said that the Corrective Principle
which justifies correcting wrongs by using their benefits applies
when the benefit is retention of what belongs to someone as well as
when it involves eliminating what doesn't belong to someone. It
can be just as inappropriate to have what belongs to us as to have
what doesn't belong to us, when the means of our having it is wrong
lWhat may also bear on making the violinist case different
from cases where two people combine resources to save something, is the
problem of marginal utilityo That is, the claim that someone has to
the product of joint efforts may not vary according to the amount of
effort contributed, but, rather, according to the need for each
individual's services. When two people have equal need of each other,
not only in the sense of each playing an equally necessary role in
producing some end-product, but in terms of each having an equal need
to produce the end-product, then the claim of the two parties to t11e
output may be equal. But 1;vhen the need of one party to produce the
output is greater than the other, and hence also his need for the
services of the other is greater than the latter's need for the former,
the person whose services are in greater demand may have a greater claim
on the output as a function of their input. This need not mean that the
person whose efforts are in greater demand would come to OlYn the thing
they work on in virtue of their efforts. But it may mean that anything
which is a consequence of making input efforts will accrue to him. I
believe-that most of what has been said about the Corrective Principle,
including the problems of multiple causes and its solution apply to
the correction of social injustices ~nd wrongs also, but I will not go
into detail on this matter here.
and it is possible to eliminate the wrong means by use of what belongs
to us. I have argued that we can take away what belongs to someone
that they get via illegitimate means ,only for very specific purposes,
and this contrasts with what we can do to what they have that doesn't
belong to them and that they ge~'via illegitimate means. I have
argued that while residence must be a cause of .. the benefit, rather
than just something without which the benefit would not have existed,
the Corrective Principle applies even when residence is not a
sufficient cause of the existence of the benefit. This is because
of the particular role that what belongs to the person plays in
producing the benefit, i.e. it mere'ly continues to function in the
way it ordinarily does. If the claim of ownership does not give
the person a right not to have what belongs to him taken away (that
is, if it is overridden in order to eliminate the residence), a
claim arising from the input that the person or what belongs to
him contributes to producing the benefit will not stand in the
way of using what belongs to him to eliminate the residence.
Above (po 253) I said that to show that killing to remove
the violinist is not unjust, we would first assume (for the sake
of argument) tliat there are no other reasons why residence might
be justified, aside from killing being unjust, and show that, on
this assumption killing is not unjust. Then we would assume that
there is some other reason why residence is justified, having to
do with the killing having negative characteristics, aside from
its being unjust. We would show that on this assumption killing is
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also not unjust. We have done the first part of this in Step
IV.
(5) The Argument presented in I-IV says that so long as
residence is illegitimate, except possibly because killing is
unjust, killing will not be unjust, i.e. what would not make an
otherwise illegitimate residence legitimate is the injustice of
destroying the benefit of the illegitimate residence, in order to
eliminate the residence, since doing this will not be unjust.
But there may be other reasons why !eilling is wrong
besides its being unjust. So, the reason killing is wrong may not
be that it is unjust (ioe. the person's right to his.'lffe'c'an he
overridden) and yet it can still be wrong to kill him. For example,
killing can be wrong because (1) it is gruesome, or because (2) it
involves destruction of something very valuable, regardless of
l;vh~ther anyone's right not to haver.this. .valuable: thirig destro.yed or
taken from him is overridden. 1
We must now do the second part of wnat we said we would
do, in order to show that killing is not unjust. That is, we must
show that killing is not unjust even though there are non-justice
objections to killing.
INote that if this latter factor does lead to a prohibition
on killing to stop support when (a) leaving the same valuable thing
to be destroyed does not give rise to a prohibition on refusing
to start support, and (b) merely keeping the valuable thing in
existence is not a reason for continuing support, it will be some
factor about destroying the .valuable thing which will make the difference.
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In general, someone's right to life can be overridden, and
it can still be wrong to kill him. Furthermore, it being wrong to
kill need not, in general, change the fact that his right to life is
overridden. Wnen, e.g. we find out that it is wrong to kill, after
having decided that his claim to his life can be overridden for a
specific purpose, it may be that it is right that he go on living,
but not because his right not to be killed isnot overridden. LO put
the matter even stronger, sorneone's right to life can be overridden,
and it still be impermissible to kill him. Also, it being impermissible
to kill need not change the fact that his right to life is overridden.
This means that the non-justice objections to killing are so strong
that killing is impermissible even if it is not unjust. I distinguish
betwen the killing being merely wrong (e.g. indecent) and it actually
being impermissible (forbidden, prohibited).
Consider an analogy: Someone owns a hat. He has a right
not to have it taken away from him. (Assume) his right is overridden
only in an extreme emergency. We are about to take away his hat
to stop such an emergency, when we discover that stopping the
emergency will result 'in a great commotion. This commotion does not
involve committing any injustices. Nevertheless, we decide that it
is impermissible to stop the emergency at the price of the commotion.
But if we do the impermissible thing and stop the emergency by taking
his hat away we have not co~itted an injustice against the person
whose hat it is. His claim is still overridden by our acting to stop
the emergency, even if the problem of creating the commotion is not
overridden by its being part of the attempt to stop the emergency.
In other words, it seems that the goal which justifies
overriding someone's rights may be a goal which we are prohibited
from seeking; it does not lose its ability to outweigh the rights
because it is prohibited. This position is specifically meant to
say more than that it may be indecent to do what it is not unjust
to do. It says that (a) it may be impermissible to do' what it is
not unjust to do, and (b) doing what it is impermissible to do
may involve no violations of someone's rights, even if it involves
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·d· ,. h 1overr1 1ng someone s r1g ts. It will be important to get clearer
about when something which is not unjust, but which involves rights
being overridden is impermissible, as opposed to merely morally
objectionable (wrong) but not impermissible. It is also important
to know hO"tv many cases of impermissible even-if-not-unjust killings
to terminate life support there are and hOlY obj ectionable they
are in comparison to unjust killings in order to know what sort of
an impact on action the correctness of the Justice Argument has.
lA possible objection to this latter point is that someone
has a right not to have his rights overridden for the sake of ends
which are prohibited for any reason. (That rights are so important
that they should not be needlessly sacrificed, and acting contrary
to someone' s rights for a prohibited goal is to sacrifice them
needlessly.) If this were true, then it would still be possible
to say that some acts which are impermissible violate no rights,
but these cases would be limited to those in which there is no
question of anyone's rights being affected in any way (not overridden,
nor violated etc.). It would become impossible to say of cases in
which we decide we do not violare rights because we may override them,
that it was nevertheless impermissible to override them, without
also committing ourself to denying the previous conclusion, that it
wasn't unjust to override them. I shall return to this point below.
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I will deal with these questions at a further point. 1 At this point
I am still concerned with seeing if it is true that killing in the
matrix kill case is not unjust, even if it is impermissible.
I say that in general it is true that 'if a right to
something is overridden, the fact that we are not at lib'erty" to
act anyway, does not mean that the right would not still be overridden
if we did act. But what holds, in general, may not hold in the
violinist case. That is, if there are reasons having nothing to do
with the injustice of killing (non-justice reasons) for the
impermissibility of killing (such as (1) and (2) above, p.266),
the violinist's staying in the body will be justified, residence
will be legitimate atc. The question is: if we violate the
prohibitions on killing arising from, e.g. the gruesomeness of
killing or the fact that it involves the destruction of something
valuable, and kill anyway, will we also be doing what is unjust
to the person we kill? The question may arise in this case, even
when the answer was "~~o" in the hat case, because (a) if we can't
kill for non-justice reasons his residence becomes justified/legitimate,
and (b) the life we would destroy is made possible (in the sense
described above, P.25S) by this now~legitimate residence. If the
life we would take away is not the benefit of an illegitimate cause,
we would not be removing an ill-gotten gain/the benefit of some
II am indebted to Joshua Cohen for emphasizing the
importance of dealing with this issue.
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illegi timate state of affairs, i.n order to correq.t an,ille;gitim~.te. l
state of affairs. If lye do not take away only the benefi:t.. ofa'Q.
illegitimate state to correct thisstate~ the particularcor~ective
theory described above which is what was said tornake ,killing .Il;O.t
unjust, will not apply. Will it then, no.tonly.,b.e wrong (fo,r· ,non~.
justice reasons) to kill, but also unjust? ,
Note that if killing is unjust he wO.uld. l1ave:
d
a rigp:t to.
residence--where use of "a right" is restricted to cases where
violation of a right would be an injustice. That is, from a
non-justice justification for residence--which could not be said to
directly give a right to reside, but rather, only make residence
justified/legitimate in the sense that we must tolerate it at the
pain of doing something wrong--we would derive a right (a mat.ter
of justice) to stay. This right would be derived via the injustice
of killing, because if it is unjust to kill then the person must
stay in residence as a matter of justice.
The claim I will argue for now is that when the reasons
for the legitimacy of residence have nothing to do with what is
owed the person who resides in the body as· a'matter of justice (i.e.
the reasons are, e.g. gruesomeness or destruction of a valuable thing),
then (1) killing to remove him won't be an inj us tice to him, even
if it is impermissible, and (2) he will not have a right to residence
(where "right" is used as described above).
The argument given in (.4 ') above, said that the fact that
someone will lose the benefit of an illegitimate. state of affairs
could not, as a matter of justice, be a reason for not correcting
this state of affairs. We can argue for the new claim in the
following way: The illegitimate/unjustified character of the
state is a sufficient, but not a necessary conditions, for killing
not to be unjust. It is not necessaI""'j, in order for destruetioIl
of what wouldn't have existed but for tIle resideIlce not to be llnju.st,
that the stateof :affciirs'be,illegitimate, all things considered, only
that the reasons which are initially successful in making residence
legitimate (i.e. non-justice reasons) do not themselves make it the
case that the person is owed ~.residence as a matter of his rights or
of permission given to him. For, if he does not have a right or
permission to be in residence, he will not have a right to the
benefit of residence and if he has no right to the benefit it will
not be unjust to take it away. So, if non-injustice reasons for
not killing do not directly give a right or permission to reside
k.illing will not be unjust, whether there are non-justice objections
to killing or not. The fact that (a) producing the benefit does
not by itself justify residence, and (b) the person in residence has
no other source for a right or permission to reside, is enough to
make destruction of the benefit in order to eliminate residence,
not unjust.
The crucial points, then, in arguing for the claim that
killing will not be unjust if non-justice reasons are the first
reasons found to justify residence, are that the fact that his
residence must be tolerated for non-justice reasons does not directly
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give the violinist a right ,toresiqence and it. also does not give
"i.{ •
him permission to resid~, ~n the s~ns~ .tq.at having ttlis implies that
there is nothing wrong going on whe~ t~e person resides. Both
these points seem to be correct. The first is true just in virtue
of a non-justice reason not being the ~~rt of thing that can by
itself, directly, give rise to aFig~t,!... ';['h(: second point is also
true for reasons which will be ma<l~ c~ear" 9~10w. Let us assume
that both these points are true, then, from this we can conclude that
the fact that he benefits from residence which he still has no right
or permission to have means that he' still has no claim to the
benefits of the residence which is not overridden by the goal of
ending his being where he has no right or permission to be. This is
true even if this goal is overridden by the need to avoid certain
non-justice negative features of killing.
I have distinguished between (a) someone not having a
right to reside and (b) someone not having permission to reside.
I have :alre~dy given a reason to think that non-justice
objections do not directly yield a right to residence. It remains
to show why non-justice objections do not give permission for
residence. I will now do this. If someone has a right to reside
they will have a right to keep certain benefits of residence, not
all. Among the ones they do have a right to keep is their life.
(More on when we can keep benefits of residence we have a right
to below.) I wish to claim that if the right to reside and permission
to reside are indeed different, then if someone has no right to
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residence, but only pe:rm:i.ss~on ,to,fes~de,~ theym~y"s,t:ill have a
right to keep the same benefits of residence as the person who has
a right to reside. In p~rticuJ~r they have a right to keep their
life. Cases in which the owner ',has give~ someoneperIIlission to use
his property or is respon~i:bl~ for someone being,. ~hereand dqes not
take whatever action ,is penn~ss~ble .to, ,remoy~t1}e~, do seem to, be
cases in which the perso.n,i!:1 res~dence has a ,right to keep certain
benefits of residence. For example, if the supporter ,allovled the
violinist to come in and stay until the latter's kidneys were
healthy again, it would be correct to say that the violinist has
a right to keep the benefits of residence. Yet it does not seem
correct to say, looking back on the time when he was permitted to
be in residence, that he had a right to reside or was given a right
to reside. Being given a right to reside does indeed seem to be
different from being given permission to reside. The former
implies that the person who now has the right can stand on his own
in claiming residence. That is, he can defend his claim against others,
in his own right. The person who can only point to a permission to
use what belongs to someone else must continue to make reference to
the pleasure of the owner. Furthermore, the non-owner who has been
granted a right by the owner stands on an equal footing even wi th
the owner with respect to use of the property for however long the
right exists; he can make claims even against the 'owner. The person
who has been granted permission to use the property has not been
granted equal status with the owner with respect to use of the property;
he cannot argue against the owner's revoking permission at will.
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If this difference between having a right and having
permission is real, and having only permission to use something can
nevertheless give someone a right to keep the benefits of what they
use, then there would be cases where even without a right to
residence one would have a right to keep the benefits of 'residence.
~~ot having a right to res.i.dellce 1;yould be a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for not having a right to the benefit of it.
The crucial factor, which distinguishes cases where there
is (only) permission to reside and cases where there is only
toleration of residence because of non-justice objections to
terminating it, is the fact that in the latter case the benefit
is the result of a wrong, albeit a wrong which it is right
should continue. In the permission case, there is no wrong which
we must tolerate. Another way of putting this is that where we
tolerate residence, there is no positive reason which justiifies
residence, only a negative one, while in the permission cases
1there is a positive reason. Therefore, non-justice objections if kil-
ling do n~directly yield permission to remain in residence, nor do
they directly yield a right to reside. Therefore, the person still
has no right to the benefit which is not overridden by the goal of
eliminating residence, even though this goal is itself overridden.
Therefore, non-justice objections to killing do not make killing
unjust.
lSee Chapter II,for the" distinction bet~een positive and
negative reasons.
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In ,scunnnary, ,I have argued that while there may be a difference
between having a,..:right and having permission to reside, in both
these cases there is a right not to have the life terminated in order
to stop residence, but when there is only toleration of a wrong there
is no such r~gqt:not.tohave the benefit of residence taken away, and
so taking away··tlJ..e benef.~t"isnot unjust.
Justi.ce ~Ild non-Justice grounds for the impermissibil:i.ty
of killing, therefore, run on two different tracks: the fact that
it would be unjustified for non-justice reasons to kill in order to
correct residence, does not affect our judgment of what it is not
unjust to do in order to correct residence. This means that it can
be unjustified to seek a certain goal, yet it can be not unjust to
achieve it by employing means which would ordinarily involve
injustice to someone (e.g. killing). As noted above, a goal need
not be justified, atc,in order for it to make these means to it
not unjust. I said above ( p. 258 ) ,that it was only with respect
to a certain goal or when weighed against a certain other factor
that the right of the person not to be killed was overridden. This
remains true. Only, it is also true that it need not be legitimate
to achieve the goal atc. in order for it (the goal) to legitimately
override someone's right to life. Applying this argument to actual
cases of interest to us should help to make this argument clearer.
In addition, if we introduce a variation on our original life
support cases it will show (a) that not all the benefits of being
where we have a right or permission to be are benefits we have a
right to retain, and (b) sometimes, even if the goal we seek to
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achieve isunjust-..no·t only wrong andimpermissible--itwi11 not be
an i'njustice' to"the person'who is killed that he be killed for the
sake of that goal.
So consider Case (E): In Case (E) John introduces Mary,
who is dying,into my body against mytvill. In addition to having
her life s'aved by ·this suppo.rt Mary also gets other benefits of
being in my body, e.g. 'a'steady supply of food. Removing Mary
involves both killing her and taking the food away from her. Suppose
society decides that both killing her and taking the food away from
her--each, individually--are impermissible for non-justice reasons
(for example, it would be destroying a valuable life and valuable food).
Case (E) is a case where it is right (ate) that a wrong
{residence) should continue, so the benefits of this residence (life
and food) cannot, strictly speaking, be considered ill-gotten
gains. The question is, if I kill and/or take away the food won't
it be unjust, since these are not ill-gotten gains, and therefore
doesn't Mary have, atc, a right to stay in residence because
killing is unjust and taking away the vegetables is unjust.
The answer is no. The legitimacy of residence, since it
arises from negative non-justice reasons against killing and taking
the food away, does not directly give Mary, a right or permission
to stay in residence. It also does not directly give her a right
to the life or food which is not overridden by the goal of
eliminating residence. In particular, if we decide that it is
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impermissible to take away what belongs to someone, when we have
already decided it is not unjust to override, her right to it, this
does not mean that the person's right now becomes stronger in the
face of the goal for which it was originally overridden. A non-
justice reason for not killing does nothing, directly, to strengthen
the righ t of the perSOll not to be killed, or to weaken the power of
the goal to override the right. The right to stay would have to be
an implication of the injustice of taking the food or her life.away
because they are not ill-gotten gains, as suggested above, since it
does not stem directly from the fact that residence must be tolerated
for non-justice reasons. So, the suggested sequence is (1) non-justice
reasons for not killing and not taking the food away,
~
~ ( (2) legitimacy of retaining life and food.t(3) legitimacy of residence.,~
(4) legitimacy of retaining life and food.
~
(5) injustice of taking life and food away
1 (since they are not ill-gotten gains).
(6) right to residence.
But, if Mary has no right (or ,'permission) to stay then
even if the benefits of residence are not ill-gotten gains, she
has no claim to them such that to take them away in order to stop
residence is unjust. Therefore, she has no right to stay derivable
from any injustice in taking away the life or food.
In conclusion: The fact that the pursuit of our goal
(to eliminate residence) is overridden does not mean, even ind~rectly,
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that the right to life is not still overridden by the pursuit of
the goal (so that killing would not be unjust, even if impermissible)
because the reason why the goal is overridden does not result in the.
person having a (stronger) right to the benefits than they had
before the goal was overridden. Only a stronger right might make
it true that the goal does not override the right.
The further point to note about the case is that even if
Mary had a right to be in residence, derivable directly from the
legitimacy of her being there, taking away the food from ~/fary -would
not be unjust. If the food is not Mary's to begin with (unlike ller
life) then she has no claim to it, merely becau.se it is the product
of her being where she has a right (or permission) to be. It is
only if Mary had a-right or permission to be in residence in order
to get food that she woul d have a right to the food. This shov!s tha t
as noted above (P~272) one only has a right to keep certain of the
benefits which are derived from a position which one has a right or
permission to be in. If i~ry had a right to.be in residence it
would be unjust to remove her,simply because she has this right.
She would also have a right to the benefit which is retention of what
she already has a prior claim to (i.e. her life and anything else which
is' her~ it would be unjust to take away these benefits from
her. In general, at the least, the person has a right to any
improvements to what belongs to him which cannot be detached from
the thing itself, which result from being where the person has a right
or permission to be. The right to reside need not be the specific
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right to reside for the purpose of the improvement of what belongs
to him in order for the person to have a right to keep the improvement.
In Case (E) Mary has no right or permission to reside,
and residence is a wrong which it is, however, right to have continue.
But in some cases Mary may have no right or permission to reside,
yet residence is not a wrong whose existence we must merely
tolerate -because the means of ending it are unacceptable. The
claim is that, even in these cases it will not be unjust to kill
~1ary and take away the food in order to remove ller. For example, consi-
der case (F) which is like Case (E) except that I have an obligation
to John to put Mary on my property in order to save her life.
Therefore, to remove ~1ary would be an injustice .to John. Her
II have said that a right (or permission) to be there does
not necessarily change what !"1ary's rights are vis-a-vis food from
what they were when she didn't have a right to be there, but a right
to be there would change the right of Mary with respect to her
life. This might suggest that the fact that a non-justice justification
for residence doesn't imply that taking the food away is unjust need
not mean that a non-justice justification for residence also doesn't
imply that killing is unjust. But: Some sort of right or permission,
e.g. the right to be there in order to get food, is necessary to
give ~1ary a right to the food when it ~eJ'asn't hers to begin with.
Likewise, some sort of right or permission of Mary's--even if not the
right to be there in order to have her life saved--wil1 be necessary
to make taking away her life unjust. A more specific right is needed
in the case where the food is not owned by ~fury because there are
no background rights (i.e. stemming from the ownership by Mary) in
that case to give Mary a right to the food, the violation of which
could be unjust. The fact that one case needs a specific right to
residence in order to get food has nothing to do with whether
some sort of right or permission to reside is necessary for it to
be unjust to kill Mary.
residence is not merely a wrong which cannot be corrected, it is
a just state of affairs. Yet even in this case killing Mary 'would '
not be unjust to Mary, tho,ugh it would be unjust to John. This is
because in order for the Corrective Principle to fail to generate the
Justice Argument }tary must have a right or permission to reside,
and she does not have this just because John has a ,right that sh'e
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b · · d 1e 1n reS1 ence. So if I destroy the benefits of aresidence·which
she has no right or permission to have, she doesn't lose anything
to which she has a right, which is not overridden by the
goal of eliminating residence. Eliminating the residence will be
an injustice (to John) and yet this injustice does not change the
fact that if Mary has no right or permission to reside then taking
its benefit away from her in order to eliminate residence will
not be unjust to her. The justice of doing something to one person
is not affected by its constituting an injustice to the ot11er
person. It is possible for someone's rights to be overridden for
a purpose which will constitute an injustice to someone else.
In summary, I have argued that in cases where there is a
non-justice objection to killing which justifies the continuation
of residence, it will still not be unjust to kill to stop residence,
even if it is impermissible to do so. This is because toleration of
IOn the point that my promise to John to do something for
Mary does not give Mary, but only John, a right that I do it, see
David Lyons, "Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries," American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No~ 3 (July 1969).
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the wrong of residence, does not give the resident·, either a right
or permission to residence. It is only having a right or permission~..
to residence which gives one a right to keep certain, not all, of
the benefits of residence. If having to tolerate ·residence rath.e·r
than do something impermissible (but not unjust) toendr·esiden.ce
does not give a right or permission to stay, then theresiden:t
still has no right to the benefit of residence which is not
overridden by the application of the Corrective Principle to eliminate
the residence. This is true even though achieving the goal of
eliminating the residence is overridden by the non-justice objection
to killing. This means that a goal can be impermissible and still
override someone·s right to life. I extended this conclusion to
cases where pursuing the goal involved an injustice to someone other
than resident, i.e. cases in which residence is not a wrong we
must tolerate but a just state of affairs. So long as someone
having a right to have another person in residence does not give
the latter person a right or permission to reside they will have
no right to the benefit of residence which is not overridden by
the goal of eliminating residence.
(6) The preceding parts of the Justice Argument were concerned
with cases where (1) the person whose body was occupied was not
responsible for the presence of the person inside him (and had not
given permission for the residence to begin), and {except for
Case (F» where (2) there was an injustice done to the person who is
occupied in kidnapping him. I shall now argue that even where (a) the
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person whose body is occupied is responsible for the presence of
the person inside him, and/or (b) there was no injustice which
resulted in the person who is occupied being occupied, it will not
be unjust to kill the person to remove him. I will argue that since
the person has no right (or permission) to continue in residence
and his continuing existence is a benefit of this residence, it
will not be unjust to eliminate the benefit of a state the person
has no right or permission to have exist in order to eliminate the
state. I will argue that responsibility for introducing someone
will sometimes make a difference to the justice of killing, but,
in itself, responsibility for (a) saving someone's life and (b)
making them a threat to oneself in the process of saving their
life, will not make it unjust for us to then kill him.
(a) It was argued above that deliberately introducing
someone into one's property does not, by itself, independent of
other considerations, give the person a right to go on being in
residence. (Nor does it indicate permission granted for the person
to go on staying in residence, if there is agreed to be a difference
between getting a right and a permission.) So if removal were
perfectly innocuous for the resident he could be removed.
(b) In our Cases (A), (B) and (C), 1 there is no other
ground for the justification of continuing residence'besides the
1These are the cases we began with and are primarily
concerned with deciding. For a description of these cases see
Chapter I.
possibility that killing to remove is wrong (for justice or
non-justice reasons). As in cases where residence is "not voluntary
on the part of the supporter, need to have one's life saved is not
sufficient by itself for requiring that residence continue.
(a) and (b) imply that the person has no right/permission
to go on staying except possibly because killing to remove would
be wrong.
(c) We have shown in cases where residence results from
an injustice, that if killing is not wrong because it is unjust it
will not be unjust to kill, even if killing is wrong for non-justice
reasons. That is, if the reason why killing is wrong is not that
it is unjust, killing will not be unjust. So in order to show that
killing in cases where the supporter voluntarily began support is
not unjust we must only show" that the reason why we decided that
killing is wrong (if that is what we decide) is not that it is
unjust.
(d) The person's continuing in existence is the benefit
of the continuing residence. That is, there continues to be ALN
and the residence is causally involved in producing the benefit of
continued existence.
(e) Therefore, the same argument applies in cases where
residence is voluntarily begun by the supporter as applies in
cases where the resident is forced upon him. That is, we may kill
the violinist to remove him without injustice because it is not
unjust to eliminate the benefit of a state which the person has
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no right or permission to have exist, iri order to eliminate that
state. So killing will not be unjust.
The fact that the same argument applies for the non-~njustice
of killing in these cases where -the supporter voluntarily begins
~ - .'.
residence, as in tIle cases where residence is forced upon the
supporter does not mean that 't11e ~uppo~terfs responsibility for
introducing the resident 'will never 'make a'differ-~nce (or does not
make a difference so far as the weight of non-injustice objections
to killing). For example, if someone who had no need to be
introduced was introduced, and became dependent for life-support,
then it would be unjust to kill to remove 11im. But in such a case
it would also be true that the person had a source for a right to
stay independent of the fact that removing him would involve killing
him. That is, the person wl10 is responsible for giving him a need
(which he wouldn't have had otherwise and with which, if it goes
unfulfilled, he will be worse off than 'he would have be-en otherwise)
would have to meet the need, even if the person became detached
by an act of nature but the need remained. So in this case, where
responsibility makes killing unjust--and unlike our cases--it is
not true that there is no other source for a right to stay besides
there being something wrong with killing.
In yet another case, the supporter voluntarily introduced
someone who does not receive any benefit from residence, i.e. he
does not become dependent on life support. This resident has no
right to stay on in residence, aside from the fact that killing is
necessary to remove him, and yet ,it would be unjust.to'kill him.
This is because in killing {lim to remove him the supporter would
be responsible for his losing his life when hewould,not have lost
it if the supporter had not attached him to begin with. In this
case it is the fact that (1) the persollwould lose his life when
he wouldn't otherwise :ha.ve died if h.e hadn' tbeenbroughtin, ·and
(2) the supporter was responsible for introducing him that makes
killing unjust. But in the cases of interest to us, we kill someone
who would have lost his life even if he had never been brought in.
(It would be too broad to say that the killing would be unjust
because the person would be worse off if he is killed than he
would have been if he had never been introduced by the supporter,
since someone could be made worse off in ways that wouldn't account
for the injustice of killing. For example, it may be worse to die
in one way rather t~an another, and yet if someone would have died
in the better way if they hadn't been introduced it still wouldn't
be unjust to kill them using the worse way.)
It is the fact that the supporter is responsible for
residence in each of these cases that helps make killing unjust.
Killing would not necessarily be unjust if everything were as it is
in these cases, except that the supporter was not responsible for
introducing the resident. This is to say, for example, that the
non-injustice of killing in ALr~ satisfaction cases, lvhere residence
is begun against the will of the supporter, does not depend on there
being HLN. Someone can be worse off if they are killed to be removed
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than they would',have. b,een if. they had never been inside the other
person's body--worse off ina way that could affect the justice
of killing if the. supporter ~yere responsible for introducing them--
and it still not be .unjust to kill when the supporter is not
responsible ,for tnt.roducing·them. This is because getting ALN
satisfaction ,as a .;:con'seq.;uence of being plummeted into someone,
where being'plununeted ·in, also gives rise to the need for ALN
satisfaction, is to be provided with the benefit of having the ALN
satisfied. One is provided with the cure at the same time as the
disease, when one could have just gotten the disease without the
cure. Providing this benefit (cure) is not something the supporter
must do, i.e. if the person were plummeted in, giving rise to
ALN, but there was no automatic satisfaction provided for the ALN,
the supporter wouldn't have to start to provide it, even though
the resident will be worse off if it isn't provided than he would
have been if he had never been plummeted in. So if he has no right
to residence and the ALN satisfaction is a benefit (even if not a
benefit in comparison to the state the person would have been in
if he hadn't been 'plummeted in), we may, without injustice, kill
to remove him.
Note that the supporter's responsibility for starting
support may make killing unjust even if he would be killing someone
whose life he had previously saved. Helping someone to. retain
his life, someone who would not have been alive now if we hadn't
helped, does not, in itself, give us a right to now make them no
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worse off than:' they would have been if we hadn't helped them then
(i.e. dead)-. Suppose we save someone' s life by carrying him in
our body and safely detach hini ending the process. Suppose further
that we reintroduce him into our body when he had no need to be in
residence, and we then want tohave'himkilled in order to remove
him. Killing in 'such a case-would bOe unjust. We are responsible
for introducin-gthe person when he had no need to be introduced and
if we kill him we shall be making him worse off--in a way which would
affect the justice of what we do--then he would have been if we
hadn't acted.
If it is true that having saved someone's life does not,
in itself, give us a right to kill someone, thereafter, it is also
true that having saved someone's life, by itself, does not mean
that we are prohibited from killing them. And, in particular, when
the ALN-satisfying residence we wish to terminate is unavoidably
continuous with the time in residence which we voluntarily donate
to save someone's life, we may kill without injustice to stop the
residence. The following is evidence for the claim that helping
someone retain something need not mean we cannot later take it
away. If I help someone retain possession of his gun and then
he tries to shoot me with it, I may take it away. Even in situations
where the person becomes a threat to me solely in virtue of my own
actions (not theirs) which help him retain something, I may take away
what I helped him retain, in order to stop the threat to myself.
At least when they lose no more if I do this than -that which I helped.
h · 1t enl reta1n. For example, if I help someone retain his apple~
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foreseeing that his having his apple will unavoidably res'ult in his
emitting harmful rays in my direction, I may help him retain the
apple and still take it away from him in order to defend myself
against the threat that his having it presents. This is a case
where I may be responsible for making someone a threat to me, they
will be worse off if I defend myself against them than they would
be if I didn't, and yet I may defend myself in the same way anyone
else could, since the threat arises as part of my attempt to benefit
someone and what they los~if I defend myself is just the benefit
they wouldn't have had if I hadn't made the attempt.
This shows that in the cases of interest to us, the fact
that (1) we voluntarily began to help the person who retains his
life, and (2) the unavoidable consequence of using the only means
available for helping him retain his life, puts him in a situation
where he is a threat to us, need not mean that we cannot kill him
to remove him. In particular, it need not mean that we cannot
respond to the threat of continued residence and make use of the
fact that it produced the benefit of continuing life, as ~ve do in
1This clause is meant to guard against (1) my giving
someone something that makes them a threat against me, and (b)
then defending myself against the threat in such a way that they
are worse off than they would have been if I had never given them
the thing. Possibly, we need not even take this precaution if our
duty to help someone retain what is theirs (vs. give them something
new) is so st'rong that we have no option but to do it. If this
were so, then we could respond to the threat they present even if
they would lose more than what we helped them retain.
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the Justice Argument.
Note that the case involving our returning someone's
apple to them is meant to be analogous to non-ALN cases; that is
the threat presented to us by their having their apple is not
involved in helping them retain it. In such cases, we can defend
ourselves.against the threat in the way anyone else (who hadn't
returned the apple) could, for the reasons given above. This
means we have to decide what sort of response is, merited by the
particular threat. What we couldn't do is (a) take away the apple
in order to compensate ourself for the efforts we gave voluntarily;
or (b) take the apple away as if it were the benefit of losses
we have not agreed to suffer, since it is not the benefit of these
efforts. In ALN cases, however, we cannot only respond to the
threat presented by the continuing life in the way anyone else
who hadn't helped someone retain his life could. We can respond
as the Justice Argument says we can, since the continuing life is
the b~nefit of the continuing losses we suffer. (As in non-ALN
cases we could not kill in order to compensate ourself for the
efforts we have already given voluntarily.) TI1e apple case most
directly shows that ·voluntarily helping someone retaip their life, need not
mean that we cannot kill in cases where residence voluntarily given
satisfied AU~ and the remaining unwilling residence is E£! needed
for AL~~ satisfaction. In such a case, unlike the cases where ALl~
satisfaction continues, we will need an argument not dependent
on the Correction Principle to actually justify killing, given that
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responsibility for having saved th.e person does not mean tllat
killing is prohibited. We cannot say that killing is not unjust,
because we are eliminating only the benefit of unwilling residence,
since the benefit was the result of that part of residence which was
given willingly.
I have argued that it will not be unjust to kill in ALN
cases where the resident was introduced voluntarily, in order to
stop residence which involves efforts we wouldn't have to make merely
in order to save someone's life. It is true, however, that if we
kill in such cases what we do will not fall under a concern for
corrective justice. This is because, if the residence continues
when no one has forced the residence on us and no one interferes
with our terminating it, there is no injustice in its continuing.
Still, the residence against the will of the supporter is uArightful.
(See Chapter II) It is unrightful for the resident to be where
he has no right to be or has no permission to be, even if his presence
is explained by his having been introduced by the supporter and even
if his continuing in this unrightful situation is justified by
our having to tolerate his presence rather than use the means necessary
to remove him. In arguing as I have that the corrective
principle makes the killing not unjust in cases where residence
is voluntarily begun, I have, then, really been arguing that the
same corrective principle which makes it not unjust to use the
benefit of an unjust residence to eliminate the injustice, makes
it not unjust to use the benefit of an inappropriate residence to
eliminate the inappropriate residence.
It is important to note that both i~ cases where residence
starts as the result of an injustice and where the supporter is
responsible for starting support, the use of the Corrective Principle
not only makes trying to kill not· unjust it makes acquiring the
death of the resident -not unjust. This means that when there ,are
non-justice objections which make killing impermissib1e,ther.esident
has no legitimate grounds for self-defense (aside from Hobbesian
ones). WIlen the person is to lose only the benefit of the efforts
he has no right or permission to have, he has no- grounds of appeal.
This m.akes it right that a third party rights enforcer should side with
the supporter, if he sides with anyone; when the resident could be
removed without losing anything and when he could be removed by
losing only the benefit of residence the rights enforcers should
side with the supporter, if he sides with anyone. In cases where
the supporter is not responsible for introducing the resident, the
rights enforcer must help the supporter. \Vhen the supporter is
responsible for residence, the rights enforcer might argue that he
is under no duty to help. Since the supporter foresaw what would
happen and went ahead with supporting anyway, he should noW shoulder
the burden of fixing his situation. Third parties, even rights
enforcers, might well argue that they should. not be held responsible
for helping people out of messes when the latter go into a situation
voluntarily and fully aware of possible consequences. The rights
enforcer may help, but he need not. (vfuat might weigh against this,
is that because the supporter was trying to save someone's life, his
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useful attempt should put the rights enforcer. under an ob'ligation ··,to.
help him if he decides to stop the efforts.) Furthermore ,.incas.es
where the supporter voluntarily introduced the resident,non-justice
objections to k.illingmay weigh more heavily than in cas·es where
residence is not voluntarily begun. That is, if there arenegat~ve,
qualities to terminating support that ~vere notpresell.t if we let.
die to begin with, when we decide whether to begin support we must
consider that terminating it will involve these additional negatives.
If there is no good reason for risking these additional negatives
we maybe penalized for making it necessary that these additional
negatives occur. The penalty may be that greater efforts have to
be suffered on our part before we are permitted to overlook the
non-justice negatives, and kill. (Again, the fact that 'there is a
useful reason, e.g. trying to save someone's 1ife,for risking these
additional negative factors, might argue against a penalty.) This
entire discussion of when a rights enforcer should help end support
is only meant to be suggestive not definitive.
In summary, I have argued that killing to remove someone
from residence in a case where the supporter willingly introduces
the person, is·.notunjust: This is because the person will still
only be losing the benefit of a position he has no right (or
permission) to remain in, except possibly because killing is wrong.
I have argued that responsibility for introducing someone will
)
sometimes make a differ~nce to the justice of killing, e.g. when the
person who would be killed was not in any danger of losing their
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life prior to being introduced. (When the supporter is g~
responsible for residence, absence of HLN will not affect the
application of the Corrective Principle in ALN cases.) The justice
or injustice of killing will not, however, follow merely because
we are responsible for having helped the person retain his life
or because we are responsible for making the person a threat as th~
unavoidable consequence of helping him retain his life. In HLl\l but non~ALN
cases the supporter who is responsible for introducing the resident
can respond to the threat in the way anyone else could. In ALN
cases, the Corrective Principle will apply. To justify killing
on the basis of the corrective Principle in ALN cases where we
are responsible for residence will E£!, however, involve correcting
for an injustice; only for an unrightful residence. Whenever
the Corrective Principle justifies killing there will be no right
of self-defense on the part of the resident, so the rights enforcers
should side with the supporter in the matter af removal, if they
side with anyone. While killing by first or third parties in ALN
cases where the supporter is responsible for residence will not
be unjust, a rights enforcer may have no duty to aid, and non-justice
objections to killing may count more heavily against the permissibility
of killing.
I have argued that killing to stop residence in cases
where residence is begun against the will of the supporter and also
where it is begun voluntarily by the supporter as in Cases (A),
(B), and (C) will not be unjust. If this is correct, what is its
significance?
At minimum it shows that killing in these cases caIlnot
be murder and it cannot be treated like killings which involve
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· 1· f l' · h 1V10 at10ns 0 peop e s r1g ts. No one's rights are violated in
the killings in Cases (A), (B) and (C), and so protests, protections,
prohibitions and punishments reserved for violations of people's
rights would not be applicable to these cases. Furthernlore, 1f the
most serious moral objection which can be lodged against an act
(or omission) is that it involves violating someone's rights,
killing in Cases (A), (B), and (C) could not be among the most
morally objectionable acts.
In addition, I will argue at a later point that the
Justice Argument, in particular, is significant because it is
necessary in order that some killings be not unjust. That is,
there are cases which are in every way like some cases in which
we end life support without injustice except that there is no
life saved by the support, and killing in these cases will be
unjust.
The question still remains of whether any or all killings
which are not unjust are also (a) permissible and (b) not morally
objectionable. If all the killings which, I have argued, are not
unjust are, nevertheless, impermissible--that is, prohibited and not
merely objectionable but not prohibited--the fact that they are not
1For example, going up to a stranger on the street and
shooting him dead.
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unjust will not have much influence on our actions. At a later
point, I will argue that (a) some killings ,which are not ,unjust are
nevertheless impermissible, and (b) some killings which are not
unjust are permissible though morally objectionabl~and (c) some
killings which are not unjust are permissible and not O
morally objectionable. I will attempt to provide some tentative
suggestions as to why sone killings which are not unjust are
nevertheless impermissibl~andnot merely objectionable and exactly
what role the non-injustice of the killing plays in deciding that
a killing is permissible. I mention these questions now only to
note that they do arise. They will be dealt with later, when more
of the details necessary for a discussion will have been made available
by the analysis of other issues.
II
I will now make clear some of the more general implications
of the Justice Argument. Among these implications are: (A) "Because
I needn't do it merely in order to save his life," has a more crucial
role to play in the non-injustice of killing in ALN cases than in
non-ALN cases. This turns out to mean that the efforts for the 'sake
of which we may, without injustice, kill is higher in non-ALN cases
than ALt~ cases. (B) It is not unjust to kill some Innocent
Beneficiaries even though they are not Innocent Threats.
A. The Justice Argument shows that (1) "Because I needn't
do it merely in order to save his life" indicates that we can kill
without injustice when (a) we are making efforts we need not make
merely in order to save SOmeOIle' s life, (b) the efforts we are making
produce ALN satisfaction, and (c) the person who benefits from the
efforts in question has no grounds for having them done for any
other reason, except possibly becal~e it is wrong to kill. The
Justice Argument also shows that (2) "Because I needn't do it merely
in order to save his iifa" pla),Ts a signifi.cant role in· explaining
why killing is not unjust because the Corrective Principle says ·that
it will not be unjust to the beneficiary to eliminate the benefit
of what we need not do, in order to stop doing it. If I need not
do something merely in order to save someone's life, then the
fact (1) that I am saving their life or (2) that killing would not
be permitted if saving~ required, will not be reasons why I
must continue the efforts. If the resident has no other grounds
for having the efforts made, except possibly because killing would
be wrong, then I can take away the benefit of the efforts without
any injustice. But life will be the benefit of residence only in
ALN-satisfaction cases. So only in ALN cases will killing consist
in taking away only the benefit. "Because I needn't do it in order
to save his life" tells us that we need not do something merely
to produce that benefit which must be the benefit of residence if
the Corrective Principle is to apply.
If there was ALN-satisfaction but the efforts which were
causing the life to be saved were ones we had to make merely in order
to save someone's life, then the benefit could not be used to stop
the efforts. The person would have a right to residence and to
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the benefits of it.
If there was ALN-satisfaction and we did not have to make
the efforts merely in order to sustain the life, but the beneficiary
had a right to the efforts for some other reason, then it would also
be unjust to kill.
Finally, i"f there were no AL1~-satisfaction (as is the
case in non-ALN cases), then we would be taking away~ than the
benefit of the efforts, since the efforts do not provide life
support. The Justice Argument does not say that we can take away
what is not the benefit of efforts. It might still be true that
(1) we would be doing what we need not do merely in order to save
a life, and (2) the person may have no other right to have these
efforts made, aside possibly because to stop them would involve an
injustice, but the fact that we are doing what we need not do merely
in order to save a life would not be an automatic indicator of when
killing would not be unjust. At least, not according to the
Justice Argument, since we would not be removing only the benefit
of residenc~. It would certainly not be a question of using an
ill-gotten gain to eliminate the state which produced it. 1
INote that even if there were no ALN satisfaction as the
result of these efforts, the life of the person in residence might
be an ill-gotten gain because, e.g., it is being saved by the
illegitimate use of some third person via a long-distance hook-up.
But if it cannot be used to correct the wrong which produces it,
it cannot be used merely because it is the ill-gotten gain of that
other state, to correct the state which does not produce it.
At least not according to the Justice Argument.
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Killing in non-ALN cases might still be ~ot unjust even if it would
not be the Justice Argument which determined that it was pot unjust. For
example, sometimes a person's right not to be killed is overridden
simply because he has a sufficiently bad effect on other, and/or is
where he ought not to be while having this bad effect. But to decide
if his right not to be killed is overridden in non-ALN cases we must
weigh (a) one person being dead against (b) the bad effect to someone
else which this person would produce (where this bad effect is not
causally involved in sustaining the first person's life). The fact
that the effect that the resident would have involves losses to the
supporter equal or greater than he would have to make to save someone's
life may remove one factor that could stand in the way of killing,
i.e., if we had to aid we could not kill. But we would have to
give some argument in addition to the one based on the Corrective
Principle to explain why exactly the effort we need not make even
to save someone's life is the effort in defense of which it is not
unjust to kill. 1 And, in fact, it seems that tne $'l,i)OO non-ALN case
is an example of a case where it would not be unjust to refuse to
make the efforts involved, in order to save someone's life, but it
would be unjust to kill someone in order to get back the $POD. In
the ~~,.OOO_ALN case, it l-lould~ be unjust to Itill (according to the
Justice Argument). The difference between ALN and non-ALN cases
IThomson's Argument not only omits reference to satisfaction
of ALN as crucial, but implies that in non-ALN cases doing what we
]C1eed not do merely in order to save a life is grounds, by itself,
:for killing.
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indicates that the claim that "we needn't make efforts rather than
kill which we wouldn't have to make rather than let die"--isnot what"
should lie at the heart of Thomson's argument. If it were correctly
described as being at the heart of Thomson's argument then not only
would killing in AL~l cases be permissible (as well as not unj ust)
whenever they involve efforts as large as we would not have to make
rather than let die, but the efforts we could permissibly and justly
avoid by killing in ALN and non-ALN cases would be the same. Neither
of these two implications holds. In particular, in non-A~~ cases
the efforts we need not make rather than kill seem to be larger than
those which we both (a) need not start to begin with in order to
save someone's life, and (b) larger than those which we may, without
injustice, kill to terminate in AL~i satisfaction cases •
If we see the Corrective Principle as lying at the heart
of Thomson's argument, however, this allows us to explain the
non-injustice of killing in all ALN cases where we are making
efforts it would not be unjust to refuse to give rather than let
die, it does not require us to say that k.illing is permissible in
all these cases, and it does not require us to say that killing in
non-ALN cases is not unjust or permissible whenever efforts are such
that we need not make them merely in order to save a life ..
In addition, the difference between the ALN and non-ALN
cases indicates the following: (a) The large size of the loss we
seek to defend ourselves against is not the only factor which makes
killing not unjust. Losses, in the form of efforts, may only be
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large enough so that we would not have to suffer them to save som~qne's
life in order for the relation holding between the efforts-as-ca~se
and the life-as-benefit, to give rise to the non-injustice of killing.
So the size of the loss to one party if we do not kill is not all
that is involved in making killing not unjust. The relation ("causally
dependent on") holding between what is taken away and the efforts is
also important in determining the non-injustice of killing. (b) People
speak of someone's right to their body being in conflict with someone
else's right to life. It is fair to describe both ALN and non-ALN
cases as ones where this conflict exists. Yet in, e.g., the $1000AL~1
and non-ALN cases we may resolve the conflict differently. Again,
the function that the body performs with respect to the other
person's life will make the difference. (c) It may well be easier to
justify killing the person who has his life saved as a result of
efforts he had no right or permission to have in order to stop the
efforts than it will be to justify killing a third party who is
guilty of forcing one person to support the other, if killing him
would end the support. This is because if he were killed he would
be deprived of more than the benefit of efforts he had no right or
permission to have, since he is self-supporting.
In summary, I have explained the significance in ALN
cases of the fact that the efforts I kill to terminate are efforts
which I need not make merely in order to save someone's life. I
have also indicated why this fact is not of equal significance in
non-ALN cases.
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B. The argument for the noninjustice· of' killi.ng in tlon-ALN cases
(vs. ALN ones) must involve deciding if it is ·not unjust to kill someone
who is morally innocent (i.e. he didn't introduce himself into
residence) but who has a certain bad effect on someone, i.e. someone
who is an Innocent Threat. The J~stice:Argument for ALN cases has
been appliedil.1 cases where the beneficiary of efforts is also an
Innocent Threat. That is, he has the bad effect of causing the
efforts from which he benefits to continue, i.e., he is innocently
causally involved in producing the threat of continued efforts to
the supporter. (The innocent beneficiary of the efforts causes
the efforts to continue by staying alive and, therefore, remaining
in resiaence. Indeed, not only does he cause the efforts to
continue, but it is in virtue of the benefit of the efforts itself
(continued life), not something else, that the efforts continue.
And these efforts (residence) in turn provide the benefit. It is
a feedback mechanism: efforts lead to benefit leads to efforts.)
But the Justice Argument does not necessarily require that the
cases to which it is applied involve a beneficiary who is also a
threat. The Argument only hinges on the person losing the benefits
of efforts he has no right or permission to have; it does not
require that he cause the efforts to exist.
This means that the Justice Argument opens up the
possibility of further broadening the range of people it is not
unjust to kill. That is, we may not only kill aggressive threats
and innocent threats, but also innocent beneficiaries of threats, who
.~
: 1
are not themselves innocent threats.
III
Having made clear some' general implications of the
Justice Argument I will now"~make clearer what the Justice Argument
implies and what it does not imply about particular cases. I will
first consider why killing in certain ALN cases (e.g. $1000 cases)
should be impermissible and objectionable, even though it would
not be unjusto I then provide reasons for why killing will be
unobjectionable in some AL!~ cases when it is unobjectionable to
let die to begin with, though it is not unobjectionable to kill in
non-ALN cases.
In the $1000 ALN case, the conclusion ,.of the Justice
Argument is that it is not unjust to kill. But I have said that
it is both impermissible and objectionable to kill in this case,
while it is both permissible and not objectionable to refuse to
give $1000 in aid. Thismeans that negative characteristics present
when we kill,but absent when we refuse to start life saving aid
to begin with, must (at least, in part) account for the fact that
it isnot objectionable to refuse to start $,1000 aid to begin with,
but it is objectionable to kill to ,stop it. These negative
characteristics may be characteristics due to the presence of
killing per se, or they may be characteristics which would be
shared by theBNA case. (Recall, that this is the case in which I
II believe we could extend this point to areas of social
justice also •
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refuse to give a small amount of aid which is required to prevent
the person I am already supporting from getting typhoid. I refuse
in order that the disease shall kill him and remove him from me.)
A list of such factors would include: (1) Interest in the
occurrence of the cause of death of something of great value (a
person's life).!
(2) The weight of the person's having a 'right not to
have their life taken away, even though it is overridden.
(3) Responsibility for causing the loss of something of
great value. (This is a characteristic present only in the killing,
not in the BNA case.)
(4) Making someone worse off than they would have been
without our act when it is not unjust to do this. (This is a
characteristic present only in the killing, not in the BNA case.)
(5) Intrusion into the private sphere of a person when it
is not unjust to do this. (By this I do not mean messiness, but inter-
ference, even~if it is very clean.) (This is a characteristic present
only in the killing, not in the BNA case.)
(6) (If we use the person as a means to stop the residence
Treating the person as a means.
II note that something of value is involved. This is
because it may be true that it is of no consequence whether we have
an interest in the occurrence of the cause of the destruction of
something of no value. This is because whatever we do, or whatever
attitude we have toward what is of no value, may be of no consequence.
But once we are dealing with what is of some value, whether we do
one thing or another to it, or have one attitude or another to it,
may be of great significance.
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If we\-Tant to find out whether ('a) the factors only present
when killing is present m~ke killing objectionable when letting die
to begin with isn't objectionable, or whether (b) the factors which
can be present in BNA cases also account for the difference, we should
do the following:
(1) Compare BNAwith the matrix killing. If they are
equally unobjectionable or objectionable, then we will know that if
the presence of killing is of no moral significance. Note that if
the presence of killing in this case does not make a moral difference,
this need not mean that killing does. not differ morally from letting die,
per see But it does mean that factors such as causing the death will not
make a moral difference.
(Note that we leave it open that BNA is permissible when
matrix killing isn't and yet that they are equally morally
objectionable .)
(2) Compare BNA with letting die to begin with. If BNA
is more objectionable than letting die to begin with (even if it is
not impermissible when letting die to begin with is permissible)
this means factors such as interest in the cause of death/using
someone as a means, make matrix killing morally objectionable when
letting die to begin with isn't.
Note the following: (1) It is possible for BNA to be less
objectionable than matrix killing and also to be objectionable when
letting die to begin with is not objectionable. In this case, both
factors present only because killing is present and factors present
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independent of the presence of killi.ng would make killing morally
objectionable when letting die to begin with was not objectionable.
(2) For those who think that an act (e.g. matrix killing) and
an omission (e.g. BNA) can be equally morally objectionable and yet
only the act be impermissible, the fact that the killing was more
objectionab'lethan letting die to begin with could indicate that
the killing was also impermissible. As a matter of fact, I have
said that the killing in the.$lOOOcase is both morally objectionable
and impermissible, and this may be due to factors which killing
alone introduces or to factors present also in BNA cases.
I said that factors (1)-(6), which are present in the
kill case alone or also in BNA might only account in part for the
objectionableness and impermissibility of killing in the ~lOOOALt~
case because there may be another reason for the impermissibility
of killing. This reason is that it seems inappropriate to take
advantage of the fact that someone has a greater need for support
to begin with, as is true in ALN cases where there was HLN, in order
to make killing permissible when it wouldn't otherwise be permissible.
The significance of this point is made clear by comparing ALN with
non-AL!~ cases.
In the $lOQO~-ALN case it will be unjust (and therefore
impermissible) to kill, because the efforts the supporter would make
are too small to justify killing in order to end them. In the
~lOOOALN case it is not unjust to kill. In general, killing is
likely to be just more often (i.e. when lower amounts of effort to
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of killing, because it seems odd that (a) when two people have equally
strong reasons for residence, and hence equally strong excuses for
residence, it should be easier to justify killing one rather than the
other, or (b) when one person has a stronger reason for being in
residence than another, and hence a stronger excuse for being in resi-
dence, it should be easier to justify killing the one with the stronger
reason.
So far as (b) is concerned, in the ALN cases the resident has a
stronger positive reason and hence excuse, than the person in non-ALN
cases. He either had a stronger need for residence to start (where
there was HLN) or he gets benefits from residence (where ALN need
started when residence started). These reasons are not strong enough
to justify residence, but they are still stronger than that present
in non-ALN case. In the non-ALN cases there is no positive need for
residence that could serve as an excuse for residence.
So far as (a) is concerned, I argued that it may be right to
equate negative and positive reasons for residence, so that need to
avoid being killed in removal is as strong an excuse for residence
as HLN/ALN. Seen in this light the ALN and non-ALN people have
equal excuses for residence, even if HLN people had a greater excuse
for residence to begin. So, in the ALN cases the positive excuse
for residence is stronger than in non-ALN cases; and at the very least
the complete excuse for residence is equal to that in non-ALN cases.
Yet, if permissibility followed non-injustice, it would be easier to
kill in ALN cases than in non-ALN cases. That is in cases where lower
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efforts are demanded of the supporter, killing will be not unjust in
1ALN cases and unjust in non-ALN cases. In these cases where efforts
lost are lower, it is easier to argue that killing is not unjust as
the excuse provided by a positive reason becomes stronger because (a)
as the need for residence gets stronger (at its strongest it is the
need for life itself) the person killed is more likely to lose only
what he would get from residence, and yet (b) the positive need does
not, however strong it is, justify residence. When someone needs
residence for life support he has the strongest grounds for being
there, but he is only then, as opposed to when he has a lesser need,
in a position where he would lose only what he receives via the
wrong/unrightful residence, if he is killed. His strong positive need
pulls in the direction of our not being able to kill, when it is seen
as an excuse, and yet it also pulls in the direction of making ~illing
not unjust when it wouldn't otherwise be so.
It seems odd to be able to kill someone who is in a position
he would have a stronger reason for being in to begin with (even
though the reason does not justify his being in the position) when
we could not kill someone (in non-ALN cases) who is in the same
position with less reason for being there to begin with, given his
lesser (positive) need for residence. It seems odd that the person
with ALN and, hence, with the stronger positive excusing condition,
lRecall that in non-ALN cases, as the threat value to the supporter
goes down, the non-injustice of killing is likely to disappear, whereas
in ALN cases, the grounds for the justice of killing doesn't diminish
as the threat size goes down, so long as it doesn't go down below what
we wouldn't have to tolerate merely in order to save someone's life to
begin with.
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and with at least equal need, positive and negative excusing conditions
taken together, should have a mark against him in virtue of these
characteristics, even if his having ALN does not constitute a mark in
his favor.
In the light of these two points, it is worth emphasizing that
while it may be a ground for the impermissibility of killing in some
cases that it is distasteful to base the permissibility of killing on
someone's greater need, this does not alter the fact that the non-
injustice of killing does indeed depend on the greater need, at least
in some cases (namely those where killing in non-ALN cases involving
comparable efforts lost will be unjust). The non-injustice of taking
away something from someone depends on whether he has it appropriately;
if someone is not beholden to improper sources in order to have what
he has, we are more limited in what we can, without injustice, do
than when there is something wrong with how someone comes to have
something. In non-ALN cases the person does not have his life by the
inappropriate means we wish to eliminate; in the ALN case he does.
I will add the last two points--(l) greater need/worse off
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and (2) equal or stronger excuse--to the' previous six as factors
which, I suggest, account for a killing being morally objectionable
and impermissible in some cases (i.e. those where the efforts to
the supporter are relatively low), even though the killing would not be unjust.
It seems that a killing in the $1000 ALN case would not be
unjust, yet it is not only indecent (morally objectionable), it should
be impermissible. So while the Justice Argument shows that killing
in this case would not be a violation of anyone's rights, it does not
show that it should be allowed. In suggesting that the eight factors
discussed above make killing impermissible in some cases where it
would not be unjust, I am suggesting that one can weigh (1).\ the ~
fact that someone will lose something very valuable (their life)
and (2) that the things noted by the eight factors will occur,
against (la) the smaller loss to the supporter and (2a) the fact that
it would not be unjust to kill, and conclude that it is impermissible
to kill. This means that there can be cases where it is impermissible,
for non-justice reasons, to correct an unjust state of affairs by means
which are themselves not unjust. Correcting the injustice does not
have priority even when doing so involves no other injustice. Despite
the fact that the correctness of the Justice Argument does not
imply that killing is permissible.in all ALN cases where efforts
are such that it would be unobjectionable and permissible to let die
to begin with, I suggest that some killings will be permissible
solely because of the correctness of the Justice Argument. So the Justice
Argument not only shows that killing in ALN cases does not have
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whatever gravity is attached only to injustices, it also makes killing
permissible in some cases where it wouldn't otherwise be so. That
is, I suggest that killing will be both not unjust and permissible
in some ALN cases, while it will be unjust and impermissible in
non-ALN cases involving comparable efforts on the supporter's part.
The reasons why killing is permissible in these ALN cases
include characteristics of the case which are also present in the
ALN cases where killing is not permissible, even though it is not
unjust.
By implication, therefore, these characteristics are among
those outweighed by the negative factors in cases where killing is
impermissible, even if not unjust. I enumerate some of them now,
because I shall now be discussing cases where they help to
effectively outweigh the negatives involved in the killing.
"T.hese characteristics mitigate some of those negative
factors which I said were present when we terminate support, but are
not present when we refuse to begin life support to start with.
They mitigate these factors by giving a moral justification for their
presence. For example, when we cause or have an interest in the
occurrence of the cause of death, interfere with the person etc., we
nevertheless do it to someone who does not have their life by appro-
priate means, and for the purpose of correcting unjust/unrightful
situations. The fact that we use the person as a means and that
treating him merely as a means is ordinarily morally wrong, should
be weighed against the fact that our action can also be interpreted
as treating him in keeping with respect for his nature as a person:
this is not only because the killing is not unjust, but because
another implication of his nature as a person besides his right not
to be treated merely as a means seems to be that his life should
not be lived improperly at the expense of others. lNhen we kill in
order to stop the improper support, we therefore, not only show a
concern for the welfare, rights and nature of the supporter, we
also are concerned with eliminating a status not befitting the
dependent. (Kant did not think it odd to say that we owe it to the
guilty to punish them, in recognition of their nature as persons.
Likewise, if someone is where he oughtn't to be, or receives support
in ways he oughtn't to, or is a part of a situation in which he has
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harmful effects, it may be that what befits him as a person is that
others take action against him, even if he is morally innocent.)
These characteristics of the case may mitigate the
non-justice negative factors present when we terminate support.
But, as noted, they do this in cases where killing is not permissible
(e. g. ,$lmO ALN case) as well as in cases where it is. The additional
factor, which when added to those which mitigate, actually outweighs
the non-justice anti-killing factors to make killing permissible is
the size of the efforts demanded of the supporter in any given case.
Hhen the efforts involved get larger, but are still less than what
must be present to make a non-ALN killing 'not unjust, we weigh the non-
justice negatives of terminating support against the efforts
involved, and because killing is not unjust in these ALN cases, we
will decide that killing is permissible. In particular, I suggest
that when we reach a certain effort level, it is not objectionable
to take advantage of the fact that killing is not unjust in these
ALN cases. We may ignore the tendency not to distinguish between
ALN and non-ALN cases, we may ignore the distaste associated with
treating a person of greater positive need more harshly, and judge
that killing is permissible.
In particular, in the cases we ,are concerned with where
months of body support is involved, given that the reason for killing
is the desire to avoid these efforts, killing would seem to be
permissible, as well as not unjust.
In stmlmary, I have presented two sorts of reasons to
account for the impermissibility of killing--without injustice--to
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terminate support, when efforts are low but still greater than we
would have to give, either from decency or duty, rather than let
someone die. These reasons were (1) avoiding non-justice negative
characteristics of terminating support, present in 'BNA killing and/or kill-
ing cases, and (2) the fact that having the permissibility of killing
coincide with the non-injustice of killing would involve taking
advantage of the fact that someone was in the worse of two states,
in order to treat them more harshly, even though they had an equal
or greater excuse for residence than someone we could not remove.
r argued that these non-justice objections to killing--the first sort
being present in non-ALN as well as ALN cases, the second only
in ALN cases (and tending to make us not distinguish between
the permissibility of killing in ALN and non-ALN cases)--did not
make killing unj ust in AL~~ cases such as the $1000 case. This is because
the non- injustice of the killing depended on how the person came
to have a benefit and the purpose for which we want to eliminate it.
Having given reasons why killing may be impermissible in ALN cases
when it is not unjust, I then presented reasons why killing would
be permissible in some ALN cases when it wouldn't be permissible in
non-ALN cases. Some of these reasons, those which mitigate the
non-justice·negative objections to killing by giving them a
legitimate role, are present in cases where killing is still not
permissible. What helps outweigh the non-justice negatives, and
lets us take advantage of the fact that killing would not be unjust,
is the size of the efforts. That is, there will be a range of efforts
which are large enough so that they make killing both not unjust
and permissible in ALN cases, even though they are not large enough
to make killing just or permissible in non-ALN cases. I concluded
that our cases, where simple body support is involved are of this
sort, and therefore killing in these cases is permissible.
IV
I now will discuss some of the possibilities for further
research raised by the approach I have taken to killing in ALN-support
cases.
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I have argued that for some range of effort levels, killing
to stop these efforts will (1) be not unjust in ALN cases when it is
unjust in non-ALN cases and (2) be morally unobjectionable or permis-
sible when it will be morally objectionable and impermissible in non-
ALN cases. I believe that consideration of these differences between
ALN and non-ALN cases will, first of all, provide us with a new way
to show that killing, per se is not morally equivalent to letting die,
per se. This is because what makes the difference between the injus-
tice and/or objectionableness of killing in non-ALN cases and the non-
injustice and/or unobjectionableness of killing in ALN cases is the
addition to the"ALN Case of a property which belongs to all let die
cases--and all not-aiding cases--~ definition, i.e., that the person
will lose only what he would get via support. That is, a definitional
property of letting die, but no definitional property of killing, is
evidence for the non-injustice/unobjectionableness of a killing.
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In order for this fact to bear on the question of whether
killing is morally equivalent to letting die, per se I think we would
have to show that (a) this definitional property of letting die is
evidence for non-injustice/unobjectionableness on its home ground also,
i.e., is evidence for the non-injustice/unobjectionableness of letting
die, and (b) that letting die has no properties peculiar to it which
killing does not share which are evidence for injustice/unobjection-
ableness.
In order to show (a) it seems to me that one would first
have to show that a "difference in the context" provided by the ALN
killing case and the let die case for the definitional property in
question is not sigpificant. The difference in context which seems
crucial is the following: in the ALN kill case the person loses only
what he would have gotten via support it is already agreed he has no
right to have merely in order to save his life. In the case where we
want to see if the fact that someone loses only what he would get via
support helps determine the right to let die, it is
not already agreed that he has no right to support in order to save
his life.
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I suggest that in order to show that t-his difference does
not rule out that "losing only what he would get via support" is evi-
dence for the unobjectionableness of letting d~e we must examine the
significance of there being no right to the use of support Erior to
whatever is the final decision on the issue in question, whether this
is "can we kill" or "can we let die. II If the fact· that the person
would lose only what he would get via support he had no prior claim
1to is evidence for (1) the unobjectionableness of letting die and/or
(2) the superior strength of a right not to be deprived of what one
would have via a source one did have a prior claim to, then we would
have reason to think that (1) the right not to be killed is stronger
than a right. (if such exists) to rlave one 1 s life saved and that (2)
qlosing only what he would have gotten via support" is evidence for the
non-objectionableness of letting die as well as of ALN killing.
Consideration of the presence or absence of a prior claim to the source
of continuing life would, I believe, also show how a right not to be
killed is dependent on a more fundamental right to one's body. This
dependence would in turn reveal that the most basic right(s) we have is
not necessarily the most important/stringent right we have. 2
This attempt to deal with the "difference in contexts" would
be one step in showing that "losing only what we would have gotten via
support" is evidence for the non-objectionableness of letting die. We
II use I' prior claim" to mean claim prior to our final de-
cision about whether someone has a claim.
2See Appendix
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might also have to deal with,the general proQle1;Il that just:b~calls~ ~
definitional property of an act/omission is evidenc~. for the non-
objectionableness of another act/omission, this need not, in general,
mean that the definitional property has. this samerol~ on its home
ground.
In summary, I have suggested that consideration· of ALN
killing cases will (1) help provide a new way of arguing for the claim
that killing and letting die are not morally equivalent per se and
(2) illuminate the relation between a right not to be killed and a
right to one's body, and (3) help us in developing a procedure to tell
when a definitional property of one factor, which is evidence for un-
objectionableness in one context is also evidence in another context.
In addition, I believe consideration of ALN cases will help
us decide which procedures to use in constructing comparable cases.
In particular it will eliminate cross-definitional equalization as an
acceptable approach to constructing cases to be used in seeing if acts/
omissions are morally equivalent per see This should be so for two
fundamental reasons: (1) If a definitional property of one act/omission
is evidence for the unobjectionableness or objectionableness of acts/
omissions, introducing it into the context of the case involving the
other act/omission will just conceal the difference per se of the two
acts/omissions. It may make the Rresen_~e of one act/omission rather
than another morally insignificant without this meaning that the acts/
omissions are morally equivalent, per see (2) If the definitional
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property of one act/omission is not evidence for unobjectionableness
on its home ground but only outside its home ground introducing it
there will conceal the fact that different reasons are required to make
one act/omission unobjectionable than are required to make the other act/
omission unobjectionable, and hence conceal that the acts/omissions'
are not morally equivalent. The possibility that 'the same factor can
play different roles, e.g., a purely definitional role or a role as
evidence for (un) objectionableness, in cases involving different acts/
omissions should alert us to the need to specify not merely equal fac-
tors, but equal role for equal factors, in constructing comparable
cases.
Conclusion
In conclusion, examination of cases in which people provide
other people with life saving support serves at least five general
functions: (1) It shows how far "it's mine" provides protection
for a person whose body is used. But
the fact that the person who will be killed can say of his life and
his body that "it's mine" does not mean that his right not to have
them used is not overridden. (2) It served as the opportunity to con-
sider a principle which it seems ought to be part of our view of cor-
rective justice and see how it extends to include removal of things
that belong to people. (3) It leads to consideration of contrasting
cases, the ALN and non-ALN cases, which I have said (a) make clearer
the different roles that losses suffered(efforts made)play in
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justifying killing, depending on the function the losses/efforts have,
and (b) throws light on when non-threatening individuals can be killed.
(4) The contrasting ALN and non-ALN cases can also, I have 3uggested,
serve to isolate the effect of ~efinitionalpropertiesof killing and
letting die, and provide a new, technique for seeing whether killing
differs morally from letting -die~per see That is, a suggestion for
further investigation ,has been that rather than compare comparable
kill and let die cases, we compare two killing cases, to one of which
a definitional property of letting die has been added. If the defini-
tional property of letting die makes a difference to the permissibility
of killing then we know that a definitional property of letting 'die,
but not of killing, is evidence for the moral permissibility of acts,
and this, at least, suggests that letting die differs morally, per se,
from killing. (5) It helps us understand more about the principles for
constructing comparable cases.
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APPENDIX
In order to make clearer some of the details of a discussion
which would show that a definitional property of letting die is
evidence for the unobjectionablness of acts and omissions, I will now
present such a discussion insofar as it bears on whether a definitional
property of letting die is evidence for the non-injustice of acts or
omissions. Parallel conclusions can be drawn from parallel arguments
for the claims that (a) a definitional property of letting die provides
evidence for the moral unobjectionablness of letting die, per se,
and (b) that killing and letting die differ in moral objectionablness,
per se.
If the efforts required for the non-injustice of killing in
non-ALN cases is greater than is required in ALN cases, three possible
conclusions to be drawn from this are: Conclusion 1: (a) the person
we kill in the ALN cases would lose only what he would retain via
support, (b) losing only what one would retain via support is a
property present in all let die cases, by definition,l (c) if this
factor makes killing not-unjust when it would not otherwise be so
(i.e., when it would be unjust in some non-ALN cases, even though in
both the ALN and non-ALN cases the efforts we would kill to avoid are
(1) the same size and (2) efforts someone has no right to have merely
in order to save his life), this means that a definitional property
lIt is also a definitional property of all not aiding cases.
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of letting die is evidence for the non-injustice of an action, while
a definitional property of killing is not.
Conclusion 2: Since losing only what he would have gotten via
support is a definitional property of letting die, it is also evidence
that letting die itself is not unjust.
So, if we had to justify that which we have been assuming all
along, namely that we can let die to begin with (at least when efforts
involved are of a certain size) part of the justification would be that
the person would lose only what he would get via the support. This
is not to say that it is conclusive evidence that letting die (or any
not aiding) is non-unjust. If it is not conclusive evidence, then it
is not evidence that not aiding is .always not unjust. Note that in
the case of killing, the presence of the definitional property of
letting die ..is conclusive evidence for the non-injustice of killings.
That is, all killings in ALN (versus non-ALN) cases as described above
will be not unjust. This difference in the degree of evidence the
definitional property provides will be discussed below.
Conclusion 3: If the definition of letting die provides
evidence for the non-injustice of letting die, when killing does not
provide evidence for the non-injustice of killing, then letting die,
per se, differs from killing, per se, so far as there is more evidence
for its non-injustice, per se, than for the non-injustice of killing,
per see
B. 2. Are these three possible conclusions correct?
One ground for objecting to Conclusions 2 and 3 is as follows:
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I have so far identified the definitional property of letting die which
is evidence for the non-injustice of killing, in cases where the efforts
are ones the person has no right to have merely in order to save his
life, as "losing only "That he would have had via the efforts. U But
we should consider that this definitional property has no effect at
allan changing unjust killings into non-unjust ones in cases where
the efforts are ones the person has a right to have in order to save
his l'ife. The fact that he will lose out on having only what he would
have gotten via the efforts is no reason for thinking killing is not
unjust when he has a right to the effort. So it 'seems natural to suppose
that it is only in cases where we already know that the person has no
right to the aid in order to save his life that losing only what he
would get from that aid is evidence for the non-injustice of an act or
omission which makes the aid not occur. But if this were so, we would
not need the evidence, since we would already kno~ that it was not
unjust to not aid. Further, in cases where we already know the person
has a right to aid, the fact that he would lose only what he would get
via aid if we did not aid does not mean it is not unjust not to aid.
But in cases where our aim is to decide whether we can let die to begin
with, i.e., in cases where we do not already know that the person has
no right to the aid, we do not know that the person would be losing
only what he would get from aid he has no right to, since we are just
in the process of deciding if he has a right to the aid. Since, in
the killing cases it is losing only what he would have had via efforts
he had no right to that makes a difference, we have no reason to think
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"losing only what he would get via efforts" by itself, in the case of
letting die to begin with, is any evidence for the non-injustice of
letting die. And so, we have no reason to think that there is more
evidence for the non-injustice of letting die, per se, than for the
non-injustice of killing, per se (Conclusion 3).
This argument against Conclusions 2 and 3 rests on the fact that
in the ALN killing case we assume that we have already determined that
we may let die to begin with--so the person has no right to support
merely in order to save his life. But, in the let die case, "losing
only what he would get via support" is supposed to be involved in
determining that we may let die to begin with.
The strategy for showing that this argument is incorrect is,
essentially to show that (a) in cases where there is a prior right to
that which can save a life, for reasons other than that it can save a
life, the person has a stronger right not to be without its product
(i.e., his life being saved) than in cases where there is no prior
claim to it; and (b) in the case where we kill an unsupported person
he will have a prior right to that (his body) which produces his
continuing life so he will have a stronger right not to be without the
life that comes via his body than someone else would have not to be
without the life that comes via a body they have no prior claim to. This
means that the fact that "tIle person would lose out on only what he
would get from a source X" would be evidence for the non-injustice of
letting die, where X is someone else's body and he has no prior claim
to its use but not evidence for the non-injustice of killing, where X
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is the person '-s own body. (c) So the right not to be killed will be
stronger than the right to get life supporting aid when there was no
prior right to the support. This will be so for the same reason as it
is worse to refuse life saving support to someone who has a right to
our aid for reasons independent of life-saving than it is to refuse
life-saving support to someone who has no prior right to our aid.
1. First, note that in the case of letting die to begin with
we know that the person who is not aided will lose out on what he would
get from efforts he-has-no-right-to-except~possibly-because-we~cannot­
let-him-die, just as in the ALN-killing case we know the person killed
will lose out on only what he would have gotten from efforts he-has-
no-right-to-except-possibly-because-we-cannot-kill-him; that is, in
both these cases the person has no claim to the efforts prior to the
final decision. The person in the ALN-killing case, who has no right
to bodily support merely in order to save his life, might have gotten
a right to the support because we could not kill, i.e", all things
considered, he might have had the right. We decided that all things
considered he does not have the right, in part, because he loses only
what he would have gotten from efforts he has no right to not all
things considered. It is only at the not-all-things-considered level,
prior to our decision about the act in question, that absence of a
right is required, in order for us to decide if there is a right to
support all things considered, or if there is a right to kill. Likewise,
it may be claimed in the let die case, it is the absence of any right
to the efforts, other than a right that may come becuase it is
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that the person in being denied the life-saving aid loses out only on
what he would have gotten via us is not evidence for the non-injustice
of not aiding because of the existence of the prior right, the violation
of which would be an injustice,
B. It is possible to analyze cases of type (a), where we kill
someone who is self-supporting as cases where the person who is killed
has a prior claim to the source of what he loses out on, what we would
deprive him of. That is, (1) he has a claim to his body, independent
of there being any question that the denial of this claim will involve
his los~ng his life and (2) if we kill him he loses out on, we deprive
him of, his life which is the product of the functioning of that body.
If the final claim to aid is weaker in letting die cases where
there is no prior claim to the source of life than it is in cases like
(b) above, and if the prior claim to the source of life is at least as
strong in a case like (a) as it is in a case like (b), then the final
claim to aid would be weaker in letting die cases where there is no
prior claim than the claim not to be killed is in non-ALN killing
1
cases. This means that even if there is a final right to life-saving
aid in some cases where there was no prior claim to aid, this might
well be weaker than the righ~ not to kill an unsupported person in a
comparable case.
ITo show that the right not to be killed is stronger than the
right to have aid one has a pri.or claim to, one would have to show that
the latter prior claim was not as str~ng as the claim to one's body.
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This need not mean that we cannot override the right not to
be deprived of the product (life) of a source (body) which it is agreed,
independent of a decision as to whether we may kill, that we have a
right (claim) to.
This analysis of the strength of the right not to be killed
of the unsupported individual vis-a-vis the strength of a right to aid
(if the latter exists finally) involves deriving the right not to be
killed from a more basic right: i.e~, a right to one's body for
reasons other than that without it one would die. The alternative to
deriving the right of the ordinary non-supported person not to be
killed from a more basic right is to say that people have a right not
to be killed even if they do not have a right to their bodies for
reasons other than without them they would die.
It is important to note that it is no argument against deriving
a right not to be killed from a right to one's body that the former
might be more valuable than the latter or is the most valuable part
of the latter. This is because (1) the more basic/general right from
which the ,right not to be killed is derived may be less important than
the right that derives from it, and (2) that the more basic/general
right might be overridden without it being permissible to override the
right derived from it. So, we might be able to use a person's kidney,
thus overriding a right to his body that he has for reasons independent
of the fact that he would die without his body. This would not mean
that we could kill him, since his going on living is more important
than his losing a kidney. (Likewise, someon~'s right to his body may
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be overridden in that we can order him to work (slavery), and ·yet his
right to th.e product of his labor might remain,'even though the only
reason he has a right to the product of his labor is that he has a right
to the body which produces it.) Analogously, someone may have a right
to the diamonds produced on a plot of land ,only. because he had a right
to the land. Yet we may be able to override his property right and
use his land, while still not being able to take away the diamonds.
This is because the diamonds are more valuable than the land itself.
The most valuable right we have, and the one it is most difficult to
override, need not be the most baSic right we have. We may have one
right only because we have a more basic right and yet we can override
the latter and not be able to override the former.
The claim to aid where there is no right to the aid prior to
a decision about a final right will be weaker than a 'right not to kill
the unsupported person. This is because the latter person has a prior
right to the source of the life he would lose out on. When we speak
of "someone losing only what he would bet via support," in let die
cases, most of the cases we in fact are talking of are ones where there
is no right to ·aid prior to a final decision. It is because this is
true, and because (1) Hlosing only what he would get via support': is
a definitional property of letting die, and (2) a prior claim to the
source of the life one would'O::tJ.ose out on gives one a stronger righ.t
not to lose out on that life, that "someoq~ losing only what he would
get via support" is evidence for the non-injustice of letting die,
per see Evidence which is lacking for killing, per see This means
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that the objection to Conclusion 2 and 3 based on the claim that the
fact that someone will lose only what he would get via the aid cannot
be evidence for the non-injustice of letting die unless we already
know that the person has no final right to the aid, fails. So "this
objection to concluding that this definitional property of letting
die is evidence for the non-injustice of letting die because it is
evidence for the non-justice in killing cases, fails. 1
The argument against the objection has shown us an important
step in arguing for the view that the right of a person not getting
ALN support not to be killed is stronger than someone's right to life
saving aid. This step is to show that the right of a person who has
a prior claim to aid not to lose out on the benefit of having the aid
(life) is stronger than the right not to lose out on the benefit of
having the aid of someone who has no prior claim to the aid. 2
lElsewhere, ·1 have dealt with another objection to deriving
the conclusion that a definitional property of letting die is evidence
for its non-injustice/unobjectionableness because it is- evidence for
non-injustice!unobjectionableness of other acts/omissions. So the
conclusion that it is evidence should be considered tentative.
2Though I will not go into detail at this point, I believe
focusing on the issue of the prior claim may be more successful in
showing that a claim to aid is weaker than a claim not to be killed
than an alternative argument. The latter just consists in arguing that
someone has no right to aid but he does have a right not to be killed.
Those who deny that there is no right to aid will not be convinced by
the mere assertion that there is none. But if they grant that (a) there
is a prior claim to one's body and (b) cases in which we have a prior
claim to aid are ones where we have a stronger right to aid for life
support than ones where there is no prior claim to the aid, then they
should grant that even if there is aright to aid without a prior claim
to support (i.e., a right to aid in standard cases where the question
arises) it will be weaker than a right not to be killed.
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I have argued that it is because "losing only what he would
get via support" is usually' associated with not having a prior claim
to the support, that it can be evidence for the non-injustice of
letting die.
"He would lose out on having only what he would get via efforts
he is not known to have a right to prior to the decision about whether
we can kill or let die," is a property of the letting die case., which
could be claimed to be evidence for the non-injustice (as well as non-
objectionableness, as we can also show) of botll letting die and killing.
The addition of the description of the efforts as ones he has no prior
right to, -- which is not a definitional property of letting die
to the definitional property of letting die -- his losing only what he
would have gotten via support -- still means' that a definitional
property of letting die is evidence for the non-injustice (and as we
can also show, the non-objectionableness) of a killing, since it is
a necessary part of a condition which suffices as evidence. So, even
if we took this newly characterized property as evidence for non-
injustice (and unobjectionableness), the definitional property would
still also be evidence for non-injustice of killing and of letting
die.
We might, on the other hand, say that "losing only 't--lhat he
would have gotten via the efforts" suffices in itself as evidence in
situations appropriately described, i.e., where there is no prior right
(i.e., no right prior to the decision in question) to the efforts.
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Either way, the argument proposed does not show that a definitional
property of letting die (lose only what he would have gotten via the
efforts) is not evidence for non-injustice of killing and letting die
itself.
b. The type of argument given here in opposition to one
objection to Conclusions 2 and 3 has the same form as that used in the
Justice Argument. That is, it emphasizes that we decide whether someone
has a right to something (not to be killed, to be aided) in part by
reflecting on the fact that, independent of the possibility that his
right stems from the injustice of killing or not aiding, they have no
grounds for a right. It is an implicit criticism of (1) those who
say, in the case of killing, "You can t t argue tha t we may take away
the product of the residence, because that aSsumes he has no right to
be there, but he may have a right t.o be there, and then his losing
out only on the product of it would not at all be evidence that he
can be killed," and (2) those who say in the case of letting die, "he
may have a right to the support because he needs ~t, and so in losing
out on only what he would have gotten via the support, he loses out
on what he had a right to, so losing out on the product of the support
is no evidence that we can let die.'~ The criticism it offers of these
positions is as follows: (1) It is those who put forward these positions
who fail to take seriously the possibility that there is no right, all
things considered, not to be killed or to have aid. The argument I
present does not assume there is no right all things considered.
(2) They fail to consider whether the situation which exists prior
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to a final determination that there is a right or not (i,e., the
situation not all things considered) itself helps determine that there
is no right all things considered.
The argument I have presented emphasizes, as in the Justice
Argument, that it is important to distinguish between the rights that
are reasons why we may not do something, and so exist prior to the
decision that we may not do something, and the rights that, in effect,
just report that we may not do something, and so are not reasons in
the same sense for why we cannot do it. The first right is a reason
at a different level than the second right. So, e.g., if someone had
a right to my chair because I promised it to him, quite independent
of his needing it to save his life, then refusing to give it to him,
if this consisted in his being left to die, would be wrong, at least
because it violated his right to have us keep our promise. That is,
it would consist in our violating a different right that he had than
the right not to be left to die. If the person having a right not to
be left to die exists in its own right, i.e., if it does not depend
on violating any other of his rights, it will not exist because doing
so vl0uld violate a right not "to be left to die. Still, letting die
might be said to be impermissible because it involved violating the
person's right not to be left to die. That is, pointing to this
right does not give the reason why we decided there is a right to aid;
it reports the particular failure which characterizes letting die, i.e.,
letting die violates a right. Pointing to this right does not give
a reason for impermissibility; it characterizes it. The reason for
· .
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the impermissibility will be whatever grounds we had for deciding that
he had a specific right not to be left to die.
The above discussion has attempted to emphasize the similarity
between the case where we kill the person who gets ALN-support and the
case where we let someone die who has no claim to the aid except,
possibly, because he will die without it~ In both cases there is agreed
tobe no right to the support prior to the final decision about the
efficacy of the final grounds offered for such a right. But it should
be noted that there is a significant difference between the two types
of cases. It is the following: ~fuen we know that the person who
receives ALN support has no right to the support, except possibly
because it would be unjust to kill him, we always also can know
(according to the Justice Argument) that it will not be unjust to kill
him, i.e., we can know there will be no final right not to be killed
and no final right to be in residence. But in the case of letting die,
it is possible that even though someone has no prior claim (i.e~, no
claim all things not considered) to aid, that he will have a final
right to aid. That is, the fact that he loses only what he would get
'from what he has no prior claim to does not mean he will not wind up
having a right to the aid, even if it is evidence for his not having
a right to it. That is, it is an element on the side of his not having
a right to aid, an element on the side of the non-injustice of not
aiding, but there may be factors on the other side which outweigh
this element.
335
We can account for the divergence between the letting die case
and the killing in the ALN case in the following way: In the letting
die case where there is no prior claim to support, this. means that
reasons (actually present) other than the need to have his life saved
are not suf~icient to give him a right to aid. In the ALN killing
cases there is (by assumption) no prior claim to aid even when there
is a need to have his life saved. Because killing involves removing
the benefit of aid which one has no right to in order to have one's
life saved, the person has no right to the aid rather than be killed.
There is no injustice in removing this benefit. If it was only decided
in the ALN-kill case that the person had no right to the support in
order to save his leg but it had not been agreed he had no right to
it to save his life it would not necessarily be not unjust to kill
him to stop support. This is because he might have a right to aid
in order to save his life (i.e., a right prior to a right not to be
removed by killing) and then we could not take away the benefit of the
aid. In the case of letting die, where we have not yet decided if he
has a right to aid in order to save his life, it is always possible
the final right to aid in order to save his life exists, even though
there is no final right to aid in the ALN-kill case. A final right
could stem from a need stronger than the one which fails to give a
prior claim, but a final right cannot s·tern from our inability to take
away the benefit of the life-saving aid.
The fact that a final right to aid is not ruled out by the
absence of a prior claim to aid does not mean that such a right exists.
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And even if such a right did exist, I have argued above, it would be
weaker than the right of the unsupported person not to be killed since
the right not to lose the benefit of what one has a prior right to will
be stronger than the right not to lose the benefit of what one has no
prior right to, at least when the same loss is involved.
Glossary
ALN - Actual Life Need. ALN cases are those in which a person is
receiving life support at the time when the question of killing
him arises.
ALSN - Actual Life Saving Need cases. ALSN cases are those in
which a person is receiving life support at the time when the ques-
tion of killing him arises and he would die without this support
even if the procedure used to terminate support did not itself kill
him. ALSNcases are a subcategory of ALN cases.
atc - all things considered.
BNA - Best Not Aid case. This refers to a case where we are already
providing someone with life support, but his. life is threatened by
a new threat. In order to save him from this new threat we need
only do something very minimal. We refrain from doing this in order
to have him die so we can stop supporting him.
BTP - Brody type point. This refers to the objection to Thomson's
Argument I which says that just because we needn't support merely
in order to save a life this does not mean we needn't support
rather than kill.
HLN - Historical Life Need. HLN cases are those involving someone
who would have died if he hadn't begun to receive life support from
someone.
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nate - not all things considered
NOPC - Non-Overridden Prior Claim. We may have a prior claim to some-
thing visa vis other people but other factors can override this. If
they do not,we have a non-overridden prior claim.
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